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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the economic effects of rent control and 
other rental housing market policies. 
The analysis is conducted in a neoclassical framework, although 
some peculiarities of the housing market are taken into account. 
The case for government intervention is considered from both 
efficiency and equity points of view. The case for intervention on 
efficiency grounds is found to be very weak. If government has a re-
distributive objective, housing is one medium by which transfers can 
be effected. 
Rent control is the alternative policy which receives most 
attention. No valid case for rent control exists and rent control is 
found to be inferior to properly implemented policies of housing 
allowances and public housing. 
The apparent objective of rental housing market policies is the 
bestowal of tenant benefits at the most favourable ratio of benefits 
to costs. Considerable attention is given to the conceptualization and 
measurement of tenant benefits from various policies. 
Another matter which receives considerable attention is the issue 
of supply response. Various methods of tackling this question are re-
viewed and time-series analysis of Australian Capital Territory data 
is undertaken. 
) 
The history of rent control in Australia is reviewed, beginning 
with New South Wales Fair Rents Act of 1915. Two rent control case 
studies are reported - Canberra, 1973-1976 and post-war New South Wales. 
The emphases of the two case studies differ. 
Rental market regulation, a comprehensive form of intervention in 
the landlord-tenant contractual arrangement, is described and analysed, 
with special reference to Australian instances. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thes is i s concerned with analysing the economic impl icat ions 
f 
of rent c o n t r o l . The enquiry has embraced several major concerns. 
F i r s t l y , some conception of the operation of the rental housing market 
has had to be developed. Broadly speaking, the ana ly t i ca l approach has 
been " n e o c l a s s i c a l " in character . However they might be d i sgu ised , 
demand and supply form the basis of a l l the analys i s . These immensely 
powerful t oo l s are found to be very useful in analysing the renta l housing 
market. Secondly, the e f f e c t s of renta l housing market p o l i c i e s ( in 
par t i cu lar , rent contro l ) have been explored in the context of the 
n e o c l a s s i c a l type of model. Thirdly, actual cases have been i n v e s t i -
gated in order to test the predict ions of the models. Case studies 
are drawn from A u s t r a l i a ' s vast and ongoing experiences Vith various kinds 
of rent c o n t r o l . A fourth cohcern i s with the broad question of the 
government's r o l e in the rental housing market. Are there e f f i c i e n c y 
and/or equity reasons f o r the government intervening in renta l housing? 
F ina l ly , i f the government i s intervening on the basis of equity 
cons iderat ions , in what manner should i t intervene given cer ta in 
e f f i c i e n c y c r i t e r i a ? How does rent contro l rank against a l t e rnat ive 
p o l i c i e s l i k e housing allowances and public housing provis ion? 
The major thesis i s that rent contro l i s a c o s t l y ( i n e f f i c i e n t ) 
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e dev i ce , whether i t i s compared with other rental market 
p o l i c i e s or with more general means of red is t r ibut ing income. The 
considerat ion of theore t i ca l and empirical matters leads inescapably 
to th i s conc lus ion . 
2. 
It may be protested that this is not a particularly novel thesis. 
However, this contention can be countered in several ways. Perhaps the 
most striking defence is the observation that rent control, in the guise 
of "rental market regulation", is making a significant come-back both in 
Australia and overseas. Furthermore, there are still advocates of old-
fashioned rent control to be found. An objective assessment of the 
effects of rent controls may help prevent the adoption of this type of 
policy. It is contended that this thesis represents such an objective 
assessment. 
Hopefully, the thesis is not devoid of other contributions. In 
Chapter 2 the analytical literature on rent control is reviewed and 
attempts have been made to evaluate, elaborate and extend the analysis 
of others. Chapter 3 explores the conceptualization and measurement 
of tenant benefits, extending a basic procedure to new situations and 
providing an alternative exposition of consumer's surplus where quantity 
constraints operate. Some of the material in that chapter is based on 
work done jointly with a colleague, Richard Comes. Chapter 4 grapples 
with the difficult but crucial question of supply response in the rental 
housing market. The chaptef,' reviews the Australian and overseas litera-
ture on supply response and presents some results of regression analysis 
of Australian Capital Territory data. The fifth chapter summarizes the 
history of rent control legislation in the Australian States and Terri-
tories. In addition, there is a review of the attitudes of Australian 
economists towards rent control. This chapter acts as a background to 
three case studies of Australian experiences with "rent control" legis-
lation. The first of these. Chapter 6, looks at the situation created 
by rent control in post-war New South Wales. The major concern is with 
conceptualizing and measuring the value of a tenancy. The exploration 
of this question required grappling with some very interesting puzzles. 
Chapter 7 is an analysis of the effects of rent control in the Aust-
ralian Capital Territory over the period 1973-1976. The major 
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analyt iea l problems encountered were the estimatlon of market rent and 
the estimation of tenant b e n e f i t s . Hopefully the so lut ions found have 
some meri tor ious aspects . Chapter 8 examines the whole question of 
" r e n t a l market r egu la t i on" , a watered-down vers ion of rent c o n t r o l which 
i s proving popular in this era of "consumer p r o t e c t i o n " . D i f f e r e n t 
schemes of regulat ion are described and their l i k e l y e f f e c t s on the rental 
housing market are suggested. A l i t t l e empirical information i s brought 
to bear on the question. Chapters 9 and 10 are the most po l i cy -o r i ented 
in the thes i s . Largely on the basis of the preceding mater ia l , these 
chapters examine the case f o r and against rent c o n t r o l and d iscuss 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s ( l i k e housing allowances and public housing) . In 
l i n e with the overa l l thes is , rent contro l does not emerge as a po l i cy 
which can be recommended. Chapter 11 summarizes some of the more 
important f ind ings and sets out the thesis in more d e t a i l . 
1. Rental Market Analysis , 
The whole analys is i s based on a market where housing serv i ces are 
I ' ' 
demanded and supplied. In the renta l housing market, housing serv i ces 
are traded on a lease bas i s . The major d i f f e r e n c e between rental and 
owner-occupancy i s one of property r i gh ts . In the renta l market^ land-
lords transfer cer ta in property r ights to tenants v ia a contractual 
arrangement. This contract involves payment of a rent by the tenant 
and may involve the tenant agreeing to meet other o b l i g a t i o n s . In 
return the tenant enjoys cer ta in r i gh ts to the use of the land lord ' s 
proper ty . 
Demand f o r housing serv ices w i l l be re lated to a number of f a c t o r s 
other than r e n t . These fa c to rs w i l l include the pr ices of other ways 
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of procuring housing services - namely owner-occupancy and possibly 
renting from a public authority. The level of income will als6 « 
influence the demand for rental housing services. Other factors like, 
for example, attitudes to marriage, will also be important. In Chapter 
2 the demand curve features prominently in the discussion of rent 
control models. As portrayed there, the demand curve has all the usual 
properties. In Chapter 3 we analyse the reaction of the consumer 
to various rental market housing policies. This is in order to concen-
trate on the conceptualization of tenant benefits. However it doubles 
as a means of understanding factors underlying the demand for rental 
housing (assuming the individual confines himself to the rental 
market). 
There are some special factors in relation to demand for rental 
housing. One of these has already been alluded to - services are traded 
in this market, not stock. This aspect is" easily handled. However, 
a second difference is a bit more difficult to handle. . Demand for 
housing is influenced by high transaction costs. In the case of rental 
housing we. can concentrate on moving costs. The existence of positive 
moving costs will mean that some adjustments that would have occurred 
otherwise will not'take place. The higher are these costs, the more 
adjustments will-be deferred. Moving costs will comprise physical costs 
of moving plus the "psychic" costs attached to a move. Moving costs 
will be important in some circumstances (e.g. in specifying the housing 
demand function and in analysing the effects of housing allowances^) 
but are probably not all that important in dealing with rent control. 
2 They must always be kept in mind • 
1 In a paper on the response of U.S. public housing tenants to housing 
allowances, Murray (1977) sees a "potential hazard" in emigration 
from Government housing to private housing due to the availability 
of housing allowances. Not only is it difficult to see this as a 
"hazard", but also Murray neglects to consider the impact of moving 
costs on the extent of emigration. This is an important omission. 
2 For a rather curious analysis of the effects of moving costs see 
Robinson (1979, pp.7-9). 
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Another special factor relates to location. Urban economists have 
made much of the idea of a "rent profile" where observed rents decline 
with distance from the city centre. Travelling times (and costs) in-
crease with distance from the city so that rents in inner-urban areas 
can be bid up as the city expands. This phenomenon has implications 
for the supply relationship so will be discussed in relation to that 
issue (Chapter 4). 
Finally, some might argue that the consumption of housing is 
"special". Shelter is a fundamental human requirement, more akin to 
"need" than "demand". Stretton (1974) seems to be an adherent to this 
point of view. We will return to this question in the next section of 
this chapter. 
On the supply side there are also some special factors. The amount 
of housing services supplied can be altered by modifying existing stock 
and by changing the amount of stock. It is crucial to appreciate that 
new building is not the only source of increased housing, services. 
However, the degree to which housing services can be increased in the 
short-run is severely limited. New building in any one year may only 
represent at most about 3 or 4 per cent of the total stock. As supply 
response in the short-run is very limited, this must be reflected in the way 
the rental housing market is modelled. It must also be recognized that as 
we are only concerned with rental housing there is another source of 
rental housing - conversion from owner-occupancy. 
Capital gains are also fundamental to the consideration of supply. 
The landlord's rate of return has two components - a rent received from 
the tenant plus the change in the value of his property. One way of 
interpreting a "supply curve" relating housing services and rent would 
be to assume a constancy of changes in capital value. A change in 
expectations would shift the supply curve, as would a change in factor 
prices. A fuller discussion is postponed until Chapter 4. Here we have 
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said enough to provide the background for use of supply curves in the 
next chapter. 
Finally, something must be said about another favourite idea of 
urban economists - "filtering".^ Filtering has been defined as a 
change in the real value of an existing dwelling unit. Dwellings can 
filter up or down. Such movements are associated with changes in the 
amount of housing services yielded by a dwelling. The importance of 
filtering has arisen because some economists have seen it as a "natural" 
means of improving the housing standards of the poor. Housing purchased 
by the more wealthy would eventually filter down to the poor. The 
government would not have to make special efforts to provide higher 
quality housing for the poor. The role of filtering is a controversial 
issue. 
2. The Role of Government in the Rental Housing Market 
Traditionally economics has drawn a sharp distinction between 
"efficiency" and "equity" considerations. Economists have been far more 
at home wit;h efficiency considerations than with those relating to 
distribution. The market has, been given a hallowed place but certain 
market failures have been recognized. Market failure presents a prima 
facie case for government intervention. Identification of a market 
failure is the usual starting point to find a role for government. 
The distribution of income has been seen as a matter for social 
("collective") decision. Once decided, the economist has a role in 
determining the most efficient means of bringing about the desired 
distribution of income. The role is again one of positive economic 
analysis. There is no reason why the economist's opinion about income 
distribution is any more authoritative than that of anyone else. 
1 As with so many aspects of the approach taken in this thesis, Olsen 
(1969a) is a good reference on "filtering". 
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Econoraists who make normative pronouncements about government's role 
in relation to distribution should be treated with some suspicion. « 
More recently, two attempts have been made to marry equity and 
efficiency. One such attempt has revolved around the idea of "merit 
goods". The other, associated with Hochman and Rodgers (1969), has 
placed equity in the efficiency framework. The concept of "Pareto-
optimal redistribution" has sustained a considerable debate and may 
constitute an argument for redistribution. 
We will initially look for a case for government intervention due 
to market failure. The concept of market failure is discussed by Bator 
(1958) and Arrow (1970). It arises where the competitive market system 
operates but fails to achieve Pareto-efficiency and where the competi-
tive system simply cannot operate. The usual categories of market 
failure are public goods, externalities, natural monopoly and infor-
mation problems. Let us examine each of these in the context of the 
f rental housing market. 
Natural monopoly is basically associated with increasing returns 
(decreasing costs). Proponents of intervention in the rental housing 
market have never put up this case for action. To the contrary, costs 
have usually been seen as increasing, very rapidly.^ This is the 
"supply pessimism" thene running through so much of the literature. 
Because of inelastic supply, landlords are seen as possessing quasi-
monopoly power (see Drane (1961a) and Whitman (1925)). Increases in 
demand will lead to landlords earning "monopoly profits" (although most 
economists would prefer the term, "quasi-rents"), unless'rent control 
is imposed. Subsidies to tenants are not recommended as they result 
1 Some writers assert that both supply and demand are very inelastic 
where rental housing is concerned. Taken to an extreme, this implies 
there is no market. However, more often this belief is used to prop 
up an argument that rent control is not all that bad or that housing 
allowances are useless. The "inelastic supply and demand school" 
seems to thrive in New Zealand - see Easton (1976) and Stephens 
(1976). 
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only in greater profits for landlords. This monopoly argument denies 
competitive market adjustment. Above-normal returns will attract new 
entry in the form of new building, structural conversion of existing 
dwellings, purchase of existing dwellings for purposes of rental and 
owner-occupiers making available part of their dwellings for renters. 
Only government intervention could impede such new entry. If this were 
done via severe building and planning regulations, existing landlords 
could be granted monopoly power via government fiat.^ At the very 
least these regulations will shift the supply curve to the left. New 
entry could, of course, also be impeded by rent control. As can be 
seen, "monopoly" problems in rental housing are a consequence of 
"government failure", not "market failure". 
Another category of market failure relates to information 
deficiencies. The market's reaction to high search costs has been the 
advent of middle-m6n (estate agents, in particular). Estate agents 
bring together buyers and sellers of housing services in both rental 
and owner-occupancy markets. If information is privately supplied in 
insufficient amounts (that is, benefits of greater provision would 
exceed costs, at the margin)".', the government .has a role in supplying 
information if the benefits of the intervention exceed the costs. A 
deficiency of information does not justify intervention such as rent 
control or public housing provision. 
It is possible that there is an externality argument for government 
intervention in the rental housing market. Government housing provision 
is sometimes said to create beneficial externalities in addition to 
direct tenant benefits. De Salvo (1971) claims non-tenant benefits of 
two types arise. Firstly, the providers of the subsidy get satisfaction 
from seeing the recipients consume "standard" housing (whether the reci-
1 More generally, local government building and planning regulations 
raise developers' costs, shifting the supply curve upwards. Only 
in extreme cases is development totally banned. 
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pients want to or not). Secondly there are "spillover effects,... « 
[which] ... encompass such things as elimination of blight and slums, 
mitigation of poverty, revival of downtown business areas of the central 
cities, achievement and/or maintenance of an adequate middle-income 
household component in the central city, etc." (p.179). Welfare housing 
proponents argue that total tenant and non-tenant benefits should be 
compared with programme cost in evaluating housing programmes. Non-
tenant benefits are, of course, very difficult to quantify. Further, 
it is not clear that government housing is the most cost-effective way 
of achieving such benefits. Non-tenant benefits may arise due to the gene-
ration of consumption externalities. Without specifying an underlying theory 
of the political mechanism, it may be such that middle-class donors get utility 
from the herding of low-income recipients into ^ segregated areas, away from 
middle-class suburbs. These non-tenant benefits might be measurable by 
determining how much providers are willing to pay purely to be able to 
segregate unwanted neighbours. It is not clear whether the other "non-
tenant benefits" mentioned by De Salvo really are benefits. Public 
housing programmes often seem to actually create slums. (Witness the 
inner-Sydney and Melbourne high-rise developments.) 
A policy like rent control clearly is associated with adverse 
externalities. Kiefer (1977) has examined the effect of rent control 
on housing deterioration and finds them undesirable (as would some 
casual empiricism). Deterioration of particular units leads to 
neighbourhood deterioration.^ However, Kiefer does praise the now-
defunct Housing Allowance Experiment. This "has special merit because 
1 Robinson (1979) has considered the inter-relationship between owners' 
maintenance decisions in a "game-theoretic" context._ He sees a re-
quirement for "some form of intervention in the housing market to 
overcome or remove certain imperfections" (p.103). This argument 
for intervention (the externalities argument) is put quite inde-
pendently of rent control considerations. 
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by concentrating the subsidy among poorer families who are the major 
consumers of older housing, maintenance is stimulated in older neigh-
bourhoods which are most prone to rapid deterioration" (pp.18-19). 
To my knowledge no-one has attempted a "public good" argument for 
government intervention in the rental housing market. Some economists would, 
however, call an externality argument a "public good" argument but this is 
rather loose use of the term. 
Where distributional value judgements are made to "justify" inter-
vention in the rental housing market, very little more can be said. 
If given social objectives in relation to income distribution, the 
economist can point to the cost-effectiveness of alternative means of 
realizing these objectives. 
Where redistribution is placed in an efficiency framework, positive 
economics comes to the fore. The questions of "merit wants", "Pareto-
optimal redistribution" and "in-kind transfers" ate treated at some 
length in Chapter 10. Consideration of these questions is not 
unrelated to "the issue of "housing being special", to which we have 
already alluded. If a recipient's consumption of housing services 
.1 
enters a donor's utility function there may be a case for "in-kind" or 
"tied" transfers. But why is housing special in this sense? If it is 
because "shelter" is a basic human "need" for subsistence, then why stop 
there? Presumably food and clothing must also be in the same category 
of "basic level needs". If housing is "special" then it is not special 
in the usual (dictionary) meaning of that word.^ 
1 Browning (1975) points out that "in 1960 the poorest 20 per cent of 
all families in the United States devoted 72 per cent of their expen-
ditures to food, housing and medical care alone ... [T]he quantita-
tive advantage of even an ideal set of in-kind transfers over a cash 
transfer is likely to be slight simply because most of a cash 
transfer will be spent on ... external benefit producing goods" 
(p.533, original italics). 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIO; OF ANALYTICAL LITERATURE ON RENT CONTROL 
« 
This chapter reviews the bulk of the literature on rent control. 
Attention is confined to academic publications which are analytical in 
approach. The concern is with the positive economic analysis of the 
implications of rent (and eviction) controls. As such, we ignore all 
policy considerations which are dealt with in later chapters. Further, 
the empirical literature is not reviewed at this point. It too is held 
over to arise in ensuing chapters. 
The approach is generally critical. Writings on the effects of 
rent control are put under considerable scrutiny and assessments of 
appropriateness are made. Of course, the "appropriateness" of a bit 
of analysis depends on the specific application. In this chapter we 
review the contents of the tool-kit. Choice of the actual tool is made 
when an application is carried out. 
1. The Simplistic Textbook Approach^ 
The usual textbook approach to rent control involves consideration 
of a totally partial-equilibrium model of the rental market. Homoge-
neous dwelling units. (Q) are traded in the market at a price per unit 
(or "rent") of R. The supply of housing, S, is a positive function of 
rent and demand for housing, D, is negatively related to rent. An 
initial equilibrium situation is depicted in Figure 2.1 with quantity 
Q* and rent R* clearing the market. 
The otherwise competitive market is now confronted with a rent 
control law which limits rents to R per dwelling unit, where R < R*. 
At R, Q® dwelling units are demanded but only Q^ units are supplied. 
D S 
Therefore, as the story goes, there is an "excess demand" of Q -Q 
dwelling units. Under both the Marshallian and Walrasian market adjust-
1 For several references on the "textbook" approach see the biblio-
graphy in Frankena (1975). Add to these Alchian and Allen (1969), 
Harrison (1977) and Le Grand and Robinson (1976), among others. 
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ment assumptions there would be a tendency to restore the initial 
equilibrium. The market forces are thwarted by the rent control law. 
The first prediction generated by this model is that the per period 
supply of rented dwellings falls from Q* to Q^. There is a simulta-
neous increase in demand to Q® and, as already discussed, there is 
an "excess demand". 
The tenants of the remaining Q^ dwellings enjoy a reduced rent 
of R. There is a total transfer of "income" from landlords to tenants 
of QS(R*-R), which is graphically area R*bcR. 
It may be pointed out that there are "deadweight" or "social costs" 
associated with the law. The loss in "Marshallian" tenants' surplus 
is triangle adb and the similarly defined loss in landlords' surplus 
is bdc. 
Various other points may be made. For example, Alchian and Allen 
(1969) argue that "criteria [other than price] will be used for discri-
minating among claimants for the available good" (p.113). They draw 
the "connection between rent'controls and manifestation of greater 
discrimination by personal characteristics" (p.114). Textbook writers 
may also have something to say about the "spill-over" of excess demand 
into uncontrolled markets. This aspect is taken up by Phelps Brown and 
Wiseman (1964), for example, who consider all the possible outlets of 
unsatisfied demand. Many writers take up the question of maintenance 
and argue that landlords will have an interest in the deterioration of 
controlled dwellings. Le Grand and Robinson (1976) argue that "[e]ven 
if they do not withdraw their property, landlords may choose to conserve 
their reduced profits by reducing their expenditures on maintenance and 
repair work" (p.92). 
There are various shortcomings with the simple textbook story. 
For example, there is often no distinction between the short- and the 
14. 
long-run ~ important dynamic considerations are ignored. Further, the 
implications of distinguishing between "dwelling units" and "housing 
services" are usually insufficiently drawn out. Yet another omission 
from the story is a close consideration of what "rent control" laws 
actually entail. They normally extend beyond controls on rents. 
Most of the aspects of the problem have been treated in the more 
specialized literature. It is to these other considerations that we 
now turn. Before doing this we explore the definition of "rent 
control". 
2. What is Rent Control? 
It is too simplistic to talk only in terms of "rent control". In 
particular, controls on evictions must also be considered. Laws on 
rental housing may also contain other relevant provisions. For example 
there may be controls on security bonds. Another popular element in 
such laws are provisions relating to repairs and maintenance. Often 
there are anti-discrimination clauses. When considering the effects 
of such laws the whole package of provisions must be taken into account. 
This becomes especially important when analysing modern "regulatory" 
legal packages which kttempt to affect virtually every element of the 
landlord-tenant contract.^ 
Rent and eviction controls must go together if laws are to be 
"effective". If only rents are controlled, landlords may evict tenants, 
defeating the objective of the rent control. If evictions are control-
led (to ensure "security of tenure") and rents are not, landlords can 
force out unwanted tenants by raising rents. 
To show the importance of eviction controls we reconsider the 
simple textbook model with an additional constraint: eviction control 
1 The recent phenomenon of "rental market regulation" is considered 
in depth in Chapter 8. 
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is also imposed such that landlords are unable to evict any tenants from 
the inifial Q* dwelling units. The supply curve now has a vertical 
section at Q* below R* (see Figure 2.2). The predictions now alter 
considerably as compared with the simple textbook model. 
An "excess demand" is created which is, ceteris paribus, less than 
before. In Figure 2.2 it is Q^-Q*. There is no reduction in the 
number of dwellings traded as all initial dwellings are "locked in" by 
the eviction control. Being no diminution in the number of dwellings 
there are no deadweight losses according to the Marshallian measure. 
Measured in Hicksian terms there is a deadweight loss. The rent and 
eviction control law involves a straight transfer from landlords to tenants 
of QS^ CR'^ -R) (graphically, R*deR), in addition to the "excess demand" at 
the controlled rent. 
This serves as a reminder that analyses of "rent control" must take 
cognizance of the particular law being considered. Another instance 
where this is important is in relation to the control or otherwise of 
new leases. Positive predictions may be very sensitive to the per-
vasiveness of controls. Thi6 question is taken up in a later section 
of this chapter. 
3. A Simple Dynamic Model - The "Lindbeck Model" 
An obvious extension of the simple textbook model is the incor-
poration of some inter-temporal adjustment mechanism. This task was 
performed by Lindbeck (1967) who is perhaps best known, in regard to 
his rent control writings, for his statement that "[i]n many cases rent 
control appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to 
destroy a city - except for bombing" (Lindbeck 1971, p.39). 
Lindbeck's model involves three conceptual time periods - "momen-
tary", "short-run" and "long-run". For each time period there is a 
supply relationship. The momentary supply curve is vertical. No 
16. 
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adjustment is possible to a change in demand in the very short-run.^ 
Some response is possible in the short-run where we assume a positive 
but finite elasticity of dwelling supply with respect to rents. The 
long-run supply curve is perfectly elastic at the long-run rental price. 
The three supply curves are drawn in Figure 2.3 as Sj^ , Sg and S^ ,^ 
respectively. 
Suppose an initial long-run equilibrium at Rj^  and Q* is disturbed 
by an upward shift in demand from D to D'. The initial impact of the 
shift will be totally absorbed by a rise in rents to R^^. The higher 
rent will induce a supply response according to Sg and rents will be 
bid down to Rg. Quantity supplied will rise. A further response will 
occur in the next period (Sg^ and Rg^) and in each ensuing period 
until a new long-run equilibrium is reached with Rj^  and Q*'. 
As we will see in an ensuing chapter on rent control in the Aust-
ralian Capital Territory, rent control which holds rents below short-run 
levels but above the long-run equilibrium, will serve to slow adjustment 
to long-run equilibrium. However, long-run equilibrium would still be 
reached. If rent is controlled below R^ the/model predicts that the 
rental market will evWtually disappear (unless landlords are restricted 
by controls on eviction). 
4. Issues Relating to Maintenance 
So far we have talked in terms of variants of a model where homo-
geneous dwelling units are leased. This is obviously unrealistic 
because (i) dwellings are heterogeneous, ranging from mansions to 
shacks, and (ii) the amount of services ceded by a dwelling is, to some 
extent, a variable. This leads us to want to think in terms of "housing 
service units". This concept has been discussed at length by Olsen 
1 Even if total supply of housing is totally inelastic in the short-
run, an increase in demand for rental housing may be partly accommo-
dated by owner-occupied housing being bid away from its occupants. 
This phenomenon is explored in Chapter 4. 
18 
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(1969a) and is the most satisfying way of dealing with the problems « 
raised by a heterogeneous capital stock of housing.^ 
The amount of housing services supplied can be increased by either 
increasing the stock of housing or by increasing the amount of housing 
services produced from the existing stock. A reduction in housing 
services supplied can result from withdrawal of stock and/or failure 
to maintain existing stock. Writers such as Olsen (1969b), Moorhouse 
(1972) and Frankena (1975) have used the distinction between stock and 
services to provide valuable insights into the effects of rent control. 
Rent control may be one of three broad types. Rent per dwelling 
may be controlled, irrespective of the amount of services it produces. 
This imposes a revenue constraint per dwelling but the landlord has some 
scope to raise the price per housing service unit. A second kind of 
rent control would limit the price per service unit. In this situation 
the rent controller would fully take into account ,enhancements or 
deteriorations in the'dwelling being rented. A third kind of rent 
control might, involve elements of both these. While the hybrid variety 
is probably the most commonly observed, we will confine attention to 
the two clear-cut casfes. In doing so we will draw heavily on Frankena's 
article. 
The model where price per housing service unit is controlled is 
quite straight-forward and yields predictions very similar to those of 
the simple textbook model. Consider Figure 2.4 which depicts a typical 
firm producing rental housing (panel (a)) and the market situation 
(panel (b)). Controlling price per unit will mean that landlords will 
reduce the quantity of housing services produced by their dwellings. At 
the micro-level there is a decline from q* to "q while at the market 
1 The idea of housing services seems to emanate from Muth (1969). Both 
Muth and Olsen explain the concept much better than could be 
attempted here. 
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level there is a decline from Q* to Q^. The rent per dwelling will 
fall from p*q* to p q. There will be excess demand for housing service « 
units of Q^-Q^. There will be the usual transfer effect and 
efficiency costs. 
The major difference with the textbook model is that the response 
is in terms of withdrawing dwellings and the deterioration of dwellings, 
Maintenance spending is allowed to lapse. In the long-run the rental 
market will disappear as loss-making landlords desert the market. We 
should make two points in relation to eviction control. Firstly, evic-
tion control will not impede the reaction to the price control which 
takes the form of reducing the housing services generated by a parti-
cular dwelling. This is in contrast to the situation with the simple 
textbook model where the only adjustment possible is removal of dwel-
lings. Secondly, eviction control will impede the long-run adjustment. 
Both these points seem to have been overlooked by Frankena. 
t 
The second Frankena model, the "revenue constraint model" is of 
more interest as it leads to different predictions about the effects of 
rent control.-^ While housing services from a dwelling unit are 
variable, controlling rent from the dwelling presents the landlord with 
a rectangular hyperbolic revenue constraint. Reducing the quantity of 
housing services means that price per service unit can be increased. 
Consider Figure 2.5(a) and (b) which is the same as Figure 2.4 except 
for the omission of the controlled price per unit (p) and the addition 
of micro- and macro-revenue constraints. Imposition of the revenue 
constraint will have the following effects. Firstly, the.quantity of 
housing services produced will fall, in aggregate from Q* to Q and the 
price per unit will rise from P* to P. Secondly, there will be no 
"excess demand" as these can be removed by quality adjustments. 
1 The revenue constraint approach first appears in Olsen (1969b) and 
receives much embellishment from Frankena. 
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Finally, landlords may or may not make profits after rent control is 
imposed; In the case as shown in Figure 2.5(a), profits are made. If 
profits were being made and new entrants were subject to rent control, a 
long-run equilibrium would be restored at zero profits. For the repre-
sentative firm this would occur where R cuts the LRAC curve. For the 
market as a whole this would occur where a horizontal line from the 
intersection of R and LRAC intersected the demand curve. New entry 
would shift the revenue constrained short-run supply curve to the right 
until it intersected the demand curve at this point. As the original 
equilibrium would not be restored, rent control of this kind would still 
involve an efficiency cost. 
There are several problems with this model, not all of which are 
recognized by Frankena. One problem relates to the need to constrain 
the price elasticity of demand to be strictly above unity. If not, 
there could be no revenue constrained equilibrium. Secondly, adjustment 
of "quality" might take a long time. In the absence of physically des-
troying housing servic.es, the only means of allowing service units 
produced to decline is via failure to maintain them. Surely the scope 
for this is severely limited in a practical sense? Thirdly, tenants 
may themselves undertake repairs thus suppressing the decline in 
quality. Such action will presumably shift the demand curve down by 
the amount of the per unit repair expenditures. 
5. The Incorporation of "Need" - Cooper and Stafford 
An Interesting little paper by Cooper and Stafford (1975), and two 
follow-up papers by the same authors ((1979) and (1980)) have created 
a considerable amount of interest. The matters treated have received 
considerable textbook attention - Stafford (1978), Robinson (1979) and 
Button (1976). For this reason we review the basic issues covered in 
this literature. 
2 4 . 
The point of departure for Cooper and Stafford was the attempt, 
in Britain's 1974 Rent Act to define "fair rent". The criteria were 
to be (i) characteristics of the property such as age, locality and 
"character", and (ii) "For the purposes of the determination it shall 
be assumed that the number of persons seeking to become tenants of 
similar dwelling houses in the locality on the terms (other than those 
relating to rent) of the regulated tenancy is not substantially greater 
than the number of such dwelling houses in the locality which are 
available for letting on such terms." As Cooper and Stafford interpret 
this, "abnormal scarcity" should be ignored and all "need" met. 
The ideas may be interpreted in terms of Figure 2.6 which is based 
on Cooper and Stafford's (1979) Figure 5. The model is in terms of 
homogeneous dwelling units, not housing service units, and long-run 
supply, S^, is less than perfectly elastic. Short-run supply is 
perfectly inelastic, Sj^ - "Need" for housing is OT dwelling units. 
The market would establish a short-run rent of R2. This would not be 
a "fair rent" as "need" is not satisfied. But no satisfactory long-term 
solution presents itself. Both R^ and R^ have some claims to being 
"fair" but both involve a failure to meet "need". On the basis of 
Cooper and Stafford's' interpretation, the British conception of "fair 
rent" is untenable. 
In a sense - a very real sense - Cooper and Stafford have created 
the difficulty with the "fair rent" concept by modelling in terms of 
dwelling units rather than service units. "Need" is not a popular 
concept with economists who find "demand" far more to their liking, 
l^ile family units are linked with dwelling units, problems abound. Of 
course, the housing stock is "flexible" in the sense that available 
stock can be used more or less intensively. 
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6. Analysis Via Submarkets - Rothenberg^s Model 
Rothenberg (undated) has set out a very interesting model'where 
the housing market is divided into submarkets. Each submarket is a 
cluster of housing where dwellings produce similar amounts of housing 
services. Substitutibility within a submarket is very great but inter-
submarket substitutibility is limited. Some submarkets will be a lot 
closer together than others but happenings in all submarkets will have 
implications for all others. Rothenberg analyses two types of rent 
control - one which affects all quality levels; the other affecting only 
one submarket. In the process Rothenberg comes close to considering 
some of the issues raised by Olsen (1969b) and Frankena (1975). 
While Rothenberg must be applauded for injecting a greater 
sophistication into the analysis of rent control, there is some doubt 
about the richness of the harvest in terms of novel results. As his 
paper is very long and technical it is left to the interested reader 
to peruse and assess. However, let us summarize the major predictions 
of the case where all quality levels are rent controlled. 
Rothenberg assumes a rent control scheme where all existing 
dwellings are controlled but new dwellings are exempt. Increased main-
tenance spending is allowed as a cost, as is expenditure on improve-
ments. The effect of rent control on new dwelling construction is 
adverse due to the expectational effect of controls - "the existence 
of rent control ... raises the possibility that controls may be 
extended" (p.25).^ In relation to existing units "the owner of the 
housing unit will see advantage in decreasing its quality level" (p.28). 
Further, "the match of tenant characteristics and housing characte-
ristics can come to decline appreciably" (p.30) and "events in the 
rental part of the market will have an effect on the ownership part of 
the market" (p.31). 
1 The idea of an expectational effect arises several times in this 
thesis, including in the appendix to this chapter. 
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7. Rent Control and the Demand for Substitute Accommodation ^ 
Most analyses of the economic implications of rent control have 
tended to rely on the conventional partial equilibrium approach. But 
at the same time writers have also attempted to sketch the implications 
of rent control for markets where substitutes are traded. The analysis 
has generally been quite casual and apart from some notable exceptions, 
formal general equilibrium approaches have not been employed. In an 
appendix, the literature in this area is reviewed critically and some 
suggestions for reform are submitted. In particular, where rationing 
is by "chance and favouritism" (to borrow Friedman and Stigler's (1946) 
apt phrase) and not by an "equitable" sharing arrangement administered 
by the government, there is no satisfactory theoretical framework 
currently available. 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECTS OF RENT CONTROL IN RELATED MARKETS 
Early post-war British writers on rent control, such as Paish 
(1950), Needleman (1965) and Phelps Brown and Wiseman (1964), all 
asserted that rent control would lead to prices being higher in the 
uncontrolled sectors than they would have been if the rental housing 
market had not been interfered with. Paish states, for example, that 
the "rise in the price of small houses cannot ... be taken as an indi-
cation of the rise in rents which would ensue if rent restriction were 
withdrawn; for much of it is due to the concentration upon the only 
completely free sector of the market of the excess demand created by 
[the rent control] ... " (p.6). A more general assertion by Needleman 
is cited by Cheung (1975, p.4) and Phelps Brown and Wiseman meticulously 
analyse the consequences of rent control for related markets and make 
similar statements as to the upward price effects created in these 
markets. Cheung has drawn the further implication that not only will 
prices be higher in the uncontrolled sector(s) but also that "develop-
ment" (supply) would then be encouraged (increased) as a result of rent 
I 
control. . "" . • 
Gould and Henry ((1967), hereafter G-H), writing in the mid-
'sixties, begin their paper by referring to the earlier British lite-
rature which is referenced above. G-H claim these writers "seem to 
believe that the proposition [that rent control raises prices in the 
uncontrolled sectors] follows immediately from the most elementary 
supply and demand analysis" (p.42). But G-H do not wish "to make 
specific assertions about rent control, but to consider, at an abstract 
level, how the analysis of effects of price control on related markets 
might be carried out. Indeed, the housing market possesses so many 
technical and institutional peculiarities that we would disclaim any 
pretension that the simple models we develop are necessarily relevant 
to that market" (p.42). 
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G-H state the problem more clearly than earlier writers. There 
will be'both demand and supply interdependence between the rental market 
and related uncontrolled markets. "[E]ven if it were conceded that 
demand were to rise in the uncontrolled sector, the final effect on 
price would be in doubt if the increase in demand were accompanied by 
an increase in supply" (p.43). But G-H then, surprisingly, decide to 
ignore supply interdependence although it is an essential element of 
the problem. 
G-H use two different assumptions about the way available supply 
is shared among consumers after price control is imposed. The first 
of these is the "rationing" assumption where the government shares out 
the available quantity equally among the consumers. The second assump-
tion is that of "first come, first served" where "satisfied" buyers get 
all they want of the good at the lower controlled price and "unsatis-
fied" buyers get nothing. 
In their treatment of the "rationing" case, G-H draw on the 
analysis by Tobin and Houthakker (1950-51). There are n goods, Xj 
..., X^, and Xj^  is price controlled and rationed. Xj^  and X2 
are Hicksian net substitutes and G-H find'an expression for the deri-
vative dX2/dpj. Controlling Xj's price reduces the supply of it, 
as dXj/dpj > 0. Without presenting any details of this analysis 
the following comments can be made:-
(1) G-H do not present a true general equilibrium analysis. Tobin and 
Houthakker were only interested in the individual's response to 
rationing, given that the starting point was the free market 
equilibrium. This does not appear to be the starting position 
utilized by G-H who have their individual consumers in an initial 
position of rationed discomfort. Cornes (1979) has shown that, 
given this starting position, a reduction in the ration must have 
an adverse real income effect and that in a general equilibrium 
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context, this real income effect cannot be outweighed by the bene-
ficial real incorae effect of the fall in pj^. The result claimed 
by G-H, that price control may not lead to a rise in the price of 
an uncontrolled net substitute, is shown by Cornes to be possible 
in a full general equilibrium approach, but for different reasons 
than those asserted by G-H. In the general equilibrium context 
the "paradoxical" result is due to the strong superiority, not 
inferiority, of the substitute and due to strong supply inter-
dependence. G-H reach the right conclusion but for the wrong 
reasons. 
(2) While G-H were not prepared to claim their analysis of either 
allocation assumption was necessarily relevant to rent control, 
it would seem that their "rationing" case is totally inappropriate 
in rent control cases. Cheung (1975) has not been so careful and 
claims that G-H have "partially challenged" the British view of 
the effects of rent control on related markets. "For example, 
under what they h^ve chosen to call the "rationing" assumption, 
they argued that the price of a substitute in the uncontrolled 
sector will rise only if both the controlled and the tincontrolled 
goods have "normal" income effects" (fn. 13, p.4). Rent control, 
of course, creates a situation where rationing is by "chance and 
favouritism" which will have consequences different to those due 
to an equal sharing arrangement. Friedman and Stigler (1946) have 
considered the feasibility of public rationing of house space and 
conclude that "it would raise stupendous administrative and ethical 
problems" (p.28). In addition to administering new lettings, 
existing leases would have to be modified. If, however, rental 
housing could be "rationed" in the G-H sense, the Cornes' general 
equilibrium analysis would be an appropriate tool for attacking 
rent control problems. 
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Rent control would seem to imply a rationing scheme similar to that 
of G-H's "first come, first served". But not exactly the same. At 
least some demanders will not get all they want of the controlled good 
(housing services) at the lower controlled price. Some will have too 
much and others too little. In short, some will not be "on" their 
Marshallian demand curves. The question of quantity constraint, as it 
relates to tenant benefit, is discussed in Chapter 3. For present 
purposes we will consider G-H's assumption as a reasonable approxi-
mation. 
Before setting out the G-H second model it must be emphasised that 
the analysis is inherently illegitimate as there is no numeraire. In a 
two good model, lowering (controlling) the price of one good only has 
meaning if it is a price reduction relative to P2» the second good's 
price. If this is the case (and it clearly is not according to G-H), 
the "solution" is immediate: P2 must "rise" (relative to pj^ ). The 
only reason for setting out the model is to exposit some further diffi-
culties and because it.is the only approach to this problem known to 
the present writer. . / 
The price of the .first of the two goods (X^, X2) is controlled 
to pj*. There are N buyers, j of whom get access to the controlled 
good and k = N-j who do not. The individuals are identical in that they n n 
have the same free market "demand functions", Dj^  = D^(pj^,p2) 
n n 
D2 = D2 (P1>P2)' Supply of each good is a function of 
price only, thus S^ = S^(p^) and S2 = S2(P2)- The model 
is written down as: 
own 
Si = Si(pi*) (A2.1) 
=DI(Pi*»P2^ (A2.2) 
j = S^/Di (A2.3) 
j+k = N (A2.4) 
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= jD2(pi*,P2) + kD2(P2) (A2.5) 
S2 = S2(P2) (A2.6) 
Of these, (A2.5) requires some explanation. The second RHS term is the 
demand for the uncontrolled good by unsatisfied potential buyers of the 
controlled good. To them, the price of the controlled good is irrele-
vant to their determination of desired consumption of X2 and does not 
enter their demand function. 
Disequilibrium prevails in the controlled market such that D^ > 
Sj^  at Pj^ *. For equilibrium in the uncontrolled market, D2=S2' 
Substituting in (A2.5) and (A2.6), differentiating (treating p^* as a 
variable) and re-arranging, we have: 
dp2/dp^* = (9D2/3pi*)/(8S2/3p2 " (A2.7) 
If the market for good 2 is Walrasian stable, the denominator is 
positive. Then if 9D2/8p]^* can. be shovra to be positive, G-H claim a 
paradoxical result is possible in that lowering the controlled price may 
' r 
lead to a reduction in the uncontrolled price. Conditions favouring 
dp2/dpj^* > 0 "are the; asymmetry in the responsiveness of demand for 
X2 to P]^  and the irresponsiveness of demand and supply for 
to its own price" (pp.48-49). What is wrong with this analysis? 
(1) There are only two goods and, implicitly, a fixed money income. 
Under G-H's assumptions, lowering p^ means a reduction in supply 
of Xj^ . Therefore expenditure on X^ must fall and P2X2 must 
rise. Then as long as 0 < dX2/dp2 < P2 rise when 
Pj^  is controlled.^ 
1 G-H give every reason for us to believe money income is constant. 
They talk, for example, about X. and X2 being gross substitutes, 
"\d.thout eliminating income effects" (p.46). This only makes sense 
if money income is constant. G-H also lead us to believe that 
dX2/dp2 is finite and positive. This is explicitly assumed for 
xi-
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(2) There is no supply interdependence in the model. Moorhouse and 
Bl6ck (1968) have incorporated supply interdependence and easily 
show that dp2/dpj^* can be positive if 9S2/9pi* > 0* But 
these authors have accepted the basis of the G-H analysis which 
is fundamentally invalid. 
(3) As mentioned above there is no numeraire, a fundamental require-
ment. Cornes (1979), in a three good general equilibrium model 
constructed around the "rationing" assumption found it necessary 
to make one good the numeraire. Any successful analysis of the 
"first come, first served" case would require at least three goods, 
one of which was a numeraire. 
(4) G-H assert that disequilibrium can remain in the controlled market 
and that no "black market" arises. But Barzel (1974) argues that 
the unsatisfied customers will bid up' the price paid by satisfied 
customers through "waiting" so that the effective price will be 
the demand price for the quantity supplied. The higher effective 
price will cause an increase in demand for substitutes (a "substi-
tution effect") but "[gjince ... the real price paid by buyers is 
higher than that, received by sellers,-... we have a net resource 
cost resulting in a negative income effect that for superior goods 
will shift demand to the left, enhancing the price effect on com-
plements but reducing that on substitutes" (p.84). The effect of 
waiting is another essential consideration in modelling unorganized 
rationing schemes. 
As a final point on the issue of rent control as it affects related 
markets we must note the warnings of Cheung (1974). He cautions that 
"[i]f certain outcomes are to be attributed to the [price or rent] 
control, the constraints specified must conform essentially to those 
in real practice" (p.55). If economists blindly used simple general 
models in all circumstances, without recognizing the special factors 
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thrown up by particular problems, the science would be severely 
retarded. It is the-versatility of the economists' tools which makes 
economics such an interesting and useful discipline. 
G-H have questioned the relevance of simple demand and supply 
analysis in deriving predictions about the effects of rent control. 
But a dynamic partial-equilibrium demand and supply analysis can get 
us a long way in analysing the implications of rent control. We can 
also illustrate many of the points made above. To satisfy Cheung we 
carefully define the form of control as "rent control" where: (i) The 
market is initially in long-run equilibrium.^ (ii) Rent control is 
applied to existing dwellings only - all new dwellings are exempt, 
(iii) While controlled rent (per housing service unit) is held below 
long-run market rent, R*, it is above variable costs or outgoings, G. 
That is G < R < R*. (iv) Eviction control applies to existing dwellings 
such that there is-no diminution of quantity, after control, from the 
original equilibrium level, Q*. The situation is illustrated in Figure 
A2.1 where S is the - short-run supply curve and D the demand curve. 
If eviction control were absent, quantity offered would fall to v^ere 
the R line hits S, in the'short-run. But -quantity is held at Q*. 
There is a pure transfer to existing tenants of R*abR. There is excess 
demand of ^-Q*, totally induced by the lower price. 
The demand for non-controlled rental housing can be analysed via 
"fringe" demand and supply curves. The initial situation is trivial. 
No-one is willing to pay above R*, the fringe demand curve beginning 
at R* on the vertical axis. Nothing will be supplied except above R* 
so the fringe supply curve begins at R* on the vertical axis also. 
The equiMbrium price is R* and nothing is traded in the uncontrolled 
market. 
1 Long-run supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
2 These fringe curves are so trivial that they are not shown in Figure 
A2.1 to avoid cluttering. 
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But controlled and uncontrolled markets do exist side-by-side as 
in the eases of, for example, Sydney (see Chapter 6) and New York City 
(see Olsen (1972)). Circumstances will tend to change yielding a fringe 
demand curve like, say, D'. In particular, growth of income and popu-
lation may increase total demand for rental housing.^ Accommodation 
of this demand must occur in the uncontrolled market. Further, the 
short-run fringe supply curve may not begin at R* if there is a fear 
of extension of controls harboured by landlords. The existence of such 
a fear will lift the long-run supply price by an amount equal to the 
probability of control multiplied by the expected reduction in rent. 
Call this amount, f, giving short-run supply curve S' and long-run 
supply curve, in the uncontrolled market, Sj^ '* 
Rents in the uncontrolled market must be above R* as long as f > 
0. In the initial short-run period, uncontrolled rent will exceed 
f + R*. But this tental, given by the intersection of S' and D' will 
attract new entry. In the next period Sj^ ' will be the relevant short-
run supply curve and the rental will be established where S^' inter-
sects D'. This rental will be lower, and quantity traded in the 
uncontrolled market, higher;.' This process w^ll continue - in the 
absence of other disturbances - until the uncontrolled rental reaches 
f + R* and uncontrolled quantity traded is given by dropping a per-
pendicular from the intersection of Sj^ ' and D'. 
When the uncontrolled market is in long-run equilibrium the only 
excess demand remaining will be that induced by the rent control plus 
that encompassing those demanders who would pay above R* but not 
f + R* per unit. 
What we can conclude from this analysis is that rents in the 
uncontrolled market could be taken as an accurate guide to market rents 
1 We do not show the shift in the aggregate demand curve, again to 
avoid cluttering. 
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if the uncontrolled market is in long-run equilibrium and f = 0. Con-
trary to what is often asserted, rent control need not necessarily lead 
uncontrolled rents to be higher than otherwise. We note the further 
implication that, in aggregate, rent control will not increase "develop-
ment" above what it would have been and will lessen it if f > 0. These 
hypotheses flow from a particular set of assumptions and are only 
"valid" under these conditions. 
CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT OF TENANT BENEFITS 
Many public policies with respect to the rental housing market 
result in benefits to tenants. Such policies principally comprise those 
of public housing provision, housing allowances, rent control and urban 
renewal. The evaluation of tenant benefits presents both conceptual 
and measurement problems. The conceptual difficulties are particularly 
severe in cases where policies impose a quantity constraint on reci-
pients. All of the policies mentioned may entail such a constraint. 
Initial attempts to conceptualize tenant benefits were made in 
relation to public housing. Bish (1969) and Smolensky (1968) proposed 
measures which assume tenants are on their Marshallian demand curves. 
Even if this assumption is applicable, the measures proposed are un-
satisfactory. De Salvo (1971) suggested a conceptually pleasing measure 
which was essentially Hicks' equivalent variation. This measure is 
valid in situations with or without quantity constraints,.^ 
The discussion revolves around the use of an equivalent variation 
.V 
measure even though it is recognized that the compensating variation 
' .1 _ 
may be appropriate in certain circumstances. Basically the equivalent 
variation springs to mind when adoption of a rental housing market 
scheme is contemplated while the compensating variation has an appli-
cation when considering the removal of an extant scheme. 
The De Salvo measure was developed for public housing situations. 
De Salvo (1975) applies the measure in just such a situation. This 
concept is applicable also to cases of rent control, housing allowances 
1 The novelty of the De Salvo method is the application of Hicks' 
equivalent variation to quantity constrained situations. Where there 
is no quantity constraint we should, but do not use the label "Hicks' 
equivalent variation". 
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and urban renewal. The use of the measure in each of these s i tuat ions 
i s discussed in this chapter. 
In sect ion 3 we consider two poss ib le Marshallian measures of tenant 
b e n e f i t where quantity i s constrained. One i s label led the "simple 
Marshallian surplus" , the other the " i d e a l Marshallian surplus" . The EV 
and CV are also examined in the pr ice -quant i ty space and the bounding 
propert ies of a l l four measures are explored. The simple Marshallian 
surplus i s found to have a very undesirable property in that i t tends to 
overstate welfare change. The sect ion introduces a novel technique f o r 
analysing quantity-constrained s i tuat ions . 
The actual estimation of tenant b e n e f i t s i s fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas u t i l i t y funct ion al lows ease of 
estimation of tenant bene f i t s using read i ly avai lab le data. However, i t 
i s not very r e a l i s t i c . Murray (1975) has worked with a "generalized CES" 
u t i l i t y funct ion . I t may also be poss ib le to begin d i r e c t l y with an 
expenditure func t i on . 
The f i n a l sect ion explores the bias that might r e s u l t from using 
average data instead of individual data when estimating tenant b e n e f i t s . 
Discussion revolves around E.Q.. Olsen 's (1972) analysis of rent contro l 
in New York City . Olsen has applied an unsophisticated Marshallian 
measure to the estimation of tenant b e n e f i t s . The use of this measure 
could be seen as cancel l ing out some of the advantage due to having a 
r i c h bank of individual data. 
1. Naive Measures of Tenant Benefit 
Smolensky (1968) sought to measure tenant bene f i t s from government 
housing as "the amount of money, which i f i t were paid annually to the 
tenants of public housing for as long as the housing units stand, would 
leave the to ta l cost of the program to the nation unchanged" ( p . 9 5 ) . 
Supposing that V i s the i n i t i a l cost of the dwell ing, R^^ i s pro ject 
rent , i s operating cos t , n i s the l i f e of the dwelling and r the 
rate of i n t e r e s t , then S^ . in 
n (R - 0 ) + S 
V = 2 Pt ' ' 
(1 + r )^ 
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is Smolensky's implicit subsidy. Smolensky estimated S^ to be ,an 
« 
average of $62 (1965 prices) per month for government dwellings let 
under the United States' Public Law 171 over the period 1952 to 1964. 
This is, of course, a measure of tenant benefit based on the diffe-
rential between "market" and project rent. Bish (1969) has used a 
similar measure. Consider Figure 3.1 which is representative of Figure 
2 in Bish's paper (p.426). Bish contends that "as the degree of elas-
ticity is not kno\-m, we assume here that housing is a constant-cost 
industry; thus, the private market value estimated in this study is 
assumed to be equivalent to area OBEG in figure 1" (p.429, Bish's 
italics). The public tenant is sold OG units of housing service for 
OA per unit, project rent being OAFG. There is thus a subsidy of ABEF, 
the difference between market valuation of OG and the amount actually 
paid. Bish regards his analysis as an improvement over that of 
Smolensky because the latter concentrates "on the cost of the program 
rather than on direct benefits accruing to individuals bccupying the 
subsidized housing" (p.428). While this is true, both measures leave 
a lot to be desired. 
» r 
" ' I ' 
Both Smolensky and Bish assume, implicitly and explicitly (res-
pectively), that tenants are on their Marshallian demand curves. In 
most cases, public housing policies impose quantity constraints which 
will, except by accident, be binding on the tenants. But even if the 
public housing offer is compatible with the recipient's demand curve, 
the Smolensky and Bish measures are still far from ideal. Conside-
ration of Figure 3.1, for instance, indicates that the Bish measure 
overstates tenant benefits by area CEF, if benefits are interpreted in a 
crude Marshallian sense. 
2. The De Salvo Measure 
Bish and Smolensky developed measures of tenant benefit to deal 
with public housing situations. De Salvo (1971, 1975) was also con-
41. 
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cerned with conceptualising (and measuring) tenant benefits frojn public 
« • 
housing programs. The De Salvo method can, however, be adopted to deal 
with situations of rent control, housing allowance and urban renewal. 
Indeed, it is applicable in any situation where there is a quantity 
constraint in addition to the constraints imposed by income and prices. 
In all the housing applications of the measure we will assume that the 
free market price of housing services that are privately supplied re-
mains constant.^ 
The basic approach assumes that individual consuming units 
("individuals" or "families") have a utility function, 
U - U(H,N), 
relating utility to consumption of housing services (H) and the 
consumption of non-housing commodities (N), Hicks' composite theorem 
is assumed to hold. The utility function is assumed to be "neo-
classical" with properties that yield smooth, convex-to-the-origin 
indifference curves. In the absence of a quantity constraint, utility 
is maximized "subject to a budget, constraint, 
) Y = PjjH + PjjN " 
where the prices of both commodities,P^^ and Pj^, are assumed fixed, 
and the individual's initial income, Y, is fixed. 
Tenant benefit measures arise for different policies by deter-
mining, (i) the way in which the particular policy alters the indivi-
dual's choice set, and (ii) the response of the individual to the 
changed circumstances. This exercise will be performed for each policy 
considered, beginning with public housing. A simple rent control 
1 While every individual is a price-taker, the aggregate effect of an 
increase in demand for housing services may be to raise their prices. 
If we cannot assume a constant price of housing, the analysis becomes 
unworkable. There is considerable evidence for a high long-run rent 
elasticity of supply of housing. (See the discussion in Chapter 4.) 
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situation will then be examined, followed by analyses of a housing 
allowance scheme (the now defunct Australian Housing Allowance' 
Experiment, HAE) and an urban renewal scheme. 
(i) Public Housing 
Suppose a family is initially in equilibrium at point A in Figure 
3.2. Now suppose an offer is made of H units of housing services at 
P®^ unit, where a < 1. The new budget line has slope - (oPj^ / 
Pjg). The nature of the offer constrains the family to point B, which 
is not a point on the demand curve in the (Pjj,H) space. This point 
yields utility level Uj^ . But Uj^  could be furnished by an infinity 
of other combinations of H and N, one of which corresponds to a tangency 
with a budget line with the slope of the original price ratio. This 
particular point is C in Figure 3.2. Measured in non-housing goods, the 
amount of money needed to make the family as well off at the old price 
ratio as under the public housing scheme is the vertical distance DE between 
the original budget line and that tangential to U^ at C. This amount is 
Hicks' price equivalent variation measure of consumer's surplus. The 
necessary .income supplement will always be less than the cost of providing 
the government housing, except in a special case. 
Net of administrative costs, the public housing offer costs BE in 
Figure 3.2, while the income grant would only have to be DE. Bish and 
Smolensky both use BE as a measure of tenant benefit, but in the context 
-
of the tenant being "on" his Marshallian demand cur\'-e."^  This case is 
shown in Figure 3.3 which is similar to Figure 3.2 except that point 
B is now a point of tangency between the new budget line and U^ (that 
is, it is a point on the Marshallian demand curve in the (P^,H) 
space). Clearly, the simple rent differential is still not equal to 
Hicks' equivalent variation, and, indeed, overstates it. The same level 
of utility is still available at a lower cost via an income grant of DE. 
1 Bish uses the difference between market rent and tenant rent while 
Smolensky suggests the difference between resource cost and tenant rent 
If public housing is produced inefficiently the measures will differ. 
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There is a special case where the simple rent differential, will 
equal Hitks' equivalent variation. This is when the budget line repre-
senting free market prices, but incorporating the Hicksian equivalent 
variation in income, is tangential to the highest indifference curve 
attainable with the government offer at the quantity of housing services 
incorporated in the government offer. In other words the offer point 
must be on the income expansion path. 
(ii) Rent Control 
As in the case of government housing, rent control also results 
in individuals assuming positions off their Marshallian demand curves. 
At below market rents, many families would prefer to consume more 
housing services but are prevented from doing so because of the diffi-
culties they would encounter finding a dwelling, at a controlled rent, 
compatible with their demand curve. There ^re very great pressures to 
stay where they are and enjoy the subsidy bestowed on them by (un-
willing) landlords. It is for this reason that it 'has long been 
recognized that one of the costs of rent control is the restriction it 
places on mobility. Hany workers do not respond to labour market signals 
because it might entail moving and, thus, forfeiture of tenant benefit 
.4 _ 
from rent control. ' 
Consider Figure 3.4 which represents a rent control situation. 
The family initially consumes H units of housing services at P^ ^ per 
unit ("rent" is P^H), being in equilibrium at point A on indifference 
curve Uq. A rent control policy is introduced which limits price per 
housing service unit to oP^j, a < 1, and disallows eviction. At a P ^ 
the family would like to be at point E, on U2, consuming a greater 
quantity of housing. Excess demand for rent controlled dwellings makes 
such a move very risky and the family "sits" in the dwelling yielding 
H units of housing. At the controlled price, aP^ a higher iso-
utility curve. U p is reached and the family is at point B. This is 
47. 
2 ^-(^W 
FIGURE 3.4 
48. 
not a point on the demand curve in the (Py,H) space. Any combination 
of N and H along Uj^  will yield the same satisfaction - the family is 
indifferent between the rent control position, B, and say, position C. 
C could be attained if the pre-rent control price ratio were restored, 
and a lump-sum payment of DA made to the tenant. DA is, of course. 
Hicks' equivalent variation.^ While DA and market freedom would make 
the tenant equally happy as under rent control, it costs the landlord the 
greater amount, BA, to put his tenant on Uj^ . If the aim of rent 
control was to benefit the tenant by DA, then this could be done at a 
lesser cost to the landlord. The landlord always has the option of 
offering the tenant any amount in excess of DA for vacant possession. 
The landlord could retrieve up to BD, in this way, that would otherwise 
be lost. The landlord, having bribed the tenant, would then sell his 
property at the vacant possession price. Perhaps rent control policies 
could be improved by allowing this possibility - if the landlord could 
bribe the tenant to leave, without coercion, he could then re-let at 
market rents. The tenant would be equally well off as he would accept no 
less than DA, the landlord would gain by BD, and a rentable dwelling 
would not be "lost" to an own-er-occupier. i 
There are circumstances where rent control may mean that families 
consume "too much" housing. This sort of situation arises where rent 
control has prevailed for a long time and family members have left home 
leaving only the parents in a family-size house. Such a case is illus-
trated in Figure 3.5. The family is at point A consuming H units of 
housing services. The simple rent differential is AC, the'equivalent 
variation is only CD. Now introduce the possibility of sub-letting 
1 We are assuming a single period time horizon so as to avoid the 
capitalisation problems otherwise encountered. 
2 Shreiber and Tabriztchi (1976) have analysed the question of landlord-
tenant agreements as a solution to some of the problems of rent con-
trol. They do not, however, advance the particular solution suggested 
in the text. 
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(without restriction from the landlord) at the market price of housing, 
« 
The sitting-tenant can sub-let units of housing services along 
the "sub-letting locus" marked in the figure. The rational master-
tenant would sub-let a total of H-H* units,finding a new equilibrium at 
point B. In this situation the master-tenant's equivalent variation 
would be enhanced by AD, making a total of AC. Sub-letting can, 
therefore, bring the simple rent differential and the equivalent 
variation into line. As a consequence, all "demand-side" inefficiency 
can be removed. 
(iii) Housing Allowances^ 
The form of the Australian housing allowance scheme was to be 
decided by HAE, which was abandoned in June 1978. It was fairly clear, 
however, what the administrators had in mind. The scheme they envisaged 
entailed a dollar payment equal to the actual rent paid minus one 
quarter of the recipient's pre-allowance income, Y. Theire was a maximum 
allowable rent in calculating payments, although recipients would have 
been able to occupy dwellings with rents above this maximum. The maxi-
mum was known as "standard rent" (S). It can safely be assumed that 
recipients would respond to such a scheme in a strategic manner so as 
V 
to extract maximum possible payments consistent with their income. This 
would normally entail occupying a dwelling costing an amount at least 
equal to standard rent. 
Figure 3.6 is useful in expositing the De Salvo measure in the HAE 
case. In acting strategically to maximize utility subject to the post-
HAE choice set, a "corner solution" is the best possibility and this 
occurs at a consumption of S/?^ units of housing services. Hicks' 
equivalent variation is found by drawing a line which is both tangent 
to the family's indifference curve and parallel to the original budget 
1 This section is based on material contained in two previously published 
papers - Albon (1977b and 1979b). Other tnatters raised in these papers 
are discussed in Chapter 10. 
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line. The family pays a total rent of ml and receives el as a HAE 
payment. The payment is valued only at kl by the recipient, as an 
income supplement of kl would yield the same utility as a tied (HAE) 
payment of el. 
In some circumstances, HAE is as efficient as an untied income 
supplement. This occurs if, and only if, a family wishes to consume 
housing costing more than S. For this to occur there must be an in-
difference curve tangential to the segment ec of the post-allowance 
choice set. 
There will be other cases where individuals will only participate 
if they can form a coalition with their landlord. We will not pursue 
such cases here, deferring the discussion until Chapter 10. 
(iv) Urban Renewal 
In a recent paper by Flowerdew and Rodriguez (1978), an attempt 
is made to conceptualize and measure tenant benefits from urban renewal 
programs. In some circumstances, such programs may involve a tenant 
moving from one quanti-ty-constrained position to another, thus pre-
senting an interesting and difficult conceptual problem. Flowerdew and 
Rodriguez seem to deny that an equivalent variation measure is possible. 
However, a measure to' handle such situations can be devised. 
Consider Figure 3.7 where a simple "urban renewal" case is shown. 
Suppose 
public housing is provided at aP^ j per unit. Initially the 
individual is at point A. The authorities now undertake an urban 
renewal program and offer the individual more units of housing services 
at price OPH* constrain him to point B. To compare the two 
quantity-constrained points the ploy is to find utility-equivalent 
points associated with free market prices. These points are C and D, 
respectively. The equivalent variation is marked on the vertical axis. 
An alternative exposition of this case is alluded to in an ensuing 
section of this chapter. 
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(v) Other Cases 
Many other cases spring to mind. Three will be mentioned here. 
Firstly there is the Australian Government's "Regulation 92" which is 
a rent subsidy available to public servants where the degree of subsi-
dization is related to rent, up to a maximum. In some ways the scheme 
is similar to the HAE. A second example is the practice of the Aust-
ralian National University in letting houses to undergraduate students 
at below-market rents. During an internal inquiry into this practice 
a colleague (George Fane) enunciated the principle that a lump-sum 
subsidy would be more efficient than the provision of cheap housing. 
Finally, there is the Australian Government's Defence Housing Scheme 
which has recently been under review. In the process of review Michael 
Cook (1978) has written a very interesting paper pointing out the 
inefficiency of tieing transfers to housing consumption. This paper 
is all the more interesting because it was, written in apparent ignorance 
of much of the recent literature on this subject. 
3. Marshallian Measures, the De Salvo Measure and a Compensating Variation 
Measui^ e 
* r 
Marshallian- measures of "welfare chaage have been considered for the 
.1 
purpose of evaluating tenant "benefits in the context of quantity-const-
rained situations. For example, Olsen (1912) has used a Marshallian measure 
of the tenant "benefits from rent control in New York City. Murray (19T6) 
has analysed the "bounding properties of this measure. Unfortunately, in 
so doing, Murray seems to have erred. The measure considered by Olsen 
and Murray can fairly be dubbed the "simple Marshallian surpliis" (SMS) in 
constrast to what might be called an "ideal Marshallian surplus" (n4S) 
developed by Comes and Albon (1980). In this section we use the price-
quantity space to set out the SMS, the IMS, the De Salvo measure (the EV) 
and a compensating variation (CV). The bounding properties of these 
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measures are explored, partly by use of the quantity ppace diagram. It « 
is found, that CV<IMS<EV<SMS for a normal good. While Marshallian measures 
in general cannot be recommended, the SMS seems to be particularly undes-
irable as it has the curious tendency to show an increase in welfare where 
no increase has occurred. 
Olsen's measure, the SMS, is illustrated in Figure 3.8. The 
symbolism is altered to be more in conformity with that used in Comes and 
Albon and that used in this thesis.^ The demand curve D is a function D 
( P , T T , Y ) where IT and Y, both assumed constant, are prices of other goods and 
money income, respectively.' The price elasticity of demand is assmied to 
be unity..' The individual illustrated is off his demand curve and consumes 
less than he would at market prices (H<H^). Total benefits are equal to 
P^bcP^ less adb. The first area represents the lesser amount H is purchased 
for than it would be at market prices, while adb is (Marshallian) surplus 
precluded from the tenant because- he is unable to purchase the market 
2 quantity of housing, H^. In symbols Olsen's measure is 
1 For convenience "th^  'H' subscript is dropped in this section. 
Integration does not immediately yield the final expression above. 
If the constant is taken outside the integral. 
H rm 
P H m m i .H 
H 
and the integration performed, we have 
P H [£n.H - £n.H] m m m 
Incorporation of the price terms does not alter the value of the 
expression but does make the terms directly observable. 
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FIGURE 3.8 (Modified Olsen 1972, p.1084) 
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P H - P H -mm s 
H m 
H 
P H m m 
H 
dH 
= P H - P H - P H (£n.P H - £11.P H) mm s mm mm m 
We -will return t o a discussion of Clsen's appl icat ion o f th i s measure 
l a t e r in th i s chapter. 
An alternat ive technique f o r treat ing quantity constraints in the 
(P,H) space i s set out in Comes and Albon (198O). This approach involves 
the use of i s o - u t i l i t y curves which form a locus o f pr ice and quantity-
combinations (given IT and Y constant) each y ie ld ing a given u t i l i t y l e v e l . 
Similar curves have been appl ied, in an analysis o f credit rat ion ing , by 
Ja f fee and Russell (19T6). 
In Figure 3-9 there are three types of construct ion. F i r s t l y , 
there i s the Marshallian demand curve, D, which i s a function D(P,7r,Y). 
Secondly, there are "compensated demand curves which are o f the form 
C(P,iT,U) where it i s held constant, Y i s allowed to vary and U r e f e r s t o 
the constant u t i l i t y l e v e l along a compensated demand curve. We are 
dealing s o l e l y with a normal good, l i k e housing, so that the compensated 
demand curves are steeper than the Marshallian demand curve. Final ly 
there are spec ia l ind i f f e rence curves which have zero slope where they 
cut E and are ind i cat ive of a preference d i rec t ion such that u t i l i t y 
increases f o r southerly movements. 
Suppose an individual i s i n i t i a l l y at the f ree market pos i t ion 
with pr i ce P^ and quantity H^, on the Marshallian demand curve. We are 
able t o handle p o l i c i e s which o f f e r e i ther " too much" or " too l i t t l e " . 
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housing at the controlled price. Suppose a situation where "tod little" 
housing, H , is offered at the controlled price, P . Indeed we will 
s 
consider the situation where H is less than H . As the P ,H coordinate 
m s ' 
is not a point on the Marshallian demand curve, we are unable to apply 
the usual measures (Marshallian surplus, EV and CV) immediately. Our 
method is to find a point on the Marshallian demand curve which is 
equivalent to the constrained point, P ,H, in the sense of being on the s 
same iso-utility curve. This is found by "jumping" from the constrained 
point to the point P ,H , both of which lie on the same indifference Z 7j . g 
curve, U . Note that we have assumed that the policy actually increases 
utility (from to U ) so that the individual does not have to be 
coerced into accepting the offer. 
Having found the coordinate P ,H we can identify three measures 
of the welfare change. Firstly, there is the "ideal Marshallian surplus" 
(IMS), the integral over price of the Marshallian demand curve between 
P and P . • That i s , . ^  • • 
m z 
P > • ' . 
rm 
- D (P,7r,Y) dP 
P z 
Geometrically, this is area P^AEP . Our second concept is the equivalent 
in z 
g 
variation, the integral over price of the compensated demand curve, C 
between P and P . That i s , 
m z 
P 
(TO. 
C (P,TT,U^) dP 
p 
z 
In Figure 3.9 this is area P^FEP^. This equivalent variation measure is 
precisely that which we have discussed earlier in the chapter - the 
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"De Salvo measure". Finally, ve have a CV measure, 
P (TH 
- C (P,TT,U^) dP 
P z 
which is P j j jABP^ in I^ igure 3-9. 
The three concepts we have found are conceptually pleasing; The 
measures obey the following for a normal good: CV<IMS<EV. For a good 
with zero income effect we have CV=IMS=EY. While a Marshallian measure 
of any kind is not the first-best choice, the IMS seems to be the most 
desirable conceptual measure in the absence of a Hicksian measure. This 
is because of its bounding properties. However, the IMS is difficult to 
estimate in empirical applications as an estimate of P is required. 
In comparison, the SMS is perhaps easier to measure while being 
conceptually less ple^^sing than the SMS. In his paper exploring the 
bounding properties of the SMS and the EV, Murray (19T6) argues that 
"when consum.ers face constraints apart from prices and income, .... 
Marshall's measure of consumer' s surplus [the SMS] cannot be relied upon 
as a lower bound to Hicks' equivalent variation" (p.U99). This claim 
appears to be off the mark - in fact the SMS always forms an upper boimd 
to Hicks' EV. For a normal good, SMS>EV>II4S>CV. 
To facilitate the comparison let us again look at the SMS. Another 
interpretation of the SMS involves identifying the price, P^, at which 
_ 
the individual would choose the constrained quantity H. P is marked in s 
Figure 3.9. We then have the following expression for the SI-IS: 
^^  P, 
SMS S 
s 
D (P,TT,Y) dP -
s 
H dP. 
a. P P m s 
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Geometrical ly , t h i s i s ^ GSP - ^ GAP which i s , o f coi irse, equivalent t o s s s m 
P^HSP^ - AGH, the SMS as i d e n t i f i e d e a r l i e r . The SMS also has an i n t e r -
pretat ion in the quantity space (Figure 3.10) as distance GB (the equiir-
al.ent o f P GSP ) minus the Marshallian surplus (MS.^) o f the move from A 
S. S Au-
t o G (equivalent t o V^GAP^ in Figure 3 . 9 ) . 
Having made the t rans lat ion from the (P,H) space t o the quantity 
space i t i s nov poss ib le to compare the SMS.^ with the f o r a normal 
A_D A B 
good. The proo f that SMS.^ i s rather ine legant . However, i t serves 
A D A D 
the purpose. The fo l lowing steps give us the r e s u l t : 
- The EV._ has been previous ly discussed and i s marked in Figure 3.10. 
A I I 
- The SMS_ = GB - MS,_ = GJ + JB - MS,_ (By previous d e f i n i t i o n ) . 
AJI ALR A ( J 
- GJ>EV.^>MS.^ (The f i r s t inequal i ty arises due t o the property o f 
i n d i f f e r e n c e curves f o r a normal good which d i c ta tes that the v e r t i c a l 
gap between i n d i f f e r e n c e curves decreases with increases in the quantity 
o f the good. The second inequal i ty i s the conventional resii lt f o r a 
normal good . ) . ' . • 
' I 
- GJ -
- SMS - JE = GJ - MS (Rearrangement o f d e f i n i t i o n . ) 
AI5 IXLJ 
-
- JB>AK>EV (By the above-mentioned property o f i n d i f f e r e n c e curves f o r AB 
a normal good . ) 
- SMSab^^AB 
The i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f the SMS i s more pronounced by consideration 
o f a c o r o l l a r y of the above r e s u l t . When the p o l i c y change i s one where 
the f a l l in p r i c e and the constraint on quantity are such that the i n d i v -
idual remains on the same indi f ferenos curve, the SMS w i l l show a r i s e in 
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wel fare . In the f a c e of this d e f i c i e n c y the simple Marshallian 
surplus measure i s unl ike ly to command much support from applied 
economists. 
What then of the main advantage of the SMS, i t s ease of 
measurement? According to Murray (1976), recent work in "estimating 
i n d i f f e r e n c e maps d i r e c t l y . . . . should make passe the approximate 
techniques [of ear l i e r w r i t e r s ] " (p .494) . I f th is statement i s 
accepted the SMS has nothing to recommend i t . 
4. Estimation of Tenant Benef i ts 
In actual app l i cat ions of the De Salvo measure, many researchers 
have assumed a Cobb-Douglas u t i l i t y funct ion . This part icular form 
has two s i g n i f i c a n t advantages. F i r s t l y , very simple expressions 
f o r tenant b e n e f i t s can be derived quite e a s i l y . Secondly, the 
informational requirements in applying the measure are "minimal". 
Against these advantages, there i s one major drawback -
the Cobb-Douglas r e s t r i c t s preferences to a very large degree. 
I t implies unitary pr i ce and income e l a s t i c i t i e s of demand. The 
appropriateness , or otherwise, of the Cobb-Douglas can only be 
determined empir i ca l ly . 
In the case of public housing, an expression f o r tenant bene f i t 
using the Cobb-Douglas u t i l i t y funct ion can be derived as f o l l o w s . 
6 4 . 
We seek to maximize the utility function, 
U = H ^ N ^ - ^ (3.1) 
subject to the budget constraint, 
Y = aPjjH + PfjN (3.2) 
where a(<l) is the proportion of private rental price per housing 
service unit by which this price is reduced. Partial differentiation 
of the appropriate Lagrangian, and solution of the resulting set of 
simultaneous equations for H and N , yields the following demand 
relations: 
. (3.3) 
aP 
M (l-g)Y (3.4) 
N = — 
A family with an"initial income of Y is given a public housing offer 
of H at aPjj per unit. This yields a utility level of 
U^ = H ^ N^"^ (3.1a) 
As Y - ctPjjH is income left for consumption of N , then by reference 
to (3.4), (3.1a) can be rewritten as 
1-3 
U^ = H ^ 
Y - aP„H 
ri 
(3.1b) 
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Hicks' equivalent variation is found by determining the level of income, 
Y* , th^t would cede U^ at the original price ratio (a=l) where the 
individual was not constrained in his housing choice. The appropriate 
expression for U^ is , under these circumstances. 
1 ^ p ^ p ^ ^H N 
(3 .1c) 
Setting (3 .1b) equal to (3 .1c ) , thus keeping the family on a given 
indifference curve, (U^) , and solving for Y* results in 
Y^ c = 
6 ^ Y - aP, H 
n 
1-3 
( 3 . 5 ) 
^ 3 ^ 1-3 
which is , of course, the expenditure function. At market prices, H 
would cost P^H which can be denoted R^ j^ . At subsidized prices, H 
costs oip H, that is R . Substituting into ( 3 . 5 ) yields 
Y* = 'r 
1 3 'y-r 
- m p 
^ 3 ^ ^ 1-3 
1-B 
(3 .5a) 
the level of 'income necessary'to yield the same level of utility at 
.V 
market prices as is yielded by the public housing offer. The expression 
• .1 
for tenant benefits is , then. 
T = 
3 f — ^ r Y-r 
m p 
3 ^ 1-3 
1-6 
- Y (3 . 6 ) 
Exactly the same expression can be derived in rent control 
situations. Where, in the public housing case, R^ was the rental on 
the public housing dwelling, we now interpret it as the controlled rent, 
ap^ T^T, where a is set by the rent controller and IT is the fixed amount 
of services yield by the controlled dwelling. R^ is equal to P^H. 
Now consider the HAE case. Suppose first a case where the partici-
pant consumes S/P^ = H units of housing yielding utility level. 
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l-B 
(3./) 
where Y is now defined as initial income plus the HAE cash payment. 
That is. 
Y = Y + (S - .25Y) 
= .75 Y + S 
(3.8) 
We now seek that level of income, Y*, which would yield the same utility 
as the HAE payment in a situation where no strings are attached. This 
utility level is 
3Y* B (l-B)Y* p. 
"N 
l-B 
(3.9) 
By equating (3.7) to (3.9) and using (3.8) we can solve for Y* as 
l-B 
Y* = s 
B ^ Y-S " 
B, l1-B (3.10) 
Tenant benefit is Y*-Y. In other cases where the participant ccnsumes 
more than S/P^ ^ units of housing services, thei HAE payment will be 
equivalent to a lump-sum income supplement, that is, Y*-Y = S-.25Y. 
No attempt is made to derive a tenant benefit expression for the 
urban renewal case. 
The major advantage of the Cobb-Douglas utility function is that 
only one parameter, B, is required. B is simply the proportion of 
income spent on housing in the unconstrained situation. It does not 
need to be estimated if this unconstrained choice is directly obser-
vable. In cases where B is not directly observable, Murray (1975, 
pp.774-775) sets out a procedure for its estimation (or at least this 
would appear to be the only rationale for setting out this procedure). 
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In his analysis of tenant benefits from public housing, Murray 
(1975) employs what he calls a "generalized CES" utility function of « 
the form (in our notation), 
U = (aHb + NC)d 
where, a, b, c and d are parameters. Murray sets out a complicated 
procedure to estimate these parameters. This function does not conform 
with the usual CES specification, unless parameters b and c are equal. 
This is why Murray calls the function a "generalization". Aaron and von 
Furstenberg (1971) have suggested the use of a CES function and set out 
a functional form which is in keeping with the accepted interpretation 
of that function. Other utility functions could be applied to the 
estimation of tenant benefits. 
Alternatively, one could begin directly with the expenditure 
function, thus dispensing with the explicit consideration of utility 
functions. This approach is a gift from the development of duality 
theory. 
A filial possibility is to ask tenants how much they value the 
benefits from the particulat housing program,^ This approach is used 
by Flowerdew and Rodriguez (1978) in relation to urban renewal 
programs.^ This method could also be used in situations of rent 
control, public housing and housing allowances. One difficulty in 
applying this method may be one of preference-revelation. Interviewees 
may be unwilling to reveal their true preferences if it was felt this 
might jeopardize the continuance of their subsidy. 
1 In situations where moves are required (as in urban renewal prog-
rammes) , moving costs are incurred. If an interview method is used 
to ascertain tenant benefits, moving costs will tend to get tangled 
up in the measure. 
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5. Individual Versus Average Data « 
In applying any of the measures of tenant benefit it is desirable 
to have data at the individual level so as to avoid the possibility of 
aggregation bias. It is interesting to inquire into the extent of any 
aggregation bias as it is sometimes the case that average data only is 
available. 
In his study of rent control in New York City, Olsen (1972) 
applies the simple Marshallian surplus measure to the evaluation of 
individual tenant benefits from rent restrictions. A unit elastic 
demand curve is assumed for each tenant. Only the position of the 
curve can vary. The sample size is very large - 5,915 families. 
Total tenant benefits from rent control in New York City are 
estimated to be $270 million in 1968 - an average of $213 for the 
1 ,266 ,829 families in controlled dwellings. However the total cost 
of rent control to landlords (R -R ) was found to be a massive 
, m P 
$514 million or $406 per dwelling. This might suggest, from our 
previous analysis, that families were consuming an amount of housing 
services, under rent control, considerably less than they would have 
under free market conditions ( i . e . H^-H is large) . However this is 
not the case - Olsen's mean sample value of R is $1,405 while P H^ m rt m 
is $1 , 470 . The average family would only consume 4 . 6 per cent more 
housing if totally free to choose. This seems to suggest that tenant 
benefit should be quite close to the rent differential , or 
the cost to landlords. However when Olsen uses the average data to 
calculate the SMS (R^ = $999, R^ = $1 ,405 and P^^H^ = $1 ,470) he finds 
this very result - tenant benefit in total is $513.1 million (almost 
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$405 per family) which i s extremely c l o s e to the simple rent saving. « 
Olsen re l egates th is f inding to a f oo tnote where i t i s noted that 
"the use of aggregate data can resu l t in large errors in estimating 
the b e n e f i t s and waste from government programs that do not simply 
reduce the pr i ce of a good from some one l e v e l to some other l eve l 
f o r a l l subsidized fami l i es " ( f n . 18, p .1094) . Unfortunately 
there i s no explanation of the d e f i c i e n c y . 
In pr ivate correspondence with the author^. Professor Olsen expanded 
on the discrepancy with an i l l u s t r a t i v e example and other empirical 
evidence. The i l l u s t r a t i v e example points to the importance of the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of house-space across indiv iduals . Mean values mask the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . Deviations from the mean cancel out while s t i l l being 
respons ib le f o r wel fare l o s ses . The other empirical evidence was a 
re f e rence to a study of tenant bene f i t s from public housing, Kraft 
and Olsen (1976). These authors found mean tenant b e n e f i t s of $54 per 
month using individual data compared with $72. per month using average 
data. The mean transfer was $74 per month. A De Salvo-type measure 
was used in their study. 
In a study of rent contro l in the Australian Capital Terr i tory 
(see Chapter 7 ) , a crude attempt i s made to apply the De Salvo measure 
using a Cobb-Douglas u t i l i t y funct ion and average data. I t i s l i k e l y 
that the use of average data in th is appl i cat ion may not r e su l t in 
too much b i a s . The d i spar i ty between the resu l t of using average as 
against indiv idual data w i l l be greater the more dispersed i s constrained 
1 Letter from E.O. Olsen to R.P. Albon, June 9, 1977. 
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consumption relative to desired levels. On this basis the New York 
City b las would exceed that In Canberra because rent control had 
prevailed for longer In the former city than In the latter. The 
longer rent control Is In force the more the pattern of desired 
consumption will diverge from the actual pattern. The divergence 
will result from changes In incomes, family sizes, tastes, etc. 
Before closing this chapter, one further aspect of Olsen's (1972) 
study deserves attention. As it applied the SMS, an upward bias would 
be expected. Applying the De Salvo measure to the average data and 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function (B is $1,470/$6,229 = 0.236) 
results in an average tenant benefit figure of $393. The average figure 
for the SMS is $405^. This constitutes a particular example of 
the general result that SMS > EV for a normal good. 
1 Olsen's use of a unit elastic demand curve is consistent with a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
-CHAPTER 4 
THE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY OF RENTAL HOUSING^ 
The responsiveness of the supply of housing to changes In demand 
(and rents) Is the most crucial empirical Issue to be decided In 
relation to the Informed formulation of housing policy. The effects 
of rent control, for example, are dependent on the elasticity of supply. 
o 
If supply Is Inelastic, as many suggest, then rent control may^ not 
have the adverse supply effects usually associated with that policy. 
Inelastic supply conditions will also thwart the success of a housing 
allowance scheme. No appraisal of rental housing policy would be 
complete without careful consideration of the all-important supply issue. 
All the evidence on the supply issue points to a high elasticity of 
supply for all housing and for rental housing, alone. This evidence -
all from the United States - is reviewed in this chapter. There is no 
Australian study which provides any substantial evidence on the question 
of supply response. However, the Australian literature contains many 
assertions, that the supply of (rental) housing is highly inelastic with 
respect to -rents. The surfeit af assertions and the dearth of evidence 
sit uneasily together. 
The major concern of this chapter Is to provide some evidence for a 
prior belief that the elasticity of supply of rental - and other -
housing is highly elastic. In addition to reviewing the considerable 
U.S. evidence, two attempts are made to furnish some Australian 
evidence. Firstly, time series data from the Australian Capital 
Territory is used in regression analysis of the supply relationship. 
1 An Initial attempt at coming to grips with this problem is embodied 
in a paper presented at the 1979 La Trobe Economists' Conference 
(Albon, 1979c). Considerably more work has since been performed. 
2 If total supply is inelastic, the supply of rental housing can still 
be elastic. 
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Secondly, some other quantitative and qualitative evidence is brought 
to bear-on the question. 
Review of Australian Studies on Supply Response 
Most Australian writers on the issue of supply response have been 
satisfied to make assertions, one way or the other, without the backing 
of reasoned argument and/or careful empirical analysis. An example of 
an unfounded allegation of inelastic supply can be found in Apps (1976). 
Other examples are cited in Chapter 10 where we discuss the housing 
allowance issue. 
The paucity of Australian evidence is reflected in Neutze and 
Bethune's (1979) review of Australian urban economics. These authors 
discuss the issue on pages 86-88, especially in relation to capital 
gains as a stimulus to rental housing investment. Then, on page 90, 
when discussing the abandoned Housing Allowance Experiment, Neutze and 
Bethune assert that "tt]he main economic argument against provision of 
assistance in cash is that supply may be price inelastic (Australian 
Institute of Urban Studies 1975). This is less likely to be a problem 
as long as-governments still,construct housing for rent and sale 
(Stretton 1974)". The AIUS reference gives no evidence to support 
I 
Neutze and Bethune's first assertion. Instead we find non sequiturs 
such as: "...[T]he increased demand [for rental housing] is not taking 
the usual form of a demand-price satisfactory to the prospective 
supplier. Rents are sticky. People are showing a marked reluctance 
to pay the much higher rents which the investor would have to charge 
to make a profit, and consequently the necessary supply of investors 
is absent" (p.38). IThile arguing that inflation may make investment 
in rental housing attractive - because of possible capital gain - the 
AIUS goes on to say that "[i]n a sense the people who are being phased 
out are the legitimate investors, the people who go into an enterprise 
to make income from it, leaving only those who can afford to gamble on a 
73. 
capital-gain ... [I]n the present configuration of costs, interest 
rates and expenses of running, investment in rental housing is quite 
unprofitable" (p.39). TJhat is missing from the AIUS reference is any 
real evidence. There is an assertion of a "marked shortage of rental 
housing ... and a rise in rents" (p.38) and an observation that strata 
titles were becoming more prevalent. Tlie lack of evidence shows up clearly 
in the tentative way the AIUS opens its conclusion to this discussion: 
ii this exodus from the rental investment market has been occurring 
..." (italics added). The AIUS does proceed to discuss the deleterious 
effects of local council regulations on the costs of rental housing 
provision.^ The other reference given by Neutze and Bethune is 
equally disappointing. Stretton (1974) is attributed with showing that 
government housing provision mitigates the problem of inelastic private 
supply conditions. This would be difficult to demonstrate, both in 
principle or empirically. Stretton does neither. This issue is taken 
up later in this chapter and in Chapter 10. 
One study of rental housing supply which did hold considerable 
promise was the Rental Investment Study conducted by Dr. John Paterson 
(of the New South Wales Planning and Environment Commission) in asso-
ciation with the Australian Housing Research Council. While all the 
survey data has been collected, it has not been processed and inter-
preted. Apparently Dr. Paterson has withdrawn from the undertaking. 
However the data may still form the concrete basis necessary to fully 
resolve the supply issue in Australia. 
1 The effects of these regulations are probably very important and are 
deserving of careful study. 
2 One interesting side-effect of the defunct Australian Housing 
Allowance Experiment would have been the generation of a rich bank 
of cross-section data suitable for sophisticated cross-sectional 
regression analysis. 
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2. Assumptions about the Supply of Land 
Suppose, as one extreme, that the supply of urban land were fixed. 
In these circumstances, it might be thought that eventually there would 
arise a classic Ricardian situation where increases in demand for 
housing would result purely in increased returns ("rents") to the 
suppliers of the factor in fixed supply (land). The supply of housing 
(in total) would be perfectly inelastic. This type of situation would 
never arise. Firstly, the supply of urban land is never rigidly fixed. 
Even in places like Hong Kong, where the conditions for a Ricardian case 
are most appropriate, new land is created by filling in the sea. 
Secondly, even if the supply were fixed, supply of housing services 
would not be perfectly inelastic unless structures and land were 
required in fixed proportions. Housing services are not produced via 
a fixed coefficients production technology. Structures can be variable 
in height and "quality". Arnott (1978) has pursued this aspect of the 
supply issue and has defined the "elasticity of supply Of structures 
on a fixed area of land to be the reciprocal of the percentage increase 
in the average construction costs of a unit of structure from a percent-
/ 
age increase in structural density" (p.295). .This is a variant of a 
definition earlier proposed by Grieson (1974). 
As interesting as it may be to theorize of such matters, for 
practical purposes we require a concept of supply elasticity which 
allows land and structures to vary. This is, of course, what we 
typically observe in actuality. Much new housing in our cities is 
broad-acre development on the suburban fringes. Flat/unit construction 
is largely confined to the redevelopment of intra-marginal areas of the 
city. In addition, existing stock can be altered and added to. 
Ideally, then, we would encompass all of these three types of supply 
response in our analysis. 
75. 
3. Empirical Approaches 
(a> The Housing Production Function 
As we have noted, the supply of housing services can be seen in 
terms of a production function relating housing services to inputs of 
structures and land. One approach to the elasticity of housing supply 
would be to attempt to estimate the production function. If this 
function was constant returns to scale and if the long-run supply 
elasticities of land and structures are both perfectly elastic, the 
long-run supply of housing would be perfectly elastic. A skilled 
exponent of this approach is Richard Muth (1969 and 1971).^ The 
expectation would be that structures could be reproduced at constant 
per unit cost but that land would not be so reproducible. As a city 
expands, land in "better" locations will assume a premium value as rents 
are bid up, largely due to transport cost advantages. Further, the 
total amount of land in a city may be severely limited and difficult 
to increase (e.g. Hong Kong). Whether this is important or not depends 
on the elasticity of substitution of land for structures and the 
relative importance of land and structures.^ Muth's investigations 
lead him to the conclusion tliat "even if the supply of land were per-
fectly inelastic, housing subsidies to loyer income families would have 
little effect upon housing prices" (1971, p.244). 
(b) The Indirect Method 
Yet another method has been proposed by Smith (1976) and, less 
obviously, by Grieson (1974). The empirical method is "indirect" as 
it does not rely on direct estimation of a supply function or production 
1 An interesting paper by Rydell (1976) considers alternative means 
of proceeding and concludes in favour of the production function 
method. 
2 Estimates of the elasticity of substitution vary markedly (see, for 
example, Smith, 1976 and Sirmans, Kau and Lee, 1979). 
3 Land is usually found to be about one-quarter of the value of a house 
and land. 
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function. A rent supply elasticity is inferred from a formula requiring 
data only on land prices (a measure of economic rent) and total market 
price of a house and land. Consider Figure 4.1, reproduced from Smith 
(1976, p.392). R is economic rent and C is resource cost. Given first 
approximations, the change in economic rent is dR = QdP and the change 
in resource cost is dC = PdQ. The change in total expenditures is dE 
= dR + dC. Given the definition of supply elasticity as Eg = PdQ/QdP 
(noting the misprint i.n Smith) , it is simple to derive 
F - dE _ 1 
Smith believes that the "direct approach to estimating supply elasti-
cities is generally preferred except where output measurements are 
difficult" (pp.392-393). This is often the case with housing studies. 
It would seem that Smith's method is dependent on the stability of the 
supply curve. If the supply curve were to shift around, the simple 
result would seem to be in jeopardy (that is, supply would not be 
identified). 
This method also yields,-quite high estimates of the elasticity of 
I. 
supply. Grieson estimates a supply elasticity of structures of 2.36 
using 1970 U.S. average data. Smith estimates partial elasticities of 
quality and density with respect to the market price of 3.75 and 5.26, 
respectively. Again these estimates give no grounds for pessimism about 
supply response. 
(c) Cross-Section Regression Analysis 
Several studies of the rental housing supply function employ cross-
section data on rents, incomes, family size, distance from the central 
business district, operating costs, etc. These studies rely on the ploy 
of deriving a reduced form equation by eliminating the quantity variable 
which is not directly observable. One such study is that of de Leeuw 
and Ekanem (1971) which employs 1967 U.S. cross-section data to derive 
Price '' 
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FIGURE 4.1 (from Smith, 1976, p.392) 
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elasticities of supply of .3, .5 and .7 for high-, moderate- arjd low-
income housing, respectively. As these are allegedly long-run elasti-
cities, they give some grounds for pessimism, de Leeuw and Ekanem con-
clude that "subsidizing the demand for low-income housing would drive 
up rents" (p.817). Grieson (1973) re-specified the de Leeuw and Ekanem 
equations and re-estimated to find figures of .37, 1.8 and 2.2 for the 
three respective categories, de Leeuw and Ekanem (1973) largely accept 
Grieson's re-specification but refer to two concepts of "long-run" -
one where the quantity of structures can be varied, the other (longer) 
long-run where the form of existing housing capital can be altered. 
They concede that in this "second long run, at least under competitive 
conditions, prices per unit of housing service presumably approach new 
construction prices (plus local land rents) for all types of housing. 
Since the construction of new housing is a replicable process, we might 
expect (input prices aside) constant returns to scale to characterize, 
at least approximately, this long run" (p.437). Again we have an 
optimistic assessment of supply response. 
A final fexample of a cross-section study is that of Vaughn (1976) 
which estimates supply elasticities as a by-product of analysing the 
. A '' 
housing demand function. Vaughn argues that "the supply price elas-
ticity must be infinite for there to be no bias in the income elasti-
city estimate" (p.47). By use of an interesting method, Vaughn infers 
a supply price elasticity of 1.63 for renter-occupied Negro households. 
Again, this is a quite high elasticity which is applicable (it must be 
assumed) to de Leeuw and Ekanem's shorter "long-run". 
(d) Time-Series Regression Analysis 
Analysis of the elasticity of supply using time-series data has 
not been a favoured means of procedure in previous studies. Muth (1960) 
raised the possibility of estimating a short-run supply elasticity using 
time-series data but dismissed it because of conceptual and data diffi-
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culties. Maisel (1963) estimated an equation for housing starts in the « 
United States, 1950M to 1952S, v/hich has explanatory variables including 
the ratio of rents to housing costs. A significant positive correlation 
between starts and the rent/cost variable was found.^ 
The analysis of the housing supply function via time-series data 
is fraught with difficulties but is still a fruitful endeavour. In this 
chapter, Australian Capital Territory data is used in an attempt to 
estimate short- and long-run rent elasticities of supply for flats. 
Some of the problems of using time-series data for this purpose are 
discussed in this section. 
In addition to the usual problems of identification and "partial 
adjustment", time-series regression analysis of rental housing supply 
raises two peculiar problems in relation to the dependent variable. 
One major difficulty arises because rental housing, owner-
occupied housing and vacant housing is readily transferable 
between categories. The supply of rental housing may result from new 
construction or by transfer ftom. owner-occupancy or vacancy. A reso-
t 
lution in terms of .a disentanglement of new construction by intention 
i 
is out of the question. Fortunately, a solution suggested itself. 
Ironically, the answer lay in the very root cause of the problem - the 
high degree of substitutibility, on the supply side, of different forms 
of housing for one another. 
Consider Figure 4.2 which represents the total housing market in 
long-run equilibrium. Demand for rental housing is and demand for 
owner-occupied housing (also a function of rental per unit of housing 
1 Reference should be made to the work of Whitehead (1971, 1974) on 
the United Kingdom housing market. Supply functions are estimated 
for housing starts and "elasticities" are estimated. Real and 
nominal values seem to be confused. A stock adjustment specifi-
cation is not employed and (useless) flow elasticities are calcu-
lated. In the latter respect. Whitehead makes the same mistake 
as Albon (1979c). 
(R/P) 
Long-run 
rental price 
CXJ o 
FIGURE 4.2 
81. 
service) is indicated by D^. Differences in tax treatment of owner-
occupiefs and landlords are ignored. The market clears the fixed 
quantity of housing services, Q, at the long-run rental price, with Q^ ^ 
housing units being rented and Q^ units being occupied by owners. 
Any new supply would be forthcoming along the short-run supply curve, 
S. There would be a whole series of such supply curves, one for each 
construction period, which, given an increase in demand (Dj^  and/or 
DQ) would trace out an adjustment path to a new long-run equilibrium. 
For convenience, we assume that long-run supply is perfectly elastic. 
Now suppose that the advent of a housing allowance scheme were to 
raise demand for rental housing to Dj^ '. The initial response would 
involve renters and potential renters, armed with housing allowances, 
bidding for the fixed supply of housing from owner-occupiers. They 
would initially be able to bid away Qj^ ' - Qj^  units, raising the 
rental price to (R/P)'. However, the higher rent would attract new 
•f 
entry according to S. At the end of the first construction period, the 
total stock of housing, services would have expanded to Q'. D^ must 
now be re-drawn to the Q' axis and will cut D^ '^ to the south-east of 
the current intersection, indicating a lower rent and higher quantities 
of rental housing and' partial restoration of the amount of owner-
occupied housing. More new supply is evoked in the second construction 
period, and, if long-run supply is perfectly elastic, a new long-run 
equilibrium will eventually be restored with the original long-run 
rental price and all of the allowance-induced demand being 
accommodated.^ 
1 This analysis has some interesting implications. For example, the 
usual analysis of rent control when supply is fixed is incorrect. 
When total supply is fixed, a rise in demand for rental accommo-
dation only will not raise rents by the same amount as when it is 
assumed that the supply of rental housing is fixed. As we have 
shown, the same is also true when demand for rental housing rises 
due to the introduction of a housing allowance scheme. 
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The Important implication of this analysis for estimation -of the 
supply curve is that the dependent variable, AQ^., should include all 
units, whether intended for rental or owner-occupancy. The short-run 
flow supply curve, AQ^. = f(Rj./P^), will be identified, given that 
only the demand curve shifts. The identification problem is discussed 
below. 
Another difficulty with the dependent variable relates to the 
heterogeneity of housing, the ideal solution would be to convert all 
dwellings to homogeneous housing ser\'^ice units. As dwellings range from 
shacks to mansions, the conversion is far from simple. The crudest 
possible correction would be a division into "houses" and "flats". More 
sophisticated divisions are possible depending on data availability. 
Use of time-series data to estimate demand and/or supply relation-
ships always involves a potential identification problem. Consider 
Figure 4.3(a) where the flow supply curve, AQ^ = f,(Rj./P|-) is 
identified. The supply curve does not shift; only the demand curve is 
subject to'shifting. A regression of quantity on rental price would 
yield a supply curve. Condi-tions unfavourable to estimation of a supply 
curve are sho^-m in Figure 4.3(b). Here a regression of quantity on 
price would yield a demand curve. In short, we need a relatively stable 
supply curve with a demand curve that shifts around, if we are to 
successfully estimate a supply curve by simple regression. 
However, there are other possible problems of identification. 
Consider Figure 4.3(c) which shows a rather deceptive case. The 
observations seem superficially consistent with the supply curve being 
identified but, in fact, the supply curve also shifts. In the case 
shown, simple regression would yield an underestimate of the true supply 
elasticity. Figure 4.3(d) is a case where the demand and supply curves 
shift in an offsetting fashion such that some very price-inelastic 
"supply curve" (or "demand curve") would be fitted. These circumstances 
83. 
R 
P 
A 
AQ AQ 
Figure 4.3(a) Figure 4.3(b) 
fitted "supply 
curve' 
/ 
R 
P 
Q 
AQ 
Figure 4.3(c) Figure 4.3(d) 
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might arise where demand for rental housing is rising at the same time 
as increasingly more stringent local government regulations are raising 
the costs of flat/unit development. Such regulations may take the form 
of zoning, specification of minimum standards or imposition of maximum 
height/plot ratios. There is some evidence that regulations have had 
an effect in many localities in the larger cities (see, for example, 
Paterson, Yencken and Gunn, 1976).^ 
Finally, there is the problem of accounting for inter-temporal 
changes in the extent of supply response. The short-run response will 
be considerably less than the long-run response. One way of estimating 
the long-run elasticity is via the partial adjustment specification. 
If we specify the desired level of stock, Q^*, as a function of rental 
price (and, possibly, other variables), ignoring the disturbance, 
Q^* = a + 3(R,./Pj.),' 
and a partial adjustment equation for new construction, 
• AQt = ^(Qt* -
then we derive an estimating form of ' 
Aq^ = aA + -
A short-run elasticity can be calculated from the estimate of 3X and 
the long-run elasticity from 3. 
(e) Other (Less Sophisticated) Methods 
Many people would argue that elaborate statistical methods are 
unnecessary to demonstrate that the supply of rental housing is not 
inelastic, except in the very short-run. They might point to the 
1 The Priorities Review Staff (1975) also commented on the effects of 
these regulations. The PRS was concerned that it is "the poor who 
are most likely to be harmed by restrictions of the sort being 
discussed" (p.131). 
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apparent failure of rents to rise, relative to other prices, over a very 
long period of time. They may, indeed, mention an Australia-wide^ 
fall in real rents over recent years, despite a rise in the relative 
importance of the private rental sector. In the United States the 
Housing Allowance Supply Experiment strongly indicates that the results 
of housing allowance programmes in Brown County (Wisconsin) and St Joseph 
County (Indiana) "reveal no significant price increases beyond those clearly 
attributable to national price inflation - especially rising energy prices" 
(Barnett and Lo\,n:y, 1979, p.v). The major method applied was a comparison 
of rent inflation in..the programme areas with national rent inflation. 
A. Time-Series Regression Analysis of A.C.T. Data 
(a) Identification and Specification Problems 
In the light of the discussion of likely difficulties in using 
time-series data to analyse the housing supply function, it is necessary 
to consider whether these problems are going to arise when working with 
Australian Capital Territory data covering the period since late 1973. 
Here we examine only identification and specification problems. Some 
of the other hazards are discussed, after the results are presented, 
to guide the reader as to how to interpret the results. 
t 
A priori reasoning seems to suggest that the supply curve will be 
readily identifiable in the Australian Capital Territory. The demand 
curve has probably shifted very much while the supply curve has been 
quite stable, over our data period. Demand for private housing is a 
function of many things other than price per housing service unit 
("rent"). These other factors include incomes, cost and availability 
of finance (for owner-occupied housing), conditions pertaining to 
Government house and flat rentals and sales, and the rate of immigration 
to the Territory. All of these factors have shown considerable 
volatility. For instance, the rents of government dwellings have risen 
1 Although this has not been true of Sydney in recent years. 
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dramatically since the mid-1970's. According to the ABS Government Rent 
Index (a c omponent of the A«C»T« CPI), rents rose almost exactly three-
fold between 1973D and 1978D. Private rents rose by only about 29 per 
cent over the same period. A severe means test was imposed on Govern-
ment housing in 1974. Previously a waiting list was the rationing 
device. The rate of population growth has also fluctuated considerably. 
In 1971 it was running at nearly 10 per cent per annum compared to about 
2 per cent now. Over the "Whitlam Years" it was around 7 per cent. 
There is no need to document the considerable changes in the conditions 
of finance facing prospective home-buyers. In short, there is substan-
tial reason to believe that the demand curve for housing has been sub-
ject to marked shifts over recent years. If it can be shown that the 
supply curve has been relatively stable, we have ideal conditions for 
directly estimating a supply curve. 
The supply curve will basically reflect construction costs and land 
costs. Regressions of quantity on rents will reveal these costs, if 
the supply curve is identified. VThat factors may shift the supply 
curve? If this were a study'of say Melbourne or Sydney, local 
government building and zoning regulations would have to be taken into 
account.'- These have changed markedly in recent years elsewhere, 
but not in the A.C.T. One factor peculiar to Canberra was the existence 
of rent control over the period from 1973D to 1976M (see Chapter 7). 
It may be argued that rent control would create a "movement along" 
rather than a "shift in" the supply curve. However, this ignores a 
separate "expectational" effect of rent control (see Chapters 2, 6 and 
8) which has been tested for by the inclusion of a rent control dummy 
1 A regression method for dealing with gradual structural shifts has 
been proposed by Wilton (1975). This technique may be potentially 
useful in time-series supply studies of the Melbourne and Sydney 
rental markets. 
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over the period of control.^ the rent variable will, of course, pick 
up any 'Wvement along" the supply curve, if supply is identified. 
There may be other factors which have shifted the supply curve. If the 
simple regressions are unsuccessful this will be prima facie evidence 
of the existence of such "omitted variables". 
Because flats/units are far more likely to be built for rental than 
are houses, it was decided to work with them exclusively. A partial 
adjustment specification, as set out earlier, was used. While a rent 
variable immediately suggests itself for inclusion, the form of this 
variable is not entirely obvious. Further, it was necessary to consider 
the inclusion of other explanatory variables. 
It was expected that investment decisions would not be related 
to current values of the rent variable. Investors are hardly likely to 
respond immediately to a single period (quarterly) rise in rent. They 
would need to be convinced that this was not a temporary phenomenon before 
making such a permanent decision. It was further 'obvious that the rent 
variable would have to.be in real terms - investors presumably do not 
suffer from money illusion. Deflating rents by the consumer price index 
i .f 
and a house price index are. possibilities. A final problem arose in 
relation to capital gains - should these be included as they may form part 
of the investor's return? For at least two reasons, capital gains (and 
losses) have not been incorporated. One very pragmatic reason is that it 
is extremely difficult to do so. Investors will react to anticipated 
capital gains (losses). Such anticipations are very hard to measure and 
model. Actual changes in value are of very little help. A second excuse 
is that long-run real capital gains are non-existent or very small if 
1 Rent control was imposed rather suddenly and unexpectedly - even taking 
the administrators by surprise. The best laid plans of mice and men 
were disturbed. The rent control dummy is, perhaps, designed to pick 
up a "disruptive" effect more than an "expectational" effect. 
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properly measured. This is not to deny that prospects of gains or 
losses vjill be important at particular times. 
Other explanatory variables, apart from lagged stock and the rent 
control dummy, were considered. One such variable that might be 
considered is a real rate of interest. While this variable may have 
some influence on supply it was not used because it will primarily have 
its effect on the demand side of the market. Secondly, the extent of 
Government dwelling construction might be tried. Again this is, in 
part, a demand-side variable but which also has claims as a supply 
influence, particularly on the basis of it being an important influence 
on expectations. A negative sign on this variable v/ould be expected. 
(b) The Data 
Quarterly data on the relevant variables were collected for the 
Australian Capital Territory over the period 1973D to 1979J, giving an 
initial 23 observations. Observations were "lost" due to averaging and 
lagging. Each variable is described in turn. The major variables are 
set out in Table 4.1. . 
Commencements of Flats ( C F ) T h i s variable was collected from the ABS 
publication "Building,Statistics: Australian Capital Territory" (AGFS, 
Canberra), various issues. Only private commencements are included. 
Over the data period the series fluctuates very widely from 0 in 1975M 
to 205 in 1973D. The mean is about 100 over the sample period. The 
considerable fluctuation necessitated some smoothing - the raw variable 
was just too variable to explain. The extreme volatility is largely 
due to the lumpiness of flat/unit projects in the context of a small 
aggregate. The variable has been smoothed by specifying a moving 
average form. Our variable, MACF^ is equal to l/3(CFj._^ + CF^ 
-HCF^+l). 
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Table 4 . 1 ; Data Used In A . C . T . Regressions 
CF MACF SF GHFC R H RHLAG 
1973 D 205 146 5389 194 100.0 100.0 
1974 M 145 167 5441 143 100.8 103.4 
J 151 99 5508 195 101.4 109.8 98 .8 
S 2 89 5624 241 101.6 117.2 95.0 
D 114 39 5768 427 102.0 123.5 89 .6 
1975 M 0 64 5944 318 102.9 128.0 84.7 
J 79 46 6167 436 105.1 132.9 81.5 
S 58 58 6209 595 106.1 138.9 79.8 
D 37 56 6326 338 107.9 142.8 77.8 
1976 M 72 53 6455 173 110.9 146.8 76.0 
J 50 86 6505 342 • 115.8 150.6 75.6 
S 137 115 6539 264 118.8 153.5 76.2 
D 157 146 6606 163 120.5 .155.7 77.2 
1977 M 144 126 6680 107 120.6 155.9 77.8 
J 77 102 6815 138 122.7 156.7 77.4 
S • 86 104 6942 194 124.3 157.0 77.9 
D ' 149 106 ..'7111 409 125.0 157.1 78.8 
1978 M 83 1'14 7186 43 125.4 157.9 79.4 
J 109 • 108 7352 83 126.8 157.6 79.5 
S 133 102 7380 76 128.1 159.4 80.0 
D 65 115 7479 67 128.7 161.1 80 .5 
1979 M 148 106 7566 58 129.4 163.7 80.2 
J 106 7699 0 130.1 167.2 79.5 
S 130.8 168.7 78.4 
D 131.2 171.4 77.7 
Sources: See Text. 
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Stock of Flats (SF): The base of the stock is arbitrary, but the stock 
of private flats was.known as at the June 1971 Census. The Stock series 
was constructed by accumulating quarterly completions of flats on the 
basic figure of 4703. This assumes no demolitions. Completions were 
taken from the ABS' "Building Statistics ...", various issues. 
Rent and Price Variables: All rent and price variables are from the 
ABS publication, "Constimer Price Index; Index Numbers for Groups, Sub-
Groups and Special Groupings, Canberra" (various issues). The rent 
index (R) covers "rent, privately owned houses and flats" with base 
1973D = 100. While a combined index over such a short period is far 
from ideal, it was the best available.^ Two deflators, P and H, were 
collected. P, the Canberra consumer price index was converted to base 
1973D = 100. H is "house price, repairs and maintenance" for Canberra, 
also converted to 1973D = 100. It is regarded as a "cost index" from 
the investor's viewpoint. Two variables were formed which incorporated 
lags. These are "RPLAG", 1/2 [ ( R j . _ j ) + ^^^ 
RHLAG, + (Rt-2''^t-2 ^  ^ ' 
Rent Control Dummy (RCD): This variable is equal to 1 over the period 
of compulsory rent control, 1973D to 1976M. 
"1 
Government Dwelling Construction (GHFC): Quarterly figures on 
Government house and flat completions were collected from the ABS 
publication, "Building Statistics: Australian Capital Territory" 
(op.cit.), various issues. House and flat completions were aggregated 
to form the variable GHFC. 
1 There is some evidence that house and flat rents moved in a disparite 
fashion. In the rent control period, the rent controller allowed 
a higher rate of return on flats than on houses. According to RESI 
data (see RESI, 1975, Appendix 10), rents of furnished flats rose 
8.18 per cent from 1973S to 1974S while furnished house rents fell 
0.5 7 per cent over the same period. To overcome these problems an 
attempt was made to construct a separate index for houses and flats 
based on data collected from the "To Let" columns of the "Canberra 
Times". Construction of an index was frustrated by the paucity of 
data over the rent control period when "To Let" columns dwindled 
dramatically. 
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(c) Estimation Procedure 
ThQ equations reported here are estimated on the Australian 
National University's package programme AUTREGAL (see Pagan, 1976). This 
regression package allows for the use of many quite sophisticated 
regression techniques, including "correction" for autocorrelation by 
a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
Where an equation displayed evidence of autocorrelation, it was 
re-estimated encompassing the "correction" for the appropriate order 
of autocorrelation. Autocorrelation was detected by perusal of the 
correlogram of autocorrelation coefficients. Standard tests for auto-
correlation are inapplicable in the presence of a lagged stock variable 
and the test statistics are not reported. 
It should also be noted that the "moving average" procedure used 
in the equations for flats may introduce econometric problems. A moving 
average process may be introduced into the disturbance. This problem 
arose in relation to a moving average specification of wage equations, 
and is discussed by Rowley and -Wilton (1974) and by Kenward (1975). 
A close examination of the correlograms (after autocorrelation 
correction) of the .preferred equations does not indicate that the moving 
I 
average procedure is a problem in these regressions. 
(d) The Results 
After variables were lagged and the moving average commencement 
variable formed there were effectively 20 quarterly observations over 
1974J to 1979M. Equations were run beginning with the purest form of 
the hypothesis before adding other variables mentioned earlier. All the 
"usual" problems of experimentation were encountered and a considerable 
pile of print-out was amassed. Even so, the results are not particu-
larly exciting. 
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The simple hypothesis involved the estimation of an equation with 
explanatory variables being the lagged rent variable and lagged stock. 
The estimated equation is^ 
MACF^ = -228.27 + 1.20 RHLAG + .034 
(-1.47) (1.03) (2.93)* 
= .36 SE = 24.703 
The equation is unsatisfactory in several respects. In particular, the 
lagged stock variable has the wrong sign, the rent variable is statisti-
cally insignificant,^ the R^ is very low and there were signs of 
first-order autocorrelation in the correlogram of residuals. 
Inclusion of the rent control dummy improves matters to some extent, 
yielding 
1-lACF^  = 118.03 + 1. 152 RHLAG - 73.12 RCD - .014 
(1.46) (2.12)* (-7.44)** (-1.70) 
P2 = .45 R^ = .81 SE = 14.30 
(1.93)* :: ; 
The equation has been run with a second-order autocorrelation correction 
and there is no significant autocorrelation evident in the correlogram 
of the corrected equation. The lagged stock variable has the right sign 
and is reasonably significant. The coefficient is indicative of a very 
long mean lag (adjustment period), even though a long lag would be 
1 The Durbin-Watson statistic is inapplicable in these equations. The 
Durbin statistic is not calculable. One asterisk indicates signifi-
cance at at 95 per cent level, two asterisks infers 99 per cent. 
The R^ is the coefficient of determination (uncorrected) and SE 
is the standard error. 
2 All equations reported contain RHLAG which proved most successful 
in the experimentation. 
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expected. The R is quite respectable. Based on mean values of 
the stock and rent variables, the implied short-run elasticity of supply 
with respect to the rent variable is .0149. The long-run elasticity 
is 1.062. 
Experimentation with equations which included the government house 
construction variable were not very successful. The presence of GHFC 
resulted in the following equation: 
MACFj. = 255.34 + .314 RHLAG - 62.22 RCD - .071 GHFC^. 
(2.87)** (.54) (-6.37)** (-2.21)* 
-0.022 
(2.93)** 
p2 = .55 
(2.32)* 
r2 = .86 SE = 12.60 
Unfortunately, the insignificance of the coefficient on the rent variable 
mars an otherwise impressive equation. All variables have the expected 
sign, including GHFC. . 
• / • 
(e) Interpretation of the Results 
" i 
(i) The supply elast.icities from the preferred equation are supportive 
of a very inelastic short-run supply response and a fairly high "long-
run" response. Indeed, the "long-run" elasticity is such that, given 
a rent elasticity of demand of one, that .52 of a specific subsidy would 
end up in tenants' "hands".^ However, two points must be kept in 
mind. Firstly the "long-run" to which we are referring is de Leeuw and 
Ekanem's first long-run - not the longer long-run when a very high 
elasticity would be expected. Secondly, the estimates of the 
1 The implied adjustment period is "too long" and reflects an inadequacy 
of data and/or specification. 
2 This result is dependent on simple partial-equilibrium incidence 
analysis. Most recent studies indicate a demand elasticity of less 
than one and, thus, a higher proportion of the subsidy falling on 
tenants. 
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elasticities are biased downwards by the use of actual units -.and not « 
housing services - as the dependent variable. To the extent that 
"quality" went up over the data period,^ the coefficient on the rent 
variable will be biased downwards. 
(ii) The results are indicative of an adverse effect of rent control 
on supply. This evidence is of two kinds. Firstly, a positive supply 
elasticity itself is indicative of an adverse effect. This result was 
found by Maisel (1963) for United States data. Maisel found that "the 
relatively low level of rents resulting from rent control seems to have 
had a depressing effect on starts through most of 1952, ... [but in] 
1953 and 1954, rents shot up much faster than costs, thus adding to the 
expansion" (p.377). Secondly, the rent control dummy enters with a 
highly significant negative sign. I'Thile this cannot be interpreted as 
an "expectational" effect, it is evidence of a disruptive effect - the 
short-run substitutibility on the supply-side is limited. There is also 
some evidence of development plans being switched to Queanbeyan. 
(iii) There is some evidence of a role for Government house and flat 
construction as a "crowding 'gut" agent. (Unfortunately, GHFC also 
"crowded out" the rent variable.) The verification that increased public 
housing activity reduces private activity is not without significance, 
and contradicts the views of some "supply pessimists". 
(iv) The results have considerable limitations. Some have already been 
mentioned. Others include the following: The data period is quite short 
and covers a turbulent period. The rent variable is an amalgam of flat 
and house rents, not flat/unit rents alone. Experimentation with long 
lags on the rent variable was ruled out by a shortage of observations. 
There must be some uneasiness about the exclusion of capital gains and 
losses from consideration. The links between the Canberra and Queanbeyan 
1 There is considerable evidence that "quality" did increase over the 
period of our analysis. 
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markets (see Chapter 7) have been neglected ~ much new rental investment 
took place in Queanbeyan over the earlier part of the data period. 
5. Less Formal Australian Evidence 
During the 1970s the decline in the size of the Australian rental 
market ceased and the relative size of the market has remained static 
during the decade. As at the June 1971 Census, 18.11 per cent of all 
dwellings were privately rented. The figure was 17.97 per cent at the 
1976 Census and seems to have been about the same at the time of the 
November 1978 "Survey of Home Rental and Ownership" (about 18.25 per 
cent). This large absolute growth of the private rental sector was not 
accompanied by any increase in real rentals. Indeed, the real level 
of rents declined considerably over the decade - see Table 4.2. This 
is hardly consistent with the predictions of the supply pessimists whose 
reasoning would have led them to predict either constant or rising real 
rent levels. If anything, the 1970s data is consistent with rental 
housing being produced under decreasing cost conditions. 
Other, informal evidence could be presented. For example, Lampe 
(1977) has-analysed the "recycling boom" in Sydney over the period 1972-
1977. This involved the renovation of old buildings which, together 
with new construction, resulted in a "glut of rental properties .... 
Owners of rental flat blocks often found themselves saddled with an 
investment property returning 6 and 7 per cent a year yield ...." Again, 
this is inconsistent with inelastic supply. Another bit of informal 
evidence is presented in Chapter 7. Demand diverted to Queanbeyan due 
to rent control in Canberra called forth a phenomenal flat-building boom. 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter is written as if the "supply optimists" were the ones 
with the case to answer. Theoretical considerations indicate a high 
total elasticity of supply in the long-run and high short-run elasti-
cities for any particular type of housing - rental or owner-occupied. 
96. 
Table 4»2; Movements of Australian Rents 
Quarter 
(1) 
Private Rents 
(Base 1966-67=100) 
(2) 
CPI (All Groups) 
(Base 1966-67=100) 
(3) 
(l)/(2) 
1971 J* 134.2 117.2 1.145 
1972 J 143.2 124.5 1.150 
1973 J 152.4 134.7 1.131 
1974 J 166.3 154.1 1.079 
1975 J 192.7 180.2 1.069 
1976 J* 219.4 202.4 1.084 
1977 J 243.6 * / 229.6 1.061 
1978 J •261.0 
•1 ? 
247.6 1.054 
1979 J 280.5 269.4 1.041 
1979 D 289.3 283.9 1.019 
* Census Dates 
Source; Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Consumer Price Index", 
Catalogue No. 6401.0, various issues. 
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The available evidence seems to confirm this prior reasoning. All the 
United States evidence implies a high elasticity. The Australian evidence 
presented here points in the same direction. The "supply pesssmists" 
are the ones who "should" be providing a case for inelastic supply. 
This must be in the form of logical argument and careful empirical 
investigation rather than assertions. 
It should finally be emphasized that problems with housing supply 
are not likely to arise on the market side. Rather, supply difficulties 
are inherent in government policies like rent control/regulation and 
building/zoning regulations. The "supply pessimists" would be better 
employed seeking out "government failure" rather than alleging "market 
failure".^ 
1 Inelastic supply is not a "market failure" in the usual sense of 
the term. 
-CHAPTER 5 
A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN RESIDENTIAI. RENT CONTROL LEGISATTON 
AND OF ECONOMISTS' ATTITUDES TO THAT LEGISLATION 
To set the scene for the three ensuing chapters, this chapter 
reviews the history of residential rent and eviction controls in 
Australia. In addition to examining the nature of these controls, we 
also review the reactions to them from, in particular, academic and 
other economists. It could hardly be said that the economics profession 
was a major force in securing the decontrol of the rental market. 
Very little attempt is made to assess the effects of the various 
bits of legislation. This task is left for case studies presented in 
later chapters. Here we are primarily descriptive. 
The saga begins with New South Wales Fair Rents Act of 1915 and 
ends with a brief introduction to current day "rental market regu-
lation". A lot of controls have been applied to a lot of dwellings 
over the intervening sixty five years. No pre-1915 cases of residential 
rent contrpl are known to the author. This is not a denial of their 
possible existence. ' , 
1. The Pre-1939 Situation 
Almost certainly, Australia's first experience with rent control 
was the New South Wales "fair rent" experiment which was established by 
that State's Fair Rents Act, 1915.^ The history and operation of the 
Act are discussed in a paper by H.V. Evatt (1920). This paper is pos-
sibly the first academic analysis of rent control to appear in the 
world. Evatt expresses qualified support for the New South Wales 
legislation on the basis that the adverse effect of the Act ("adding its 
quota to the causes of the housing shortage", p.20) was possibly out-
1 The 1915 Act is discussed at length in the Parliament of New South 
Wales' (1961) Report of the Royal Commission. The Report has a 
detailed history of all New South Wales rent control legislation, 
1915-1960. 
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weighed by its effect of keeping "rents at a reasonable rate during an 
exceptionally difficult period, and ... [acting] as a valuable deter-
rent to the building "profiteer"." (p.20). 
The New South Wales Act was only partial in its coverage, excluding 
leases exceeding three years or cases where rent was more than £3 a 
week. The Act set out a rigid formulation for the determination of 
rents. An "opportunity cost" was calculated by applying an interest 
rate to the building's capital value. To this was added the costs 
entailed by a list of specified outgoings (rates, land tax, repairs and 
maintenance, insurance, depreciation and a vacancy allowance). Any 
"fair rent" so determined (indeed, any rent falling within the ambit 
of the Act) was not to exceed the actual rent prevailing as of the first 
day of 1914, unless there were exceptional circumstances. The eviction 
provisions of the Act were such that the landlord had to show reasonable 
cause for ejecting a tenant. 
The Act attracted considerable attention, both in Australia and 
abroad. Whitman (1925) was quite impressed with the legislation, 
suggesting "that it "went further than that in-this country [the United 
States] during the war [because] fair rent courts were established and 
definitely instructed with reference to the net returns which might be 
allowed to landlords" (p.345). Evatt reports on some of the Australian 
commentaries on the Act. The Act came in for some criticism by the now 
long-since defunct Inter-State Commission and an ex-Premier of New South 
Wales who suggested that any person building rental housing after the 
introduction of the Act deserved to be sent to Callan Park, a well-known 
Sydney lunatic asylum. 
The Fair Rents (Amendment) Act, 1920, made some minor amendments 
to the New South Wales legislation, including the outlawing of above-
rent payments such as "key-money" and the prohibition of refusal to let 
a dwelling to a tenant with children. 
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A 1926 amending Act explicitly set out a series of grounds on which 
an eviction could be made. These included failure to pay rent, being 
a nuisance to neighbours, using the premises for immoral or illegal 
purposes and reasonable requirement of the premises for occupancy by 
the owner. 
A non-Labour Government was elected in 1927 at an election in 
which rent control had been an issue. In his policy speech, the leader 
of the new Government, Mr. Bavin, had pledged substantial decontrol. 
The 1928 Fair Rents (Amendment) Act provided that the legislation should 
cease to have any effect after July 1, 1933. Dwellings built during or 
after 1928 were exempted and the 1915 standard rent was dropped. The 
basis on which a rent determination was made was altered to have a 
one year duration. 
The Fair Rents (Amendment) Act, 1915-1928, was finally completely 
removed from the statute books in 1937. In the meantime, however, the 
depression had intervened. Two Acts of importance had early ensued -
the Reduction of Rent Act, 1931 (which reduced rents by 22% per cent, 
allowing for voluntary reduc^tions since June 30, 1930) and the 
Ejectments Postponement Act, 1931 (which among other things outlawed 
"squatting"). The Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act, 1932, dealt also 
with the postponement of ejectments and the reduction of rents. 
According to the De Baun Report (1939) there was not, for any 
practical purposes, any form of rent control in New South Wales on 
September 3, 1939. The War was soon to change that situation. 
Victoria's first brush with rent control was its 1938 Fair Rents 
Act. The Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board in its First 
(Progress) Report (1938) had expressed some dismay that the June, 1937 
basic wage increase had led to rent increases. According to the 
Victorian 1956 Board of Inquiry (1956), referring back to this 1937 
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experience, "[s]ome machinery is, in my opinion, necessary to ensure 
that landlords do not, without justification, use their dominant 
position to deprive tenants of the benefits of increased income" (p.22). 
The Report of the Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board led 
to the 1938 Act. 
The 1938 Act was limited to houses with capital value of £800 or 
less in Melbourne, Ballarat, Hamilton and Shepparton.^ Either a 
landlord or tenant could apply for a determination. Rents could not 
be determined at more than 10 per cent of current capital value. A 
determination would remain in force from six months to two years, as 
determined. The principle was established for Victoria that rent 
controls were useless without eviction controls. Such controls were 
incorporated in the Act as a set of prescribed grounds. 
According to Butlin (1954), the "Queensland Government had had [in 
1939] a system of rent control since 1920, and this had-been tightened 
up in 1938" (p.48). Butlin gives no reference for this statement. In 
the Queensland Year Book (1967 and following editions) there is a single 
sentence referring to this pre-war legislation. It reads: "Under the 
earlier legislation. The Fair Rents Acts,.1920 to 1938, control was much 
wider." 
No other pre-war cases of rent control in Australia are known to 
the author. 
2. Rent Control During World War Two 
After the outbreak of war in 1939, the question of rent control 
was discussed at the September 1939 Premiers' Conference. A result of 
the Conference was the introduction of National Security (Fair Rents) 
1 It may be an interesting exercise to inquire into the selective 
operation of the Act. The answer may have something to do with the 
existence of a Labour/CountryParty Coalition Government in Victoria 
at the time. 
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Regulations by the Federal Government which gave the States executive 
power to freeze rents at the August 31, 1939 level. States could set up 
Fair Rents Boards to make determinations at the request of either land-
lords or tenants. Prescribed grounds for eviction were allowed for. 
These comprised failure to pay rent, failure to take reasonable care of 
the premises, use of the premises for immoral purposes, being a nuisance 
to neighbours, sub-letting at a profit or if the landlord had made a 
contract of sale with a requirement of vacant possession. According to 
Butlin (1954, p.48), where these Regulations were applied "they gave 
landlords considerable advantage as compared with tenants". At the end 
of 1939, the rent freeze ceased so only those who had sought a determi-
nation had "protection" under the Regulations. Butlin also reports, 
however, that "many tenants would prefer to pay higher rent than risk 
eviction and bad relations with their landlords" (p.49). 
Three States adopted the 1939 Regulations - namely, Queensland, 
Victoria (which suspended its 1938 Fair Rents Act)^ and Tasmania. New 
South Wales decided to^introduce its own legislation, the 1939 Fair 
Rents Act which applied only to dwellings with rents of less that £3.10 
per week. Rents were pegged at the August 31, 1939 level, and fair rent 
machinery was established. Rents were to be set on a mechanistic basis, 
as in the 1915 Act. 
South Australia froze rents as at September 1, 1939 and allowed 
rent increases only where there were improvements or structural alte-
rations. Eviction restrictions were the same as in the Commonwealth 
Regulations. Western Australia pegged rents at the August 31, 1939 level 
and only allowed increases, by appeal to the Supreme Court, for premises 
with values in excess of £2,000. Eviction controls similar to those in 
the Regulations were imposed. 
New Federal Regulations were introduced in March 1940. As with 
the 1939 regulations there was no compulsion for the States to adopt 
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them. These Regulations froze rents at the December 31, 1940 level and 
a determination from a Fair Rents Board was required to vary a rent. 
Eviction provisions remained substantially as they had earlier. Queens-
land, Victoria and Tasmania continued with the Federal Regulations. 
South Australia and Western Australia had their own rigid rent and 
eviction control laws. New South Wales' Fair Rents Act was a matter of 
some concern to some commentators as its legislation was relatively 
weak. 
After the Australian Labour Party came to power in 1941, new 
National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations were introduced in 
November of that year. These could be compulsorily imposed on any State 
and in the Territories. The eviction provisions were considerably 
tightened up and applied universally. The rent control provisions froze 
rents at the August 31, 1939 level except via a determination (to be 
based on such things as capital value, the Commonwealth Bank overdraft 
rate, rates, taxes, insurance, repairs and maintenance spending, rents 
on comparable premises^ any services provided, justices and merits of 
the case, and,hardship). These regulations applied immediately in New 
South Wales, replacing the existing weak controls, and subsequently were 
adopted in the Australian Capital Territory (December 1941), Tasmania 
(February 1942), Victoria (March 1942), Queensland (April 1942) and the 
Northern Territory (January 1943). Western Australia and South Aust-
ralia continued their own legislation without interference from the 
Commonwealth which considered the State legislation to be adequate. 
A new set of Commonwealth Regulations were introduced in June 1945. 
One of the main features of these Regulations was the extension of 
controls to "shared accommodation". Small changes were made to the 
eviction provisions including the requirement for a Magistrate to have 
regard to alternative accommodation in considering whether to issue an 
order to quit. 
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In 1946 and 1948 other minor amendments occurred, but the -situation 
remained substantially unchanged. The Regulations ceased to exist 
entirely in 1948 (as we will see below). 
The effects of the Regulations had been to keep rents virtually 
static over the period from the beginning of the War until 1948. Over 
the war period itself, Table 9.1 shows that rents rose by only 1.0 
per cent while the "C" series consumer price index as a whole rose 22.3 
per cent over the same period. It was known, however, that illegal 
payments such as "key-money" and above-rent payments were quite common. 
The economists' verdict on the controls was generally favourable. 
E. Ronald Walker (1939), a former Professor of Economics at the Uni-
versity of Tasmania, expressed strong support for wartime rent controls 
He saw the object of such controls as to "avoid a rise in general living 
costs and to prevent profiteering" (p.101). In his study of the war-
time rental market in Melbourne, Prest (1945) contrasted the situation 
in 1939 to that at his time of writing. In 1939 "there was no scarcity 
of houses ... in the sense that we know it today" (p.53). This was 
despite a high level of post-depression demand. "The rise in rents must 
... have served as a brake upon demand, compelling some of those seeking 
better homes to revise their ideas, restraining some who contemplated 
housekeeping for themselves, and sometimes, perhaps, inducing the 
postponement of marriages" (pp.53-54). Prest then refers to the 
"pegging" of rents in 1939 which "prevented any further application of 
the brake which higher rents had previously imposed on the expansion of 
demand ... Thus demand and supply have ceased to be adjusted to one 
another by the operation of the market. Demand exceeds supply and even 
the normal interchange of houses has come to depend on personal contacts 
..." (p.54). Surprisingly, Prest then states that "[t]his does not 
constitute a criticism of the war-time control of rents and property 
values" (p.54). The pressures of wartime demand (argued by Prest to be 
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mainly due to rising incomes) were "too powerful to be held in check by « 
any normal increase in rents and property values. A rise in rents of 
the required magnitude would have borne particularly heavily on all 
those whose incomes did not rise proportionately and particularly on the 
families of service men. This in itself is sufficient justification of 
the control of rents and property values" (p.54). 
Another commentator on the wartime controls was Mendelsohn (1941a 
and 1941b) who gives two completely different views on the controls. 
In the first mentioned reference, Mendelsohn argues that measures to 
regulate rents "can have no effect on the basic level of rents, which 
is determined by the demand for houses and the cost of producing them. 
In the long run ... rent restriction has a bad effect, because it dis-
courages new building and creates a housing shortage" (p.58). However, 
in (1941b), Mendelsohn argues that the "regulations can ... be justified 
on the ground that they have prevented a probable future price rise" 
(p.l) and that "[r]ent control must be considered as an integral part 
of general housing policy ..." (p.2). 
^ / 
3. The Demise of the CommonVeaith Regulations and the 
Response of thje States 
As of early 1948, the Commonwealth Landlord and Tenant Regulations 
applied in all States and Territories except the two most westerly 
States which had their own stringent legislation. This situation was 
soon to change with the removal of Commonwealth power to regulate over 
rents and prices. 
The National Security Act lapsed at the end of 1946 and 
rent/eviction controls were included under the Defence (Transitional 
Provisions) Act. This legislation was successfully challenged in the 
High Court which led the Federal Government to seek a change in the 
Constitution through a Referendum to retain permanent pov;er over rents 
and prices. This Referendum, held in May 1948, was "lost" by the 
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Federal Government and the power to legislate in this area was con-
sequently restored to the States in August 1948. The Commonwealth 
retained the power to control rents and prices in the Territories. 
South Australia and Western Australia continued their own legis-
lation after 1948. The other States all adopted legislation very 
similar to the Commonwealth Regulations. In each case, the eviction 
provisions written into the new State Acts were virtually identical to 
each other and to those in the now-defunct Commonwealth regulations. 
The rent control provisions were also very similar, except in Queens-
land where the Landlord and Tenant Act (1948) only controlled rents of 
houses, whereas the other State acts also encompassed flats. 
The Australian Capital Territory's Landlord and Tenant Ordinance 
was introduced in 1949. It carried on the provisions of the Regulations 
except for one important difference - all premises built or leased after 
March 1, 1945, were exempted from rent controls except via a fair rent 
determination which could be sought by either landlord or tenant from 
the rent controller, but was binding once made. Eviction controls 
were continued. ' , • 
What is important is that all States, being completely free to 
legislate in the area of landlord and tenant, decided to continue with 
systems of rigid rent and eviction controls. 
Commentators on the rent control issue at the time of the tran-
sition from Commonwealth to State legislation were conspicuous by their 
absence. In 1948, Downing published two pieces of work oh housing 
policy. In the less substantial work, an Economic Record article. 
Downing (1948a) completely ignores rent control, while in the Inter-
national Labour Organization book (1948b), there is only incidental 
mention. This is a little difficult to understand in the context of 
blanket rent control throughout Australia and where privately rented 
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dwellings constituted some 40 per cent of the total dwelling stock. 
In his review of Downing's book, Arndt (1949) took Downing to task for 
his neglect of rent control. Arndt outlined some of the problems 
allegedly associated with rent control and suggested that a "choice will 
have to be made between further injury to landlords, subsidization of 
abnormally low housing expenditure out of the public purse, or a gradual 
stepping up of controlled rents. The first two courses seem hardly 
justifiable; the third will require unusual political courage" (p.100). 
4. Decontrol in the 1950s 
Except in Western Australia, there were five years of State legis-
lation before the first chinks in the armour of rigid rent and eviction 
controls appeared. Western Australia was the first State to decontrol, 
beginning this process in 1951 and very nearly completing it in 1954. 
All States made some moves towards relaxing controls during the fifties, 
for instance in relation to decontrolling new lettings (for example, 
Victoria in 1953 and New South Wales in 1954), allowing proportional 
rent rises (as in Victoria, Queensland and South Australia) or slowly 
freeing up,evictions (as in New South Wales). By the end of the decade, 
three States had decontrolled to a large extent (these were Western 
Australia, Tasmania and Victoria) while South Australia and Queensland 
had gone a considerable way towards decontrol. New South Wales still had a 
substantial way to go in 1960. 
Western Australia's Increase of Rent (War Restrictions) Act 1939-50 
was continued after the War by continuance Bills which in some cases 
incorporated slight amendments. The Rents and Tenancies Emergency 
Provisions Act No. 47 of 1951 continued the effects of the former Act, 
but in a considerably restricted form. This Act decontrolled all new 
leases, allowed controlled rents to be raised by up to 20 per cent and 
put rent determinations on the basis of current capital value less de-
preciation. The Act was amended in 1953 such that, as from May 1, 1954, 
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landlords and tenants could negotiate on a rent. Both parties still had 
recourse to a rent determination based on current values if agreement 
could not be reached. 
Tasmania allowed a 20 per cent rise in dwelling rents in 1950 and 
additional increases were allowed in 1952. At the end of 1955, 
Tasmania's Landlord and Tenant Act lapsed and was not renewed. However, 
in 1956, new provisions in the Fair Rents Act re-introduced elements 
of control. Even so, Tasmania can be counted amongst those States which 
had largely decontrolled by the end of the 1950s. 
In 1953 Victoria decontrolled all new lettings, and all leases on 
dwellings not let between 1940 and 1954. As from the beginning of 1955, 
all dwellings let in 1940 at £2.10 or more becane subject to an agreed 
rent and, if no voluntary agreement could be reached a determination 
based on current capital value (rather than the previously used 1940 
value) could be sought. Several amendmeiits were made in the 1955 
Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act, which was to operate from mid-1956. 
Written leases of three years or" more could be subject to an agreed rent 
and dwellings that became vacant could be re-let without an externally 
determined rent. The base rent (that is, ,,the rent prevailing in 1940) 
could be increased by up to 25 percent. Tlie most crucial step came in 
1959 V7hen an amendment allowed rents on all dwellings to be fixed by 
agreement. Failing an agreement, a determination based on current 
values could be sought. Certain leases remained controlled.^ 
In South Australia, an independent committee of enquiry reported 
in 1951 and as a result of the report, South Australia abandoned 1939 
values as the basis for "fair rent" determinations. The rent-setting 
body, the Housing Trust, was instructed to use "current replacement 
1 Considerable information about the Victorian legislation is contained 
in Brooking and Chernov (1972). Strangely enough, the 1959 amendment 
receives little attention in any of the sources. The leases which 
remained controlled are listed in Bradbrook (1975-76). 
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cost, less depreciation" in setting rents. A 17h per cent addition to 
the base rent was allowed in 1951 and this was extended to llh per cent 
in 1954 and 33-j per cent in 1955. Written leases for two years or more 
were exempted from control in 1954 and all fixed term leases were 
exempted the following year. These latter amendments effectively de-
controlled all new leases, whether on new or previously unlet dwellings 
or where vacant possession had been attained on previously let 
dwellings. South Australia entered the 1960s with a fairly gentle form 
of control similar to that in Tasmania and Western Australia. 
In Queensland, as in New South Wales, rent control remained more 
rigid than elsewhere. An amending Act of 1957 allowed an increase of 
20 per cent in the controlled rent of dwellings which were in existence 
in 1942, the basis of determination being the 1948 value, which replaced 
the previously-used 1942 capital value. Dwellings first leased after 
1957, and premises which were leased after that date, but which had not 
been leased during the previous three years, were exempted from control. 
Any other leases made after 1957 were to be free of control if the 
parties agreed in writing. 
t ' 
As set out in .more detail in Chapter 6, New South Wales "dragged 
the chain" in teirms of decontrol during the fifties. Despite the advent 
of "creeping decontrol". New South Wales maintained far more rigid 
controls than any of the other five States. 
Finally, we should consider what happened in the Territories.^ 
In the A.C.T. no important changes occurred in the 1950s, or, indeed, the 
sixties. The one minor change was a 1952 alteration which served to 
include those involved in the Korean conflict amongst "protected 
persons". 
Apart from the implementation of vrartime Federal Regulations in 
January 1943 and the imposition of controls after Cyclone Tracy in 
1974, the author reluctantly admits virtually no knowledge of what 
happened in the Northern Territory regarding residential tenancy 
law. 
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Interest in rent control by Australian economists during the 1950s 
was minimal. One item by economists knovm to the author is a newspaper 
item by three economists (D. Cochrane, D.M. Hocking and J.E. Isaac, 
1953) all of whom were then at the University of Melbourne. This item 
appeared in the Melbourne "Age" and argued for the abolition of rent 
controls in Victoria. They argued that the shortage of housing was an 
artificial creation which would be largely solved by the removal of rent 
control. 
When the New South Wales Government set up a Royal Commission to 
enquire into its Act at the end of the decade, N.T. Drane was commis-
sioned to write two papers on the economic effects of rent control. 
These two papers (Drane, 1961a and 1961b) leave the reader with the 
impression that Drane is ambivalent about the rent control issue. In 
the first of the two submissions, Drane asserts that "landlords should 
be prevented from charging excessive rents" (1961a, p.231). Only a 
"fair" or "normal" return should be allowed (that is, the average rate 
of return to landlords if there were no housing "shortage"). Then 
"there is still the question of which valuation to apply it to. Clearly 
the market valuation ... cannot be employed, for this reflects any 
scarcity of dwellings; which may exist. Adoption of this market 
valuation ... would yield the landlord his 'monopoly' return ... [while] 
adoption of values at some base date ... will tend to result in the 
landlord being denied not only the 'monopoly' rent but also some of his 
'fair' return as well" (p.230). Despite this, Drane concludes by 
recommending gradual de-control with an interim subsidy scheme for needy 
tenants and eventual total reliance on public housing as a means of 
helping the poor through the medium of housing. Drane's failure to come 
to firm grips with the rent control issue is reminiscent of Mendelsohn's 
attitude twenty years earlier. 
Opposition to controls came from bodies such as the Bank of New 
South Wales in its Review (1953 and 1958) and the Institute of Public 
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Affairs (1954). Both of these organizations argued in objective terms 
for the 'easing of controls and provided informative accounts of the 
positions in each State. 
5. The Sixti es 
The big event of the 1960s was the slow decline of rent control 
in New South Wales. By the end of the decade, rent control appeared 
to be a dead issue throughout Australia. Even where facilities for 
control still existed, these were very little used. In some States, 
there were still vestiges of the "old control" manifested by pockets 
of dwellings still under some form of control. Despite this, a reviewer 
writing from the vantage point of 1970 would have (erroneously, as it 
transpired) dismissed rent control as a thing of the past. 
In New South Wales, there were still 207,000 controlled dwellings 
in 1960, this representing about two-thirds of all private rentals. 
By the end of the decade (more precisely, in 1969) there were about 
49,000 controlled dwellings still extant (see Nelson, 1977, p.138). 
The pace of decontrol was certainly much quicker in the sixties than 
in the preceding decade. Ho.wever, New South Wales still lagged behind 
the other States. Th^ rather interesting story of decontrol (and 
frustrated decontrol) in New South Wales in the sixties is told in the 
next chapter. 
Queensland was the other State which had not substantially decon-
trolled in the 1950s. Decontrol occurred such that only those 
dwelling houses which were let or leased during the three year period 
ending on December 1, 1957 remained under old control. Until the end of 
1970, either the landlord or tenant could apply to a Fair Rents Court 
for a determination. The Stipendiary Magistrate assessed the rent so 
as to allow a return of six per cent of the capital value after allowing 
for outgoings, services provided by the lessor and vacancy. At the end 
of 1970 all rent control in Queensland ceased after the amendment of 
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the Landlord and Tenant Acts, 1948 1961 and the Termination -of 
Tenancy Act. 1970. 
In Victoria, there were still vestiges of control. In addition 
to a diminishing number of tenancies under "old control", there remained 
a facility for setting "fair rents". The Rental Investigation Bureau 
(RIB) could recommend a fair rent determination after a complaint from a 
tenant. Tlie RIB still operates today, negotiating settlements and re-
commending some cases to a Fair Rents Board. Fair rent determinations 
allowed an 8 per cent return on capital value plus an allowance for 
legitimate expenses by the landlord (including rates, land tax, rates, 
20 per cent depreciation on furniture and an allowance for agent's 
fees). Capital value was estimated from a number of sources, including 
sales of comparable premises. 
South Australia retained some "old control", but with rents based 
on current values (unlike New South Wales). At th,e end of 1962 the 
Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act was replaced by the Excessive 
Rents Act under which a tenant could apply to a Local Court to determine 
whether the rent was excessive. South Australia has also had, through-
out, a Housing Improvement Act which allows the control of substandard 
houses. This latter Act is administered by the Housing Trust. 
Tasmania and Western Australia, had, for all intents and purposes, 
removed rent control prior to the sixties, and need not be further 
considered. 
The Australian Capital Territory made no changes to its Ordinance 
in the 1960s. Rent control had, however, become a dead issue as the 
small base of controlled dv/ellings dwindled and very few new determina-
tions were made under the "voluntary" system. 
113. 
In keeping with the diminished importance of rent controls' in the « 
1960s, there seems to be a complete lack of writings on the subject 
by economists. 
6. The 1970s 
The seventies have witnessed something of a revival of controls 
on the rental housing market. Traditional rent control came and went in 
the Australian Capital Territory. Some form of controls were also 
imposed in Darwin after the cyclone. Most important, however, has been 
the advent of a soft form of control in several places -
South Australia, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Aust-
ralian Capital Territory. This form of intervention is sometimes 
given the label of "rental market regulation". The issues 
raised by these regulatory activities are considered in Chapter 8. 
In August 1973, compulsory rent control was re-introduced into the 
Australian Capital Territory. In many ways, the system was very close 
to that which prevailed during the war years. The Ordinance was 
amended again, in 1976 so as to,, remove compulsion from the legislation. 
In addition to making applications non-compulsory again and removing 
rent pegging until there had been a determination, the 1976 amendments 
made other changes. A "voluntary" system of fair renting was restored 
where determinations, based on current values (not at a prescribed date) 
could be sought by landlords or tenants and were to hold for one year 
only. Where there was no determination in force, the landlord was 
required to give notice 90 days in advance of a proposed rent increase. 
The amended Ordinance placed a limit on the amount of a security bond at 
4 weeks rent. These changes were in line with recommendations made by 
the Henderson Poverty Enquiry (see Bradbrook 1975). 
The imposition of rent control in Canberra attracted considerable 
attention from many quarters. The then Real Estate and Stock Institute 
of Australia (see RESI, 1975) published a study of these controls. This 
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was a thorough and objective study which stimulated a considerable 
« 
debate on the issue of rent control. The Priorities Review Staff, in 
its Report on Housing (1975) looked at Canberra's rent control and 
condemned it for "depress[ing] rental investment below what it would 
otherwise have been" , "benefit[ing] a few affluent tenants", "dis-
criminatting] against potential low-income or high-risk tenants" and 
"encourag[ing] evasion or contempt for the law" (p . 156 ) . The effects 
of Canberra's rent control laws are analysed in Chapter 7. 
A final instance of rent control in the seventies is that which 
was imposed in Darwin after Cyclone Tracy hit the city on Christmas Day 
1974. Singleton and Howard (1977) observed that it may have been 
possible to have a "natural economic recovery" in Darwin brought about 
by market forces. What was actually observed was that the authorities 
"imposed rent control, . . . . forbade people to repair their own houses, 
and dithered about letting contracts for the building of new houses." 
( p . 207 ) . Contrast this with the experience after the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake as described by Friedman and Stigler (1946) and related in 
Chapter 7 . ' . ' 
. CHAPTER 6 
THE VALUE OF TENANCIES DUE TO RENT CONTROL IN POST-WAR 
NEW SOUTH WALES^ 
As a direct result of rent control legislation, a controlled 
tenancy becomes a valuable capital asset. Evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that a tenancy subject to rent control in New South 
Wales in 1960 had a capital value of an average $2,500 (in 1960 prices). 
To put this in perspective, this figure compares to the then average 
price of a house (including land) in Sydney of about $8,000. As a 
further point of comparison the $2,500 figure represents a grand total 
of $517,500,000 on the 207,000 controlled dwellings in 1960. The New 
South Wales State budget in 1959/60 was $525 million.^ 
IThile it is tempting to think of the $2,500 figure as representing 
a "tenant benefit", this must be resisted. As will be argued, the value 
of a tenancy and tenant benefit may coincide. More generally, however, 
the value of a controlled tenancy will form the upper bound to tenant 
benefit. What can be said with more certainty is that the value of a 
tenancy sutject to control will equal landlord loss. Tenant benefit 
and landlord loss will only 'rarely be of equal magnitude. Tlie fact that 
landlord loss generally exceeds tenant benefit constitutes what is 
probably the greatest inefficiency associated with rent control.^ 
Rent control in New South Wales created considerable social 
conflict. Tension between landlords and tenants manifested itself in 
various ways, as can easily be imagined given the extent of the capital 
1 This chapter is based on a paper initially presented at the 197 7 
ANZAAS Congress (Albon, 1977a), part of which has been developed into 
a paper recently published in Australian Economic Papers (Albon, 
1979d). 
2 These comparative figures are from the Official Year Book of New 
South Wales, No. 57, 1961 and from Neutze (1977). 
3 As discussed in Chapter 3, it is possible that voluntary agreements 
between landlords and controlled tenants would serve to mitigate the 
degree of inefficiency. 
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loss suffered by landlords. One consequence of the controls was the 
advent of professional eviction services to help landlords remove 
sitting tenants. There was also animosity between "satisfied" and 
"unsatisfied" tenants as glaring horizontal inequities arose. The 
reader is referred to Webster (1980) for a colourful account of the 
social implications of the controls. 
As a background to estimating the value of controlled tenancies 
in post-war New South Wales, some preliminary matters require attention. 
Firstly, we look at the course of rent control legislation in New South 
Wales during the post-war period. This allows us to proceed to a con-
sideratio n of the effects of the legislation in the context of a simple 
neoclassical model of the rental market. This analysis suggests a con-
ceptualization of the value of a controlled tenancy which is then 
subjected to several caveats. 
1. Rent Control Legislation in New South Wales 
As explained in Chapter 5, some form of rent control has existed 
in New South Wales almost continually since 1915. Commonwealth powers 
to legislate in the area of landlord and tenant lapsed in 1948 and New 
i. 
South Wales enacted the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act. As time 
! 
proceeded, this Act became an obstacle course, especially for those 
without legal training.^ 
The form of control was two-pronged. Rents were controlled and 
evictions made very difficult. All rents were set at the level of 
August 31, 1939, except where the building was not in existence, or was 
not being let, at that date. Until 1954, all newly-let dwellings were 
subject to a compulsory fair rent determination. Rents could only be 
changed via a determination from a rent-setting tribunal which was to 
have "regard to" factors such as capital value of the property (its 1939 
1 For a guide through the legal jungle of the New South Wales Act see 
Lewis (1958), Clyne (1970) and Nelson (1977). 
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value or value at construction), rates and insurance, repairs and main-
tenance', depreciation, rents of comparable dwellings and the Common-
wealth Bank's overdraft rate.^ There were several grounds for 
eviction but these only provided a prima facie case. Courts, in 
enforcing an order to quit, had to consider "any hardship" that might 
be caused to the tenant. 
Amendments to the Act allowed a gradual decontrol, beginning in 
1954. However, New South Wales was the laggard in decontrol. It 
spurned the option used in all other States of allowing a percentage 
increase in all rents. It also persisted doggedly with 1939 capital 
values as the basis of rent determinations. The other five States all 
moved either to current values or later-year values, at some time during 
the fifties. 
New South Wales did make three significant changes to its Landlord 
and Tenant (Amendment) Act during the fifties. The first major reform 
was the exemption, in 1954, of all new lettings and of leases on dwel-
lings built between 1941 and 1954 which had not been previously let. 
Secondly, a 1956 amendment allowed decontrol of dwellings where vacant 
possession had, been attained by the voluntary quitting of the tenant 
or if eviction had occurred on certain grounds. Both of these changes 
were made under Section 5A of the Act. The final major change in the 
fifties came in 1958 when new grounds for eviction were added. 
1 The procedure used would tend to result in base-period values b^ing 
preserved. Suppose the base-period value is V, then to retain V 
the following equation must be satisfied. 
V = (R-G)/r, 
where all variables are defined as in the text. Controlled rent 
must therefore be set according to 
R = rV + G, 
as indeed (roughly speaking), it was. This assumes a perpetual 
time period. If rent control is not expected to last forever, 
the controller's procedure would establish a value above the base-
period value. 
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Until 1954 all private residential tenancies were controlled. By 
1960 about two-thirds of all private rentals, or some 207,000 dwellings, 
were still under rent control. The pace of decontrol quickened in the 
sixties such that by 1966 there were about 55,000 controlled 
dwellings. By 1969 the number had dwindled to about 49,000.^ 
The State was governed by the Australian Labor Party from 1948 to 
1965. In 1960, this Government directed a Royal Commission to inquire 
into the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act, 1948-1958. The Commission 
reported in 1961 and recommended (i) that rent control be abolished for 
luxury premises, (ii) a milder form of control for premises remaining 
under control, and (iii) a 60 per cent rise in the rent of controlled 
premises (see the Report (1961)). The Commission's recommendations were 
not accepted. Rent control nearly lost its teeth in 1964. This was 
not due to Government action, but, rather, to legal challenge. In 1963 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales confinned that the Fair Rents 
Courts should not consider current capital value when making deter-
minations. The 1939 value (or value at construction if built after 
1939) was to remain the appropriate value. However, in 1964, the High 
Court of Austtalia reversed this decision and Courts began to use 
current values in determinations. By an extremely complex series of 
I' 
events (see Clyne, 1966) this was not to continue and there was a 
reversion to the use of 1939 values. This often cited affair is usually 
remembered by the 1963 Supreme Court case, Rathborne v. Abel, which 
began it. Meanwhile, some amendments to the Act had taken place. In 
1964, Section 17A was added which allowed landlords and tenants to agree 
on a rent, if they wished. Soon after came the "wealthy tenant" pro-
vision which meant that if a tenant's income exceeded a given amount 
(initially $6,000 per annum) he could be asked to agree on a rent based 
on current values, or be decontrolled. Prior to 1964 it had been 
possible to get an eviction if it could be shown that a tenant could 
1 These figures are given in Nelson (1977, p.138) and are derived from 
a variety of sources. 
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better provide himself with accommodation than could the landlord. 
Major amendments were made to the Act in 1968 when inheritance of 
tenancies was limited to a spouse, sub-letting was made illegal and 
other anomalies cleared up. 
2. A Simple Model of the Controlled Market 
Here we set out a simple partial equilibrium model of the 
controlled rental market of the type considered in Chapter 2. The model 
is basically the neoclassical competitive market analysis. The uncon-
trolled segment of the market is not explicitly modelled. The model 
assumes that information is costless and that there is no risk or un-
certainty. While these latter assumptions would seem to be unrealistic, 
they are not crucial. The implications of dropping them will become 
clear as the argument proceeds. There is a single constant market rate 
of interest, r, which is known by all agents involved in the market. 
For the present, it is assumed that all agents expect rent control to 
continue indefinitely and tenants wish to stay in their rented dwellings 
indefinitely. 
The supply curve, S, in Figure 6.1, has a horizontal discontinuity 
at the cost of outgoings (G), a vertical section at Q* (the fixed supply 
' i 
of dwellings locked in by the rent control law) and an elastic portion 
above long-run market rent ' All the dwelling units yield equal 
quantities of housing services and the landlord is assumed to be 
incapable of varying the quantity of services yielded by a dwelling. 
That is, the landlord cannot let maintenance expenditure lapse. 
Outgoings, comprising rates, insurance and maintenance, are constant. 
The demand curve, D, holds constant such factors as income and the price 
of alternative accommodation. The market would clear the fixed supply 
of dwellings, Q*, at long- run market rent, j^jj* With the controlled 
rent, R, there is an excess demand of ^ -Q* dwelling units. At the 
controlled rent there is a transfer of surplus from landlords to tenants 
of Rm^^^* 
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If a landlord wished to sell a dwelling, with a sitting tenant, 
he could__ expect to receive an amount of (R-G)/r, which is the value of 
the net rental stream capitalized at the market rate of interest, r. 
If R and G were equal, the asset would have zero value to the landlord 
such that he would be indifferent between keeping it or giving it away. 
If rent control were removed entirely, dwellings would assume a value 
of (Rjjj-G)/r, the capitalized value of the stream of net market rents. 
3* The Value of a Tenancy, Tenant Benefits and Landlord Losses 
At first glance, (Rj^-R)/r would appear to be the value of a 
tenancy. There are, however, good reasons for dispensing with the in-
definite time horizon. Tenants may not anticipate an indefinite tenancy 
and/or there may be an expectation that rent control will not prevail 
forever. It is hardly necessary to make the further obvious point that 
dwellings do not last forever. Suppose, then, an n period tenancy 
which would have a value of 
n R - R , ' 
Z r (6.1) 
i=I (l+r)"-
An alternative- to truncating the series at n would be to capitalize over 
an indefinite time period at a risk-augmented rate of interest. This 
alternative is considered below. 
Expression (6.1) is, subject to two possible qualifications, an 
accurate representation of landlord loss. The first qualification is 
that the landlord at any point of time may not be the original landlord 
and the current landlord may have purchased the dwelling at the "sitting 
tenant" price. In this case, the capital loss is incurred by the 
original landlord.^ Nevertheless, a loss has been incurred. A second 
1. Shreiber and Tabriztchi (1976), writing in relation to New York 
City's rent control, use this fact to argue against the abolition 
of rent control. To do so "would bring windfall gains to these 
landlords at the expense of the tenants rather than restoring 
rights to the initial landlords" (p.516). This is an example of 
what Tullock (1975) has called the "transitional gains trap". This 
question is treated at length in Chapter 9. 
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possible qualification is that R^ may not be the appropriate market « 
rent. An alternative concept, R^', is discussed below. 
There are even more caveats to using (6.1) as a measure of tenant 
benefit. Firstly, the existing tenant may receive no benefit even 
though he pays a below-market rent, if the tenancy was purchased. 
Again, there is still a benefit, received by the original tenant. 
Secondly, the tenant may be quantity constrained. Even when the rent 
control is first imposed, R^ -^R will not be a good measure of tenant 
benefit (for the period), unless the income elasticity of demand for 
housing services is zero (see Chapter 3). As time proceeds, a tenant's 
demands may change due to increases or decreases in family size. The 
controlled dwelling will embody too few or too many housing services, 
respectively, reducing benefits below R^ j'^ ^ even further. The tenant 
has an incentive to stay on as long as benefits are positive. Finally, 
there is the matter of R^', now to be discussed. 
We define R^ as the long-run market rent for currently 
controlled dwellings that would be established if rent control were 
completely removed. R^ ^^ ', on the other hand, is the rental level 
charged for previously controlled dwellings in the context of a 
situation of partial decontrol - that is, where the private rental 
market remains predominantly controlled, but where some decontrol has 
occurred. 
If it was likely that R^ and R^ ^^ ' would be markedly different, 
this would be a matter for some concern. Fortunately, R^jj and R^ '^ 
should be numerically close, with R^' > R^ ^^ . Given free entry into 
the uncontrolled private rental market, competitive forces will keep 
rents down, JJ^  they happen to rise above R^ ^^ . This process is des-
cribed in the Appendix to Chapter 2. When previously controlled 
dwellings are released, they will become available for lease or owner-
occupancy. Tenants of previously controlled dwellings will either lease 
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or become ovmer-occupiers. There will be an increase in demand for, and 
supply o'f, privately rented dwellings in the uncontrolled market. Only 
if the demand effect exceeds the supply effect would rents rise, and, as 
we have argued, market forces would push uncontrolled rents down to 
R^, given free entry. 
There was, however, a sense in which entry was not completely free. 
This was due to a fear of recontrol harboured by landlords which 
probably meant that a risk premium was being imposed on uncontrolled 
rents.^ It is difficult to ascertain the quantitative significance 
of the fear factor which is the only possible influence that could keep 
A. Estimate of the Value of Tenancies 
The information necessary to estimate the value of tenancies due 
to rent control in New South Wales is available from the Report of the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act, 
1948, as amended. This Report, published in 1961, assembles information 
on controlled and uncontrolled rents, property values, number of 
dwellings and other pertineni: matters. 
1' 
The estimation of the value of controlled tenancies can proceed 
from two directions. One approach is to estimate (6.1) on the basis 
of a rent differential and an estimate of n. A second approach is to 
look directly at capital values. The best such data would be infor-
mation on "key-money" and successful bribes to secure vacant possession. 
1 Nelson (1977, Ch. 5) provides some evidence for a fear of re-
control. Some indirect evidence is provided by the sluggishness 
of investment in rental housing after controls on new dwellings 
were lifted in 1954. As a rough measure of such activity one might 
take the proportion of total dwellings built 1954-61 (the inter-
censal period) which were privately tenanted in 1961. The New 
South Wales figure was 10.89 per cent while that for Western 
Australia, which completely decontrolled in 1954, was 13.41 per 
cent. (The census figures are from the 1961 Census, Vol. I, Part 
IV, Table 14, for each State). The issue of the "fear factor" is 
taken up in Chapters 2 and 8. 
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Most of our direct evidence, however, is based on the difference between « 
vacant possession and "sitting tenant" values of dwellings. We will, 
in turn, utilize both the rent differential and capital value 
approaches. 
In the Report, it was estimated that, if total decontrol had 
occurred in 1960, the rise in rents would, "in a large proportion of 
cases, ... be between 100 per cent and 150 per cent of the existing 
controlled rent" (p.22). The Commissioners' estimate was based on a 
number of factors including the Section 5A experience and the observed 
rent increases in Victoria after almost total decontrol in that State. 
Tlieir estimate also took cognizance of opinions presented to them in 
the course of their enquiries. Further, their estimate is consistent 
with the rate of increase of the general price level which had occurred 
over the period since rent control had been imposed. All in all, the 
Commissioners' estimate seems to be a good one. 
Controlled rent in New South Wales in 1960 had a mean value of 
$291.20 per annum. Applying the Commissioners' estimates yields a range 
of R^ from $582.40 to $728.00. The lower bound of R^-R is, then, 
i 
$291.20 and the upper' bound transfer is $436.80. Capitalizing both of 
these as perpetuities yields respective values of $4,853 and $7,280, 
using as a discount rate the then prevailing maximum bank overdraft rate 
of 6 per cent. There is some evidence to suggest a time horizon, n, of 
10 years for the average tenancy (see, for example, the Report, p.24). 
The present value of R^ ^^ -R over 10 years is $2,143 for the. lower 
estimate and $3,215 for the upper bound. 
The validity of these estimates can be assessed by looking at more 
direct evidence on the value of tenancies. Before examining the evi-
dence on property values we need to establish that this will yield 
comparable figures to those derived above. Suppose that landlords and 
tenants both expect rent control to be effectively removed at the end 
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of period n. If the dwelling could be prematurely decontrolled' it would 
have a value of 
n R - G (R -G)/r R - G 
Z ^ + = (6.2) 
i=l (l+r)"- (l+r)"^ "" 
With the tenant remaining in the dwelling under rent control until 
period n, it would have a value of 
n - _ (R -G)/r 
E . + (6.3) 
i=l (l+r)"- (l+r)" 
Substracting (6.3) from (6.2) leaves (6.1). To estimate (6.1) from the 
value perspective we need information on property values before and 
after (partial) decontrol. Alternatively, we need data on "key-money" 
payments or on bribes offered to secure vacant possession. 
In Appendix 45 of the Report there is data for a sample of 15 
dwellings sold to sitting tenants and then re-sold with vacant 
possession. The mean.difference is $3,036. This is an estimate of 
(6.1) but comes from only a very small sample. Appendix 43 presents 
data on "owner's interest" in controlled dwellings as against "improved 
value", both as estimated by the Valuer General. The average diffe-
rence between these, a measure of tenant's interest, is $2,670. The 
sample size here is 166. There is also some evidence on bribes offered. 
Appendix 48 gives information on 15 bribes offered or paid to tenants 
for vacant possession. The average bribe was $2,172, but we are not 
told which, if any, of the bribes were successful. Nelson reports 
claims by Peter Clyne that he paid between $2,000 and $2,400 for vacant 
possession in 1963 (see pp.268-269). No information on "key-money" was 
readily available - the ABS does not keep a series of "key-money" 
payments. 
All of the evidence seems to indicate an average "tenant's 
interest" of around $2,500 in New South Wales in 1960. According to 
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the Report there were about 207,000 controlled dwellings in the State 
in that year. The total value of tenancies was, then, about $2,500 x 
207,000 = $517,500,000. Of the 207,000 dwellings under rent control, 
some 170,000 were in Sydney. Tenants' interest in Sydney alone was 
approximately $425,000,000. Converting these estimates into 1980 values 
gives a figure of around $2 billion for the New South Wales estimate. 
Finally, it is possible to have a stab at the risk-augmented 
interest rate implied by the above figuring. If the figure of $2,500 
is taken as a fair estimate of the average value of a tenancy and the 
Commissioners' middle estimate of market rent ($655.20) is accepted 
(giving R J J J - R = $364), then the implicit risk-augmented interest rate 
is $364/$2,500 = .1456. The implicit 1960 risk factor is, then, 14.56 
per cent minus 6 per cent, or 8.56 per cent. 
5. Conclusions 
The New South Wal'es Royal-Commission of Inquiry presented a long 
and impressive report which pontained the basic groundwork for 
estimating the great jextent to which landlords lost from rent control. 
The gain to tenants was also very large although it did not completely 
offset the landlords' loss. Redistribution via rent control contains 
inherent inefficiencies. Implementation of the Royal Commission's 
recommendations would have led to considerable falls in the loss to 
landlords and in the gain to tenants. However, the rent 'increases 
recommended (60 per cent on most premises) fell far short of those 
required to bring rents up to market levels (at least 100 per cent). 
New South Wales had let the control on rents become so severe that an 
act of immense political courage was required to relieve the effects 
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of the rent restrictions, even partially. The Government of the day 
lacked the courage and/or the will to take such a step.^ 
1 The political aspects of reftt control and decontrol in New South 
Wales are set out in Helen Nelson's thesis (1977) and in a later 
paper (Nelson, 1980). 
CHAPTER 7 
RENT CONTROL IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
1973-19761 
When compulsory rent control was imposed in the Australian Capital 
Territory in September 1973, it was the first new case of rent control 
in Australia for over twenty years. One must be thankful to the then 
Minister for the Capital Territory, Mr. K.E. Enderby, for providing 
analysts with a case of rent control which could be examined in the 
context of the "social laboratory", as Canberra is sometimes known. 
Indeed, Mr. Enderby provided other opportunities for applied studies 
in price control and non-price rationing. For example, he largely 
replaced the land auction system with a peculiar "allocation system". 
Other examples continued to be supplied, including the provision of 
subsidized public housing and cheap mortgage loans.^ 
In this chapter we analyse the effects of the system of rent (and 
eviction) control v/hich prevailed over the period from September 1973 
to early in 1976. In doing so we apply the Lindbeck model set out in 
Chapter 2 and test its predictions in the Canberra context. Some 
modifications of the model are sketched, particularly because v/e have 
to take cognizance of the inter-relationship between the Canberra and 
Queanbeyan rental markets. 
The objectives of this chapter are to determine the consequences 
of rent control in Canberra. In particular we seek evidence of "excess 
demand" for rental housing, of efficiency costs and of transfers from 
landlords to tenants. In addition to having an appropriate model in 
1 This chapter is based on a paper published in the Economic Record 
(Albon, 1978d). Part of that paper has been reproduced in J. Jack-
son's Australian edition of McConnell's Economics (McGraw Hill, 
Sydney, 1980), pp.451-452. 
2 To be fair to Mr. Enderby, his Government did improve the situation 
in relation to public housing in the A.C.T. by placing a means-test 
on applicants. 
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mind we need to have a clear idea of the legislative details of the 
control system. Further, considerable empirical information is 
required and is not always easy to attain. A good deal of attention 
is given to the estimation of market rent. 
1. The 1973 Legal Changes 
The 1973 amendments to the Australian Capital Territory Landlord 
and Tenant Ordinance (1949) were imposed in a context where very few 
dwellings were under control. A "fair renting" system was in operation 
on a "voluntary" basis and eviction controls were applicable. However, 
in effect the rental market was free of major legal encumbrance. 
Mr. Enderby reintroduced compulsory rent control because of what 
he saw as "a great shortage of rental accommodation" and "unreasonably 
high" rents. "The legislation sought to maximize the opportunities of 
low and middle income earners ... to have access to ... accommodation 
at a reasonable rent" (Quoted in RESI, 1975, p.52).^ Mr. Enderby also 
pointed out that more public funds were being provided for house and 
flat construction, simultaneously with the imposition of rent control. 
1 If there was a "shortage" of rental accommodation, it is difficult, 
a priori, to see how rent control could assist in alleviating that 
situation. Perhaps Mr. Enderby was influenced by the opinion of 
former American president, Harry Truman, who, in 1949, stated that: 
"The present housing shortage makes it necessary to continue rent 
control for at least two years, and to strengthen its enforcement. 
I recommend that this be done." (See Grampp, 1950, p.427, fn.2). 
However, Mr. Enderby seems to have overlooked much evidence on the 
possible problems rent control might cause, such as that presented 
by Friedman and Stigler (1946) in the case of San Francisco. After 
the 1906 earthquake, more than one half of the initial housing 
stock had been destroyed and, despite considerable evacuation, 
remaining housing had to accommodate a significantly larger number 
of people. Many years later, San Francisco experienced another 
period when pressure was put on available housing. Between 1940 
and 1946 the population grew by about one third (or 4.5 per cent 
per annum). In 1906 rent was the rationing device, and, due to 
more intensive use of the remaining stock of dwellings, there was 
no discernible housing shortage. In contrast, in 1946, rent 
control was imposed and "chance and favouritism" became the 
rationing mechanism. There was a considerable, and apparent, 
housing shortage in San Francisco in 1946. 
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The system of control was very similar to that which prevailed 
during the war years.^ Focus was on a base date for value and rent. 
The legislation came into force in September 1973. All rents on private 
dwellings were frozen at their January 1, 1973 levels and could only 
be changed via a fair rent determination from the Rent Controller. This 
entailed the landlord making an application to the Rent Control Office 
for a rent variation. Once a determination was made it remained in 
force for one year. The landlord's only recourse was an appeal to a 
Fair Rents Board (i.e. to a magistrate). Tenants also were eligible 
to apply for a fair rent determination. Appropriate arrangements were 
made for tenancies since January 1 1973 and for new leases entered into 
too. As discussed in an ensuing section, all fair rent determinations 
were based on January 1 1973 capital values. Eviction controls in the 
Ordinance were such as to set out possible grounds for securing an 
eviction. These included the failure to pay rent, failure to comply 
with other conditions of the lease and sale of the dwelling to an 
intending occupier who must pay one quarter of the sale price within 
12 months.' As in the New South Wales legislation, one or more of these 
grounds was to be regarded as necessary, but.not sufficient, for an 
eviction. Eviction could not occur without a court order, and the court 
2 had considerable discretion. 
2. Adaptation of the Lindbeck Model 
Lindbeck's (1967) dynamic partial equilibrium model of the rental 
housing market (see Chapter 2) is modified to allow for the influences 
1 One departure from the wartime type of system was the removal of 
the requirement that the Rent Controller have regard to "justices 
and merits" of the case and the circumstances of the parties. This 
was partly a legacy of the Rathborne v. Abel case in New South 
Wales (see Chapter 6). 
2 Further aspects of the legislation, particularly in relation to 
the fair rent determination procedure, are considered later. 
Detailed information can be sought by consulting the Ordinance 
itself and the study by the Real Estate and Stock Institute of 
Australia (1975). An item in the "Canberra Times" (27.6.75) also 
gives a good summary of the legislation and its implications. 
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of related markets such as the Queanbeyan rental market and the owner-
occupancy market. The availability of government-supplied housing, at 
below-market rents, also asserts an influence on the Canberra private 
rental market. 
In the long-run, supply vd.ll be perfectly elastic at the long-run 
rental price, Rj^ , as long as house building is a constant cost 
industry, and demand increases do not bid up land values in better 
locations. Suppose that, in Figure 7.1, an initial equilibrium where 
demand, D, equals long-run supply, S^ ,^ is disturbed by a rise in 
demand to D'. As stock is fixed, momentary equilibrium will occur at 
R p the relevant "supply curve" being Sj^ j^ . The existing stock of 
dwellings is rationed by price and the price difference, R^ - R^j 
accrues to landlords as a pure rent. The existence of super-normal 
profits will attract new entry in the form.of greater construction of 
dv;ellings for rental purposes, upward filtering of existing stock and 
the purchase of existing dwellings for rental. The rate of conversion 
of existing dwellings to private rental will depend on conditions in 
the market .for owner-occupied dwellings. The elasticity of the short-
run supply curve, together with the rent elasticity of demand, will 
determine the speed of adjustment to long-run stock equilibrium. The 
more rent-elastic is the short-run supply curve, the faster will be the 
adjustment. Adjustment occurs over "construction periods" by a process 
indicated in Figure 7.1. 
The impact of rent control can be analysed using this simple model. 
Suppose that, in Figure 7.1, rents are prevented from reaching R2 in 
the first construction period and, instead, are set at R. This has two 
effects which lead to an excess demand for dwelling units. Firstly, 
less new entry than otherwise will occur, the extent of this effect 
being governed by the elasticity of the short-run supply curve. Second, 
demand will be greater, at the controlled rental, by an amount deter-
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mined by the rent elasticity of demand. Holding the price to R results 
in an excess demand of ab units. More generally, the following further 
predictions can be made about the effects of rent control: 
(i) Excess demand will prevail such that rationing will occur by 
means other than open price adjustment. A "black market" may 
arise to allocate dwelling units. If not, excess demand will 
manifest itself in a related market. The alternatives to renting 
in Canberra would appear to be a choice of renting in Queanbeyan, 
becoming an owner-occupier, renting from the Government, or an 
obscure alternative such as living with friends or relatives or 
caravan dwelling. 
(ii) The maintenance of below-market rents will result in a transfer 
from landlords to tenants and a deadweight loss in landlords' 
(producers') and tenants' (consumers') surplus. Considering 
the Canberra market alone, the transfer of surplus from landlord 
to tenant is R2Rcd, the total deadweight loss is cfe comprising 
a loss-to tenants of dfe and a loss to landlords of cfd. In 
addition to the deadweight surplus loss, there will be a cost to 
society due to'the use of resources by the controlling authority 
in interfering with the market. However, Canberrans are not the 
only persons affected by rent control in the ACT. The effects on 
Queanbeyan residents must also be considered. Existing Quean-
beyan tenants would suffer a loss in tenants' benefit, while 
producers there would gain. 
(iii) Rent control can have a whole variety of other effects. Labour 
mobility may be reduced due to the unwillingness to leave a 
controlled dwelling because of the favourable rent and the 
difficulty of finding alternative accommodation. Space may be 
used inefficiently due to the distortion of the housing/non-
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housing choice. Discrimination against certain classes of 
tenants (e.g. "groups" and young families) is likely to occur 
so as to minimize risk of damage. Further, maintenance expen-
ditvire will be allowed to lapse, particularly if rent control 
limits the rent per dwelling and not the rent per housing service 
unit. This latter effect may take some time to become evident. 
3. The Determination of Rental Price 
In determining "fair rents" the Rent Controller collects infor-
mation from the landlord (or his agent), the tenant (if he wishes to 
provide it) and an evaluation of the dwelling's value from the Valuers' 
Section of the Australian Taxation Office. The procedure used in deter-
mining fair rents has been described in detail elsewhere (RESI 1975, 
Ch.2), but some points are relevant. A formula was used which accounted 
for the following: (a) opportunity cost calculated as 6 per cent of 
assessed value for houses and 9 per cent for flats, (b) an allowance 
for repair and maintenance expenditure ($150 annually up to $35,000 
assessed value and $20-0 for over $35,000), (c) expenses Incurred on 
insurance and rates, (d) an allowance of 20 per cent of the value of 
furnishings, (e) a vacancy allowance, and (f) an agent's commission of 7 
per cent of the above' items totalled. The Rent Controller was not bound 
by the resulting formula rent and could (and usually did) make a "sub-
jective adjustment". 
This formulation displays an inadequate and inequitable allowance 
for opportunity cost, ignores changes in capital value and disregards 
short-run considerations. The first two difficulties can be overcome 
by using an approach suggested by Swan (1976). Consider the following 
expression, 
^ - -V. - - : ^ 
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where P^ is the net present value of any pure economic profits, Vj. 
is net present value or market value of the productive asset (i.e. 
dwelling) , is the anticipated value of the asset in the next 
period, N^ is net revenue generated by the asset (i.e. gross revenue 
less all outlays other than capital outlays), denotes gross 
investment outlay, and r^ is the market rate of interest. P^ . will 
equal zero when there is no market power and when there are no short-run 
pure rents due to lags in entry, knowledge imperfections, lack of 
foresight, etc. P^ will equal zero when there is freedom of entry and 
in the long-run. In long-run equilibrium, then, P^ = P^ .^^  = 0, such 
that equation (7.1), on manipulation, becomes 
\ = r^V^ + [V^  - (VfHi -
Nj. is not a complete indicator of user cost because other costs, not 
associated with capital outlay, must be covered by the landlord. These 
comprise rates, insurance and agents' fees and are denoted The 
gross rental formula is, then: \, 
\ = G^ = r^V^ + [V^:- (V^+i - It+l)l + G, (7.3) 
Attempts to estimate Rj. were made for each of a sample of 100 
dwellings collected from the Rent Control Office. Many operational 
difficulties were encountered. The determination of an appropriate 
opportunity cost proved difficult. A market rate was considered more 
1 The analysis can be conducted in terms of real magnitudes. The 
real rate of interest (h ) is (r - p^) (1 + p^ .) where 
P,. is the general rate of inflation. The real rental price 
fSrmula is 
1 + Pt ^ ^"" Pt 1 + p^ 
where G^ is measured in end of period prices. The rental price 
is meashred in beginning of period prices. While it is possible 
to conduct the analysis in real or nominal terms, a mixture of the 
two is inadmissible. In an article on Canberra s rent control, 
McLeod (1975) incorrectly measured opportunity cost in nominal 
terras and the change in capital values in real terms. 
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desirable than the maximum bank overdraft rate which the Rent Controller 
had "regard to". The maximum call rate on loans to dealers in the 
short-term money market was used. The market values of dwellings, V^ ., 
was proxied by the Taxation Valuer's assessed value which was made as 
of 1 January 1973. Value changes were ascertained by applying an 
"appropriate index" to this base value. A land-house value index was 
constructed by the author for the period 1962-63 to 1974-75. This index 
grew at an annual average rate of 5.7 per cent which was taken to be 
the long-term "expected" rate of appreciation.^ Furnishings were 
treated in the same way as by the Rent Controller. 
Using this information gave an average rental price below the Rent 
Controller's average "fair rent" determination. This was not because 
the Rent Controller was allowing for short-run considerations. Rather, 
it was due to his complete neglect of asset value changes. This over-
sight, in quantitative terms, outweighed the effect of making an 
inadequate allowance for opportunity cost. An alt'ernative means of 
estimating market rent-in Canberra, based on the experience of Quean-
beyan, is set-out in an ensuing section. 
4, The Canberra Rental Market "and Related Markets 
^^ile a demand function has not been estimated, it is probable that 
demand for rental accommodation in Canberra is related to such factors 
as rents in Canberra and Queanbeyan, income, population growth rate, 
cost of owner-occupancy, cost and eligibility of renting from the 
Government, and conditions pertaining to the Government's public-service 
private rent subsidy. Rents had been rising in Canberra at about 8 per 
cent per annum, on average, between 1971 and 1973. House rents had been 
rising much faster than flat rents over this period. House prices had 
been increasing very rapidly over these years also. The rate of 
1 Information on the quality adjusted index and other aspects of the 
estimation procedure are available, on request, from the author. 
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increase in rents had not been high relative to the rate of inflation 
in the A.C.T. 
The imposition of rent control did create a disequilibrium in the 
Canberra market. There is considerable qualitative evidence of the 
extent of excess demand^, "To Let" columns dwindled dramatically, 
bond requirements rose sharply (and bonds became more difficult to 
redeem), bribes were offered to secure leases and long-term caravan 
parks boomed. Some extent of the excess demand can be gauged by 
examining the related markets of Queanbeyan, ovmer-occupancy and 
Government housing. 
Queanbeyan is a New South Wales town just outside the A.C.T. border 
about 15 kilometres from Canberra's Civic Centre. In 1974 Canberra's 
population was about 180,000 and that of Queanbeyan was about 20,000. 
Accounting for only 10 per cent of combined population, Queanbeyan 
provided about 25 per cent of rental accommodation. There were about 
2,000 flats and houses leased in Queanbeyan in 1974 and some 6,000 
(estimated•below) in Canberra. The size of the Queanbeyan rental market 
had expanded from 1,556 at the 30 June 1971 Census. 
Queanbeyan was a major outlet for Canberra's excess demand. Quean-
beyan's population grew by 1,310 in 1974/75 compared with an average 
of 900 in the previous three years. Canberra's population growth fell 
from 12,200 in 1973 to 10,900 in 1974. Demand for rental accommodation 
in Queanbeyan was at an unprecedented level in 1974. While demand 
usually has a seasonal dip in the period from December to-February this 
is normally followed by a seasonal peak around March. The demand for 
rental accommodation was so severe in March/April 1974, that one large 
estate agent (at least) was telling enquirers that there were absolutely 
"no vacancies". This was the first time in the firm's history that this 
1 Much of this qualitative evidence is presented in RESI (1975). 
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had ^^^^^ occurred. Vacancy rates were well under 2 per cent and 
«' 
remained so until about August 1975. 
What caused the high level of demand in 1974? On this the two 
estate agents interviewed disagreed to some extent. While one 
identified a "spill-over" of demand due to rent control in Canberra, 
the other was quick to offer the opinion that demand would have been 
as great in the absence of rent restrictions in the A .C .T . The latter 
agent did , however, claim that rent control in Canberra led to a 
transfer of some flat construction plans from Canberra to Queanbeyan. 
Certainly there is much qualitative, and some quantitative, evidence 
of a flat building boom in Queanbeyan which began in 1974, and peaked 
in 1975. The only numerical datum available is a series of unit 
"approvals" which is inconclusive, mainly because approvals do not 
necessarily imply commencements and approved projects may be commenced 
up to three years after approval.^ The Queanbeyan City Council, the 
two estate agents interviewed and casual empiricism do, however, point 
to a dramatic increase" in flat building in 1974 and 1975.^ 
The owner-occupancy market was another possible outlet for excess 
rental demand. • This does not seem, however, to have been very impor-
tant. Prices steadied in 1974 and this is consistent with a fall in 
demand for owner-occupied housing and a shift of supply of rentable 
1 The series of approvals, presented in Table 7 . 1 , indicates a peak 
in the series in 1973. The building peak certainly came later. 
2 It is claimed, by the estate agents, that owners set rents in a 
cost-plus fashion, where a return of approximately 10 per cent per 
annum on invested funds is sought. If yet another refutation of 
Hall and Hitch (1939) is required, it is provided by Queanbeyan 
evidence over recent years. Rent increases in Queanbeyan early 
in 1974, can, at least in part, be explained by increases in costs 
(council rates and interest rates both rose in this period). 
However, the "cost" element cannot explain all the rent rise as 
the "plus" factor also rose considerably because of the high level 
of demand. As will be shown later, the Queanbeyan rental market 
became greatly depressed and the Hall and Hitch rule was, of 
course, abandoned due to the recognition of market pressures. Low 
levels of demand had pushed rates of return down to as low as 6 or 
7 per cent in 1976. 
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Table 7.1; Flat Building Approvals - Queanbeyan, 
1963-1975 
Number of Number of 
Year Applications Units 
1963 22 124 
1964 27 171 
1965 32 137 
1966 17 122 
1967 16 93 
1968 30 354 
1969 41 440 
1970 17 194 
1971 22 256 
1972 20 , 365 
1973 30 680 
197A 24 425 
1975 • . '24 > 281 
Source; City of Queanbeyan, Mayoral Report, 1975. 
140. 
dwellings from the rental market.^ Many potential renters were 
unable or unwilling to become owner-occupiers. The number of vacant 
dwellings in Canberra rose from 4.784 per cent of total stock as at 30 
June 1971 to 6.362 per cent at the local census of 2 July 1975. This 
increase is possibly accounted for by landlords selling off dwellings 
to owner-occupants with a resulting period of vacancy between tenancy 
and sale and short-term emigrants from Canberra leaving houses vacant 
rather than renting them at below-market rents. 
Another possible outlet for unsatisfied demand in the Canberra 
private rental market was Government housing. This was clearly not 
important in the short-term due to the existence of waiting lists of 
about three years. Further, strict eligibility conditions were intro-
duced in 1974 such that numbers on the waiting list fell from 7,843 in 
June 1973 to only 2,997 one year later. Commencements of Government 
houses and flats fell from 1,191 in 1973 to 1,129 in 1974. 
Finally, there was only recourse to "emergency" measures, such as 
2. living with relatives or friends or living in caravans. 
We conclude this sectiqn with the observation that Queanbeyan was 
probably the major repipient of Canberra's excess demand. For those 
frustrated in Canberra, it appears to have been the only feasible short-
term alternative. 
5. Estimation of Market Rent 
A previous section has indicated the difficulties of using a formula 
approach in estimating a market rent. In this section an- alternative 
1 The course of actual house prices as measured by average sale 
prices of established and new houses was, on a March to March 
basis, a rise of 11.04 per cent in 1971, 23.98 per cent in 1972, 
33.96 per cent in 1973, -0.34 per cent in 1974 and 6.98 per cent 
in 1975. 
2 Allocation in Canberra by "chance and favouritism" probably leaves 
those with the lowest incomes unsatisfied. While these persons 
are eligible for Government housing, they are least likely to have 
the capacity to become owner-occupiers. 
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approach is used which endeavours to discover what would have happened « • 
in Canberra by examining the adjacent, uncontrolled, Queanbeyan market. 
This approach proves to be quite fruitful and provides a basis for the 
surplus estimates made in the next section. 
Table 7.2 presents data on the relative rent movements in Canberra 
and Queanbeyan over the period of interest. The Table indicates a most 
remarkable disparity. \>fhat would have happened in Queanbeyan if rent 
control had not been imposed in Canberra? Consider again Figure 7.1, 
and imagine the demand and supply curves are aggregates over the 
Canberra and Queanbeyan markets. Suppose overall demand increases so 
that, given an initial long-run equilibrium, rents would rise to Rj^ . 
In the momentary conceptual time span, supply would be fixed in both 
markets. Adjustment would begin so that over "construction" periods 
there would be a movement back to long-run' equilibrium. The momentary 
(or fixed supply) response would have occurred in Queanbeyan with, or 
without, rent control in Canberra. In the event, of course, rents kept 
rising in Queanbeyan because the "spill-over" of demand at prevailing 
rents exceeded the ability of Queanbeyan to accommodate it. 
If the momentary'rise in rent is taken as that which occurred until 
the September quarter of 1974, then the "fixed supply" rise is 14.29 
per cent. Of course, supply was not rigidly fixed and some new supply 
would have become available by that date. Initial total quantity was 
about 8,000 units and initial rent about $2,080. Given some assump-
tions about the elasticities of supply and demand, the "short-run" rise 
in rent (R2 - RL) which would have occurred, can be estimated. 
Supposing a short-run (one year) supply elasticity (e^) of 0.1 and an 
elasticity of demand (e^) of 1, then rent would have risen about 13 
per cent. To be on the safe side, we will assume a smaller increase 
of 10 per cent. 
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Table 7.2: Canberra and Queanbeyan Private Rent Indexes. 
Quarterly, December 1973 = 1 
Canberra Queanbeyan 
1973 J 0.9712 
S 0.9890 
D 1.0000 1.0000 
1974 M 1.0080 1.0000 
J 1.0140 1.1005 
S 1.0160 1.1429 
D 1.0200 1.1833 
1975 M 1.0290 1.2117 
J 1.0510 1.2396 
S 1.0620 1.2570 
D 1.0790 
1976 M 1.1090 
•J 1.1580 
Sources; Canberra Index is the "Rent, Privately Ovmed Houses and 
Flats" Sub-group from "Consumer Price Index, Index Numbers 
for Groups, Sub-groups and Special Groupings, Canberra" 
(ABS). 
Queanbeyan Index from a sample of rents on 161 Queanbeyan 
flats taken from the files of Allen Curtis & Partners, 
Queanbeyan. 
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An estimated rent increase of 10 per cent in 1974 is regarded as 
rather conservative. Rents in both markets had been rising at about 
8 per cent per annum in the three preceding years. Taking all factors 
into account this was the absolute base to the 1974 rise. Further, 
obviously not all excess demand flowed from Canberra to Queanbeyan. 
To the extent that it did not, any estimate based on Queanbeyan's 
experience must be an understatement. Finally, the estimate of 10 per 
cent has been corroborated by the views of estate agents. 
6. Estimation of Costs and Transfers 
In this section we attempt to identify the gainers and losers from 
rent control and to estimate the extent of gains and losses. If 
Canberra was the only market to consider then the areas in Figure 7.1 
would be relevant. Tenants' benefit is the transfer (R2Rcd) minus 
the deadweight loss in tenant's surplus (dfe).^ The loss in land-
lords' surplus is cfd. The transfer is estimated, as are administra-
tive costs. Further, it has to be recognized that Queanbeyan tenants 
lose, and Queanbeyan landlords gain, from rent control in Canberra. 
Total tenants' benefit in Canberra and Queanbeyan is estimated using a 
variant of the De Salvo measure discussed at .length in Chapter 3. 
Firstly we need to gather the necessary quantitative information. 
The rent elasticity of demand is assumed to be unity. Such an 
assumption implies that families spend a fixed proportion of their 
incomes on housing despite rent changes. In Australia, such habits are 
promoted by the practice of lending institutions not to lend to home 
buyers an amount which would entail repayments above a certain pro-
portion of income. Empirical studies of the demand for rental housing 
also suggest a unitary demand elasticity (see e.g. de Leeuw and Ekanem, 
1971, and the references therein). If some local evidence is required. 
1 This is, of course, a Marshallian measure of surplus. It implicitly 
assumes a zero income elasticity of demand for housing. 
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the practice of Queanbeyan real estate agents in recoimnending rent cuts 
of up to 20 per cent to combat a 1976 vacancy ratio of 16-17 per cent 
implies a rent elasticity of almost unity.^ 
The question of rent elasticity of supply, discussed in Chapter 
4, is an extremely difficult one. Based on the estimates made there, 
and allowing for the biases likely to be inherent in them, an elasti-
city estimate of 0.1 does not seem to be a major perversion of reality. 
In order to estimate the number of dwellings under rent control 
in 1974 two possible approaches were explored. One was to seek this 
information directly from the Rent Control Office, the other was to make 
an estimate on the basis of the 1971 Census data. On 30 June 1971 there 
were 5,496 dwellings rented other than from the Government or an 
employer. These comprised 3,082 houses, or 9.5 per cent of the stock 
of 32,455 houses, and 2,414 self-contained flats (51.3 per cent of 
4,703). From that date until the end of 1973 there were 9,330 house 
completions and 780 flat completions. Assuming constant occupancy 
rates, and no demolitions, there would have been 6,782 tenanted 
» / 
dwellings at the beginning of 1974, comprising 3,970 houses and 2,812 
flats. The Rent Cbntrol Office provided .information as to the number 
of first applications for a fair rent determination as of January 1974 
and 1975. The respective figures were 3,018 (about 1,600 houses 
and 1,400 flats) and 5,833 (3,400 and 2,400). If an application for 
a determination had not been received it could mean one of three things: 
(i) the parties were happy with the January 1973 level of rent, (ii) 
the parties were ignorant of, or were evading, the law, or (iii) the 
landlord was sufficiently sceptical of the benefit-cost ratio of making 
an application as to persevere with the level of 1 January 1973. In 
regard to this latter point, in the first round of determinations, 38 
1 The assumption of a unit elastic rental demand entails some amendment 
to Figure 7.1 in that the demand curve should appear as a rectangular 
hyperbola. 
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per cent of rents were raised above the existing level, 32 per cent were 
not altered, and 30 per cent were reduced. It is not surprising that 
some landlords were unprepared to undergo the expense and trouble of 
being told something different from what the market was signalling. 
Significantly, given the estimates based on the Census data, a con-
siderably larger proportion of flats to houses had come up for rent 
determination as of January, 1974, and this reflects economies of scale 
in applications for multiple units, and the higher opportunity cost (9 
per cent as against 6 per cient) allowance for flats compared to houses. 
It seems, therefore, that the major reasons for non-application were 
pessimism about potential gains, transaction costs, and inertia. For 
the purposes of estimation it is conservatively assumed that about 6,000 
dwellings were directly affected by rent control in 1974. 
Ilarket rent has already been estimated as being about 10 per cent 
above controlled rent in 1974. Taking the simple average rental in 
early 1974 as $2,080 per annum, market rent would have been about 
$2,288. 
Given thfe information above, tenants' benefit in Canberra is 
estimated as about . $1,248,000.^ . Any estimate of tenants' surplus 
foregone by supply restriction may well be a considerable understate-
ment, particularly when rationing is based on "chance and favouritism". 
There is no guarantee that those most willing to pay will be accommo-
dated. If so, some with greater willingness to pay (greater surplus) 
will be included in the unsatisfied fringe. However, given the trivial 
nature of the tenants' surplus loss in this case, this effect is 
unlikely to be very important. 
1 R-,Rcd = $208 X 6,000 = $1,248,000. Tenants' surplus foregone is 
derived by integrating the unit elastic demand curve over the rele-
vant range and subtracting from this the amount that would actually^ 
be paid for the lost supply at market rents. The loss in landlords' 
surplus is equal to supply foregone times the annual difference in 
rent all divided by two. With an of .1 these latter amounts 
are too small to warrant calculation? Supply foregone is only about 
60 dwelling units (i.e. 1 per cent of 6,000). 
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A major set of costs that have to be considered are those associa-
ted with the administration of rent controls. These costs, which are 
based on estimates by the Real Estate and Stock Institute of Australia 
(1975, Ch. 6), total about $415,000 in 1974. Firstly, there is the cost 
of the rent control activities of the Rent Control Office which are 
estimated at $143,000. Then there are valuing costs of about $138,000 
and costs of the Fair Rents Board of some $48,000. Finally, there were 
costs associated with the private sector's compliance with the legis-
lation. The principal cost here is that of application to the Rent 
Controller for a fair rent determination, although there are other costs 
(e.g. appeals, "lobbying", etc.). The total cost of application may 
have been as high as $86,000 in 1974. 
Renters in Queanbeyan, of course, lost due to rent control in 
Canberra because they paid rents higher than those they would otherwise 
have had to pay. Tenant benefit from rent-control was less than 
benefits to Canberra tenants by the loss in Queanbeyan.^ The De Salvo 
method can be adapted for use in estimating net tenant benefit from rent 
control in Canberra. Suppose total utility of Canberra-Queanbeyan 
renters is .given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function,^ 
• c. 
I . U = (7.4) 
where Q is consumption of Queanbeyan rental housing services, C is that 
in Canberra, and N is consumption of non-housing commodities by renters. 
The parameters ct, 3 and Y are free market proportions of Q, C and N. 
After rent control, the budget constraint of Canberra-Queanbeyan renters 
is 
Y = ^PpQ + PP(,C+ PjjN (7.5) 
where PQ, P^ and Pj^  are the respective market prices of Q, C and 
N; A is the multiple by which Queanbeyan rents were raised above market 
level by rent control, and y is the proportion of P^ to which the 
1 The use of a total utility function will give a different result than 
would estimation of the many constituent individual utility functions 
unless all individuals have identical utility functions. 
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price of housing service units was reduced due to rent control; Y is « 
after-tax Income of total renters in Canberra and Queanbeyan. 
The level of income, Y*, necessary to make renters as well off at 
market prices as they would be with rent control can be derived as^ 
Y* = N 
a 
rP,c> fY - XP^Q - yP^C ^ 
Y 
,-a 
(7.6) 
where bars indicate quantities consumed after rent control. Hicks' 
equivalent variation measure of tenant benefit is, then, Y* - Y, the 
income supplement (non-taxable) necessary to maintain the rent control 
utility level. 
Given the assumptions already made, the following estimates are 
suggested, PPqC is expenditure on rental housing in Canberra under 
rent control which equals $2,080 x 6,000 = $12,480,000. y is equal to 
0.91. is $2,288 x 6,000 - $13,728,000. Expenditure on rental 
housing if rent control did'not exist is $2,288 x 6,060 = $13,865,280. 
Total income, Y , equals average male weekly earnings, after tax, multi-
plied by total renters. This is a sum of $7,500 x 8,000 = $60,000,000. 
3 is, then $13,865,280/$60,000,000 = 0.231. Without rent control 
1 Utility yielded by the rent control policy, Uj^, can be expressed 
as 
Y - yP^C - Pj^N ^  " 
XfI 
C ^ 
Y - APqQ - yP^C . ^ -
"N 
while an income level of Y* in the following expression would yield 
the same utility level at market prices. U^ then, also equals 
' aY* ' a f 3Y* ' 3 r yy* ' y 
^N J 
Equating the two expressions and solving for Y* yields (7.6) 
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expendit ure in Queanbeyan would have been market rent times free market 
quantity.^ Actual Queanbeyan rent was $1,627.6 and A was 1.0757. 
Market rent would then, be about $1,513, a is equal to ($1,513 x 
l,980)/$60,000,000 = 0.05. Xp^Q is about $3,255,000. Pj^ N is Y 
minus rental spending in Canberra and Queanbeyan under rent control. 
This is an amount of $44,265,000 and Y = (1 - a _ 3) = 0.719. 
Substituting all these estimates into (6) yields a value of Y* of 
$60,990,000. The Hicks' equivalent variation measure of total tenants' 
benefit is Y* - Y = $990,000. This comprised a tenants' benefit in 
Canberra and a loss to tenants in Queanbeyan. It differs from the 
previous estimate of tenants' benefit because it encompasses Queanbeyan 
losses and because it allows for quantity constraints. The gain to 
producers in Queanbeyan has not been estimated but is certainly of a 
small order of magnitude. 
7. Events Since 1974 
The differential between rents in Canberra and Queanbeyan began 
to close in 1975. The Rent Controller adopted the rent index in the 
Australian Consumer Price Index as a relevant factor in determining 
rents. Further, rent.' increases began to taper off in Queanbeyan as 
supply, induced by high rents in the previous year, began to become 
available. The relative changes are shown in Table 7.2. Further, late 
in 1975, a weakening of demand seems to have begun and this has con-
tinued. By 1975 vacancy rates were rising and rents falling in 
Queanbeyan. 
The abolition of compulsory rent control was announced by the 
Minister for the Capital Territory, Mr. A.A. Staley, in April 1976. 
1 Equilibrium quantity would have been less in Queanbeyan without rent 
control. If e. was 0.1 in Queanbeyan, then, at market rent, some 
20 less units would have been forthcoming. Market quantity is 
assumed, thus, to be 1,980. The one-year elasticity of supply in 
Queanbeyan may well have been much higher. 
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Canberra has reverted back to a "voluntary" system of fair renting where 
tenants.or landlords may request a fair rent determination which, once 
delivered, is binding. The 1976 amendments were not a pure reversion 
to the pre-1973 situation. Over the intervening years the (Henderson) 
Poverty Enquiry had occurred and much attention had been given to 
"regulation" of the rental housing market (see Bradbrook, 1975). Some 
of these changes found their way into the A.C.T. Ordinance. Examples 
are the limitations on the amount of security bonds and changes to the 
fair renting system. As the legislation now stands there is the 
distinct possibility that a de facto system of rent control could emerge 
in Canberra. These aspects are taken up in the next chapter. 
Another event has been the perennial appearance of arguments for 
a system of commercial rent control in Canberra. There has been a 
marked reluctance to learn from the experience of residential rent 
control. Commentators, including Mr. Staleyd) and the Editorial writer 
of the "Canberra Times" have blamed the planning system' for creating 
monopoly power for commercial landlords. Mr. Staley argued that "very 
carefully regulated release of certain sorts of sites ... [means] that 
some business owners to somes'extent have the,game by the throat" 
(Canberra Times, 16.3.77, p.3). Whereas in Melbourne Mr. Staley would 
"let the market decide", in Canberra he would like to see a Commercial 
Rents Tribunal set up "to give all tenants whose leases were being 
renewed access to a tribunal to determine the market rent for the 
premises" (Canberra Times, 30.7.77, p.3, italics added). Nothing has 
yet come of these proposals. Neither of Mr. Staley's successors have 
been as positive about the issue. 
8. Conclusions 
Several major conclusions seem to emerge. It appears that rent 
control did have a binding influence in that rents were kept down 
artificially. The contrasting movements of Canberra and Queanbeyan 
150. 
rents is clear evidence of this. While rent control was imposed in a « 
tight market situation, the policy seems to have made things conside-
rably tighter. While some tenants in Canberra benefited from lower 
rents, there were associated disbenefits. Deadweight and administrative 
costs were incurred by the community. In addition, as the Priorities 
Review Staff (1975) put it, the "policy [rent control] acts to benefit a 
few affluent tenants, it implicitly taxes landlords (who may be poorer 
than their tenants) and discriminates against potential low-income or 
high-risk tenants (who miss out on any form of housing) ..." (p.156). 
Discrimination is the only variable left to landlords. This certainly 
showed up in relation to non-family "groups" and young families with 
children. Considerable costs were borne (and are being borne) in 
Queanbeyan. The spill-over of excess demand raised Queanbeyan rents 
in an extraordinary fashion, harming the poor tenants of Queanbeyan. 
A policy designed to help the poor in Canberra ended up harming the most 
vulnerable people in the Canberra-Queanbeyan area. The' distorted market 
signals in Queanbeyan led to an over-expansion of new supply which 
made the recession that much more difficult for Queanbeyan landlords. 
Rent control did not stay around long enough .;to create problems of 
maintenance and repairs. This was fortunate. However, the overall 
conclusion must be that rent control in Canberra has verified most of 
the expectations of simple neoclassical analysis and must be condemned 
as a costly redistributive device.^ 
While one academic commentator, M.A. Jones (1976) claimed that 
rent control in Canberra had the "classic effects", particularly 
"a decline in the supply of rental houses and flats" (p.290), another 
M. Neutze (1978) thought the controls were of "doubtful effectiveness" 
(p.93). Neither writer presents any evidence for his statement. 
• CHAPTER 8 
RENTAL MARI^T REGULATION^ 
The contemporary mania for paternalistic legislation has not 
bypassed the rental housing market. The cry is not for traditional "rent 
control". Rather, the new fad is for "rental market regulation", a legal 
package which stops short of "rent control", particularly in relation 
to rent-setting. Tliis is not to say that rental market regulation is 
devoid of the problems associated with rent control. The contrary is 
strongly argued in this chapter. While regulation is examined as a 
general phenomenon, several Australian and overseas cases are used for 
illustrative purposes. In particular, some emphasis is placed on the 
intended Victorian legislation. 
1. Rent Control and "Rental Market Regulation" 
As it has been known in Australia, rent control involves the very 
rigid control of dvjelling rents coupled with severe constraints on 
landlords' ability to. evict tenants. Commonly, rents have been frozen 
at the level which prevailed at a prescribed date. Often there is a 
facility for varying rents via a rent determination. A rent controller 
is usually given the .task of making rent determinations based on the 
capital value of the dwelling as at a prescribed date. Increased 
outgoings (on rates, insurance and maintenance) are usually accounted 
for in making determinations. However, as was argued in Chapter 6, the 
use of base period capital values has the effect of holding capital 
values down to levels prevailing at the prescribed date. Where free 
market capital values are rising (as they typically have where rent 
control has prevailed), there is a big incentive for landlords to evict 
tenants and sell their properties to an owner-occupier. However they 
1 This Chapter is in part a culmination of several writings on the issue 
of rental market regulation, comprising two submissions to enquiries 
CAlbon 1978a and 1979a) and two rather polemical pieces (Albon, 1978b 
and c).' A debt to Ross Parish (1980a and 1980b) will be evident. 
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are frustrated by eviction controls which only allow the landlprd right 
of repossession on certain grounds (such as failure of the tenant to pay 
rent or the landlord requiring the dwelling for his own occupation). 
The specified grounds have commonly only provided a prima facie ground 
for eviction and considerable notice has typically been required. 
"Rental market regulation" is a combination of legislative elements 
drawn from traditional rent control laws and from consumer protection 
legislation. It usually involves some form of rent control which is not 
particularly rigid. For example, tenants may have the right to seek a 
"fair rent" determination based on the dwelling's current capital value. 
Annual rent increases may be limited to some maximum percentage. The 
periodicity of rent increases may be restricted and/or considerable 
notice of rent increases may have to be given. The regulators do, 
however, tend to refrain from blanket rent freezes and rent determi-
nations based on unrealistic base period capital values. 
Severe eviction controls are also part of the regulators' 
repertoire. Regulatory legislation specifies allowable grounds for 
eviction and periods of notite required to attain evictions. Landlords 
may be able to get around these controls by hiking rents to encourage 
a tenant to leave "voluntarily". However, this will be unavailable where 
there is some form of control on rents or rent increases. 
In addition to rent and eviction controls, regulators attempt to 
control many other aspects of the landlord-tenant contract. It is 
particularly popular to interfere with the security bond -system. Often 
the regulation limits the size of a security bond to some maximum, 
usually a multiple of the weekly rent. In addition, the government may 
establish a "bond bank" and require all bonds to be lodged with this 
fund. The regulators may then supervise the size and return of bonds, 
as well as expropriating the interest income. 
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Another area of interference is in relation to repairs. In some « 
cases, tenants are able to withhold rent pa3Tnents to finance repairs they 
deem necessary. Restrictions on repairs may take other forms - such as 
compulsory repair orders. 
The regulatory legislation may contain other items. For example, 
the right of entry of the landlord or his agent may be controlled. 
Parties to a tenancy agreement may be required to enter a written lease 
arrangement. Parties may be forbidden from "contracting out" of pro-
visions in the legislation. Discrimination (for example, on the basis 
of a potential tenant having children) is often outlawed. 
The pervasiveness of regulation is indicated by the listing of 
United States legislative elements set out by Starr (1979, p.32). Local 
governments have interfered "by regulating rents; by annulling the 
owner's previous right to terminate a tenant's tenure at the end of any 
lease period without cause; by tightening controls over the various kinds 
of activities that could be permitted within a residential building; by 
making more difficult eviction for established causes ...; by establish-
ing special courts to deal with housing matters, and condoning so-called 
rent strikes ...; by refusing to allow owners to remove their rental 
units from the market unless they prove a compelling need for their own 
use of them; by forbidding discrimination against tenants on the grounds 
of race, religion or nationality, or because they have children; by 
making rules against pets all but unenforcable; by adding new require-
ments ... to an already long list of housing-code specifications; ...". 
2. The Ideology of Rental Market Regulation 
To some extent, rental market regulation is tied up with the 
"consumer protection" movement. It simply extends "protection" to a 
further commodity - rental housing services. Parish (1980a) has noted 
some common ideological features of protectionism. This is worthy of 
some discussion in the context of rental housing. 
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One aspect of thinking by the pro-interventionist group is an 
asymmetf-y in the alleged role of economics. There is an acceptance of 
"economic motives in housing when they proceed from the tenant's 
perspective", but application of "moral criteria to landlords" - "If a 
tenant complains that rents are too high, his action is economic and 
natural; if an owner does not spend money because the cost of repairs 
is too high, he is greedy" (Starr, 1979, p.27). Something of this view 
seems to come through in the Victorian Community Committee's (1978) 
Report where a "reasonable landlord" is defined as one who "is prepared 
to accept a degree of social responsibility and control in the provision 
of housing and is not merely motivated by profit" (p.33, italics added). 
There is a common uneasiness about profits. The greed and avarice 
of individuals is not seen as a force which can be harnessed for the 
betterment of society. Reformers do not say that landlords should be 
deprived of a "fair return" but there is always the hint of a monopoly 
element. Jane Fonda puts it this way: "We're not trying to screw 
landlords out of their- profits, but we have to find a way for people to 
get a roof over their heads while landlords make a decent profit. What 
we have to do is eliminate the greed quotient" (Quoted in "Time", April 
30, 1979, p.69). 
Landlord and tenant meet in an unequal contest. As Sim (1975) would 
have it, landlords have a "bargaining superiority" over their tenants 
(p.431). Or as the Community Committee believes, "[m]ost tenancy 
agreements cannot be described as contracts freely entered into between 
two equal parties" (p.55). 
Finally, we have the assertion that housing is special - a 
meritorious commodity deserving of extraordinary attention from legis-
lators. This line of approach is very prominent in the Community 
Committee's Report. Fuller discussions are to be found in Chapters 1 and 10. 
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3. Internal Origins of Australian Rental Market Regulation 
If we seek internal origins of rental market regulation in Australia 
we need not look beyond the Comiaission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975) 
and the growth of "consumer protectionism". Quite clearly, advocates 
of this kind of interference in the private rental market see it as but 
another branch of "consumer protectionism". Rental housing is one of 
many products where consumers are susceptible to falling prey to 
avaricious traders. It was inevitable that the oldest bogey-man of them 
all - the landlord - would eventually attract the attention of the 
consumer protection movement. 
The Poverty Commission was clearly not in favour of rent control, 
despite suggestions made to it that "there should be a major extension 
of measures of rent control" (p. 161). Rent control was rejected for 
three reasons: (i) Landlords will "have a clear incentive to get rid 
of their tenants" (p.161). (ii) Rent control "can lead to landlords 
attempting to cut costs by not spending money on maintenance" (p.161). 
(iii) "Even more serious is the overall effect of a sharp reduction in 
the supply of rental accommodation" (p.162). We must concur with the 
Commission when it concludes that "we do not'agree that rent control is 
" i 
in the long-term interest of tenants" (p.162). 
It is also easy to agree with the Commission when it maintains "that 
the market mechanism does operate, with imperfections for private rental 
housing and suggest[s] that many of the problems of low income private 
renters result from their low incomes" (p.162). Here the agreement must 
stop. Despite these very sensible observations, the Commission then 
comes out in favour of legislative interference in the market: "The 
cheap private rental market has many other unsatisfactory aspects such 
as insecurity of tenure, illegal retention of bond money, biased leases, 
and legislation which gives tenants few legal rights. Professor 
Sackville will be proposing legal changes which are needed to improve 
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the situation" (p.162). Here lies the germ of "rental market regulation" 
in Australia. 
Details are set out in Bradbrook (1975). The legal reforms 
suggested involve setting up in each State a Residential Tenancies Board 
and a Tenancy Investigation Bureau. These bodies would be vested with 
the full complement of regulatory powers. The solution was simple. All 
that was needed was for each State to enact the necessary legislation. 
The Poverty Commission's proposals attracted considerable support 
from some quarters. For example, the Australian Institute of Urban 
Studies (1975) published a Report of a Task Force which asserted that 
"landlord and tenant meet in an unequal contest" (p.46) and urged "the 
Australian Government to take the initiative in getting adoption of the 
Bradbrook proposals on uniform Australia-wide fair rent legislation" 
(p.70). 
The legal profession seems also to have played a role in regard to 
the advent of regulation of the rental market (and many other markets). 
As Starr (197-9) has argued, "[t]he body of laws on the books offers 
immense opportunity for exploitation by lawyers who hope to begin 
political careers, as'many legislators now in office have, by leading 
the 'tenant movement' and doing its work" (p.33). It remains to be seen 
whether any political careers will emerge from lawyers' involvement in 
the Australian "tenant movement". 
4. External Origins of Australian Rental Market Regulation 
Australia cannot be regarded as a pioneer in rental market regu-
lation. This dubious distinction probably lies xcLth Canada. However, 
there are other cases. A close-to-home example is New Zealand which has 
for some years had regulatory-type legislation. The United States is now 
producing instances of this type of law, and certain aspects of the 
United Kingdom's rent laws display regulatory characteristics. 
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The early and heavy involvement of certain Canadian Provinces with 
rental market regulation makes it possible to dub this type of'legis-
lation, with some justice, the "Canadian Disease". The Provinces which 
enacted regulatory legislation include Ontario, British Columbia and 
Quebec. Ontario's laws were first enacted in 1970. A great debate has 
taken place in Canada over this issue. The extent of this debate can 
be guaged by checking the bibliography in a Canadian Council on Social 
Development (CCSD) publication, Patterson and Watson (1976). The CCSD 
has argued strongly for what it calls "rent regulation" while groups like 
the Fraser Institute (1975)^ and the Urban Development Institute have 
been strong in opposition to it. Victoria's Community Committee on 
Tenancy Law Reform (1978) has drawn heavily on the alleged success of 
Canadian legislation to bolster its case for reforming Victorian land-
lord and tenant law. 
In the United States, New York City's rent control has attracted 
much attention. A system of controls in Massachusetts -has long been in 
operation. Very recently, however, a great deal of regulatory activity 
has occurred in the United States. The pro-interference movement has 
been able to boast the vocal support of Jane Fonda (see Time, April 30, 
1979, p.69).^ . The" American push for regulation has had most success 
in California - the home of "Proposition 13". According to the 
agitators, tax reform and their movement are not unrelated. They argue 
that property tax cuts have not been passed on to tenants. 
Legislation in the United Kingdom has elements of both "rent 
control" and "rental market regulation". As set out in Cooper and 
Stafford (1980), the United Kingdom's law attempts to define (objec-
tively) "fair rent" and has very rigid security of tenure provisions. 
1 Unfortunately the Fraser Institute concentrates on attacking rent 
control and not rental market regulation. To this extent their study 
is a little disappointing. 
2 There is also an article in "Economist" (April 28, 1979, pp.50, 53) 
on the same subject. 
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In New Zealand there seems to be considerable support for 
regulat6ry-type legislation in the landlord and tenant area. New Zealand 
Economic Papers contains two articles which mentioned the issue of rent 
control. Both of these articles, Easton (1976) and Stephens (1976), were 
broadly in favour of some form of control. Easton saw "rent controls 
as a viable form of social policy" (p.20) while Stephens proferred that 
"some form of limited rent control could be advocated, as the usual 
criticisms are less applicable" (p.51). Support for regulatory legis-
lation also seems to come from the legal profession. In a collection 
of studies on landlord and tenant law, Sim (1975) asserts that the 
"social rationale of rent control lies in the fact that ... land is a 
commodity which we all need but cannot afford to own" (p.431). Sim also 
asserts that landlords have a bargaining superiority over tenants. 
Soon after the Labour Government came to power in 1972, Rent Review 
Regulations were introduced in New Zealand. Rent Review Authorities 
were established within the Department of Labour.- Tenants could appeal 
against rent increases, which had occurred since 1 April (April Fools Day) 
1972 (inclusive) . Only rent increases which could be shown to be due 
to increased costs were allowed. The Regulations also imposed maxima 
on rent payments in advance and on bonds; disallowed evictions where 
tenants had made an application under the regulations; allowed tenants 
to recover any excess payments and disallowed "contracting out" from the 
provisions of the Regulations. The Regulations evoked little response 
from tenants. According to Frame and Harris (1977), the "government was 
clearly expecting a great number of applications, and must have been 
disappointed (and perhaps more than a little bemused) when only 208 
applications for review were received by early February 1973 ..." 
(p.220). Not to be deterred, the government began work on what became 
the Rent Appeal Act which came into force on February 1, 1974. This Act 
has all the characteristics of the archetypal rental market regulation 
scheme. Rent Appeal Boards were established to set "equitable rents" 
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- "that rent which ... a reasonable landlord might expect to receive and « 
a reasonable tenant might expect to pay". The Boards were to have 
"regard to" a number of factors. Determinations remained in force for 
12 months when made. In relation to evictions, the Act said deceptively 
little. Evictions were disallowed only for reason that the tenant was 
exercising his rights under the Act (e.g. applying for an "equitable 
rent" assessment). In practice this has meant that a landlord attempting 
to gain possession has had to prove that he was doing so for reasons 
other than the tenant exercising his rights. That is, he has had to 
prove some other substantial reason for seeking an eviction. The Act, 
like the Regulations, placed a limit on advance rent payments and on 
security bonds. Receipts had to be given for all payments. Tenants 
could deduct "excess payments" from their rent. Key-money was made 
illegal. Discrimination on the basis of the tenant having children was 
also made illegal. 
5. Australian Legislation 
Several States and the Australian Capital Territory have enacted, 
or are about "to enact, regulatory-type legislation in the landlord and 
tenant area. There almost seems to be a competition to see who can go 
I ' 
furthest in the regulatory area. 
The first State to act was New South Wales. Eviction provisions 
were tightened up considerably in 1977. A court order became necessary 
to effect an eviction, whether a lease is current or not. Penalties for 
illegal evictions of up to $500 for an individual and $5,000 for a cor-
poration were provided. New South Wales' Landlord and Tenant (Rental 
Bonds) Act, 1977 set up a Rental Bonds Board to administer the security 
bond system. The aim was to set up a central fund into which all bond 
monies would be paid. Repayment of bonds was to be supervised by the 
Board. Interest on bond money was to be used to provide, through the 
terminating building societies, cheap finance for first home-buyers 
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(subject to a ifleans tGst)« Provision of a rental advisory service was 
also enyisaged. In 1979 the Board had about $30 million in custody, 
employed 46 people and a computer, and had an administrative budget of 
about $750,000. The Government had anticipated $42 million in custody 
but the market had found ways around the scheme. Including the use of 
specially designed insurance policies. An analysis of the scheme can 
be found in Mitchell (1979). In addition to the above-mentioned measures 
there are perennial rumblings indicative of further possible action in 
New South Wales. 
Also early to act was South Australia. The legislation it enacted, 
its Residential Tenancies Act, 1978, conforms quite closely to the 
Henderson model. The Act carries over rent-setting powers from the 
former Excessive Rents Act. A Residential Tenancies Tribunal was set 
up to adjudicate on disputes between landlords and tenants and to set 
rents - if desired by the tenant. The size of bonds was limited to a 
maximum of three weeks rent and bond money has to be deposited with the 
Tribunal. Eviction controls were tightened up. A good summary of the 
provisions of the South Australian Act is contained in Whitely (1979). 
' r 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Australian Capital 
Territory has also been active in a regulatory direction. In addition 
to the measures taken concurrently with the removal of compulsory rent 
control, there have been pressures to adopt more of the elements of the 
Henderson-Bradbrook-Sackville regulatory package. Curiously, these 
pressures seem to have arisen from within the regulatory agency, the 
Department of the Capital Territory.^ An inquiry was announced and 
submissions solicited, early in 1978. The submissions included one from 
Albon (1978a) arguing against the changes mooted. As of the time of 
writing, nothing has been done to further change the Ordinance. 
1 The Department of the Capital Territory's action is a complete 
reversal of the usual procedure where a politician perceives a problem 
which is then referred to the Department. The private interest regu-
lation school should be interested in this reversal. 
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Not to be left behind, Victoria has been going through a long and 
involved process aimed at reforming its landlord and tenant law. In 
response to what it saw as a "scandalous, antiquated, oppressive and 
plainly biased" law,^ a government-sponsored "Community Committee on 
Tenancy Law Reform" was set up in December 1976. The Committee reported 
in 1978, suggesting sweeping changes to the Victorian legislation. 
Events seemed to go the way of the Committee as the draft Residential 
Tenancies Bill adopted most of the Committee's recommendations. A long 
and intense public debate ensued, indicating a considerable strength of 
feeling on the issue. A "Twilight Seminar" was held on the subject in 
December 1978 which was addressed by the Attorney-General (Mr. Storey), 
Mr. Salvaris (a lawyer representing the Committee's views), Mr. Chernov 
(a barrister-at-law and co-author of a legal text on the Victorial legis-
lation) , Mr. Cook (of REST of Victoria), Mr. Geschke (Director of 
Consumer Affairs) and Professor Parish (Professor of Economics at Monash 
University). This seminar livened up the debate.. The "Age" newspaper 
gave the issue much coverage. The decision was taken to let the draft 
bill "lie on .the table" while submissions were called. By late in 1979, 
after an election had intervened, a new draft bill had been produced 
which considerably weakened the provisions. The forces supporting the 
cause are, of course, furious, and the debate has been re-kindled in a 
o quite dramatic manner.'^ 
6. Short-run Effects of Regulatory Legislation 
In response to the 1978 draft Victorian bill. Parish has developed 
his "Twilight Seminar" paper considerably. This paper (Parish, 1980b) 
analyses the effects of interfering with private contractual arrange-
ments in the landlord and tenant area. Parish takes each of 
the major elements in the originally proposed legislation and 
1 See the Community Committee's Report (1978, p. 7). 
2 Printed posters seen on the Balaclava Railway Bridge are suggestive 
of a conspiracy (by landlords and others) to kill the Bill. 
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examines its likely implications. In addition, he analyses the overall 
effects.of the whole regulatory package. 
In general, the regulatory-type legislation will raise the demand 
for, and reduce the supply of, rental accommodation. Rental accommo-
dation, seen as a "bundle of property rights", will be altered in 
character. From the tenant's point of view there will be greater 
security of tenure (eviction controls), a better-maintained property 
(repair provisions), more privacy (landlord/agent entry restrictions), 
greater surety of security bond repajonent, and so on. These factors will 
increase the tenant's willingness to pay for rental accommodation. How-
ever, these enhanced rights are only attained at a cost to landlords 
v/hich will cause them to offer rental accommodation at higher per unit 
prices. 
Let us examine this process in a highly simplistic partial-
equilibriim market context illustrated by Figure 8.1. Initially we have 
demand, D^, supply, S^, and market-clearing rent (R^) and quantity 
(Q^). The regulations" act as a-tax on landlords, shifting the supply 
curve to Sj. On the other side of the coin, the new rights are posi-
tively valued by tenants and shift the demand curve upwards - to Dj^ . 
A new rent, Rj^ , and quantity Qj, are established. 
As drawn in Figure 8.1, the "tax" on the landlord exceeds the 
"subsidy" to the tenants, resulting in higher rents (as would occur 
anyway) and a lower quantity of rental accommodation. The figure is 
drawn in this way because it is believed that this would be the 
situation.^ Most tenants, who have quite good relationships with 
their landlords, would place little value on their enhanced rights. All 
landlords will bear the risk of major troubles and all will need to 
consider this risk as part of their long-run costing exercise. 
1 As Parish points out, to assume otherwise implies there are unrealized 
gains from trade and that the "government fist" would be more success-
ful than the invisible hand in securing these gains. 
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Note that, as is usual in partial-equilibrivim analysis, we have 
assumed,that rents are allowed to rise (i.e. rent increases are not 
suppressed by the rent-setting authority) and that rental units are 
allowed to be withdrawn (which is highly unlikely given the stringent 
eviction controls). If rents were held down and evictions/withdrawals 
did not take place, excess demand would be created and landlords would 
be forced to accept less than normal returns. The illusory "greed 
quotient" would become a thing of the past. 
Parish analyses the major provisions of the 1978 Victorian Bill 
separately. As the Bill is (was) typical of regulatory schemes, we will 
briefly review these elements and their likely implications. 
In regard to the rent-setting provisions, more will be said (in the 
next section) in relation to possible longer-term implications. To a 
large extent the effect of these provisions will depend on the way they 
are implemented - as Frame and Harris (1977) would put it, more on the 
"informal practices" rather than the "formal rules". The Victorian 
legislation would allow a tenant to apply for a rent reduction if he 
thought his rent was excessive. . The tenant's first step would be to 
contact the Director of Consumer Affairs and ask him to investigate the 
matter. The Director would, if he deemed the rent was excessive, attempt 
to negotiate a reduction with the landlord. If the rent established is 
not satisfactory to the tenant he may apply to a Tribunal for a deter-
mination. The Tribunal would consider matters such as rents on compa-
rable premises, special characteristics of the premises, rent increases 
since the tenant went into occupation and value of the premises. 
Increases in rent were limited to one only in 12 months, irrespective 
of change in tenancy.^ 
1 Parish has argued that rent increases will tend to be concentrated 
around changes of tenancy. Often landlords use the gap between 
tenancies for improvements and repairs. Further, there is a "sub-
iective argument" why increases will occur at this time. Those 
seeking tenancies are more attuned to the market than sitting tenants 
so the landlord finds the rent "easier" to raise for a new tenant 
than for the old. 
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In relation to evictions, the 1978 Bill was positively' Draconian, 
but stopped short of complete security of tenure. Six months' notice 
was required where there was no specified ground and immediate eviction 
was possible if the tenant endangered the safety of neighbours or 
maliciously damaged the property. Fourteen days was required in two 
other cases (failure to pay rent for fourteen days or more, and other 
breach of duty) and sixty days for several other grounds. Periods of 
notice and penalties have been reduced in the current version of the 
Bill. Even so, these eviction provisions are possibly more important 
than the rent controls. In the United Kingdom, landlords have attempted 
to minimize risks of being stuck with bad tenants by letting to more 
transient groups.^ Those seeking long-term tenancies - presumably 
those that governments wish to "protect" - are particularly disadvant-
aged. Presumably, the same sort of effect can be expected to occur 
here. 
Another major part of the Bill relates to security deposits. The 
role of security deposits would seem to be to induce tenants to look 
after the landlord's property. If not, the deposit can be withheld. 
The Community Committee recommended their abolition on the grounds that 
they represented a hang-over from the days of "key-money" (which might 
soon be back!) and because they were a major cause of landlord-tenant 
conflict. The Committee wanted an insurance scheme; the original Bill 
encompassed a mixed scheme. An insurance scheme would seem to be a highly 
undesirable innovation as it would reduce the incentive for tenants to 
care for the dwelling. The extra costs to landlords would be borne (to 
some extent) by all tenants. The security bond system cannot readily 
be related to key-money and disputes over bonds are probably more a 
symptom than a cause of disputation. While security bonds figure as the 
1 For some discussion of and references to this phenomenon see Cooper 
and Stafford (1980). 
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major factor in landlord-tenant disputes, it is not entirely clear that « 
the extent of bond disputation is all that great.^ 
Another provision relates to sub-letting and disallows the landlord 
from unreasonably withholding permission for the tenant to sub-let. 
While such a restriction would be far more a problem in a regime of 
traditional rent control, it does impinge on landlords' exercise of 
property rights. As such it is another item in the regulatory tax borne 
(in part) by landlords.^ 
Finally, amongst the many other provisions there is one which would 
outlaw discrimination by landlords against tenants with children. IJhen 
there is a threat to the use of price as a rationing device, resort will 
normally be taken to non-price rationing methods. Having set up a situ-
ation ideal for the promotion of discrimination it is only to be expected 
that the Bill's draftsmen would wish to insert anti-discrimination 
clauses. In this respect the cynic would say that they have probably 
not gone far enough. Other bases of discrimination (like race or colour) 
should have b.een considered. 
7. Longer-Term Effects of Rental Market Regulation 
In the previous section we have analysed the "short-run" or 
"primary" effects of rental market regulation. The "secondary" or 
longer-term effects will depend on how the legislation is actually 
operated (including those "informal practices"), on how it is used by 
the public and on how legislators respond to any difficulties which may 
1 RESI figures on bond repayments, reported and used by the Community 
Committee (1978, p.50) are hardly evidence of a really major problem. 
According to RESI's survey, 86 per cent of tenants received full re-
pajnnent and 96 per cent retrieved at least half. 
2 The incidence of any tax - implicit or explicit - will depend in part 
on the elasticity of supply. The more elastic is supply the more the 
incidence will fall on the buyer (tenant). Regulatory taxes will fall 
more and more on tenants over time if the elasticity of supply 
increases in the long-run. 
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arise. In setting out some possible scenarios, illustration is again 
drawn ftom the Victorian Bill. 
Rent control would seem to be the likely outcome of any secondary 
response to the effects of implementing the proposed legislation. The 
route back to rent control is argued below. 
Given its obvious distaste for rent control, it is a little 
surprising that the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975) advocated 
legislation, similar to that embodied in the Victorian Bill, which makes 
rent control highly probable. As we noted earlier, the Commission saw 
"unsatisfactory aspects [of the cheap private rental market] such as 
insecurity of tenure, illegal retention of bond money, biased leases and 
legislation which gives tenants few legal rights" (p.162). These formed 
a basis for its advocacy of "regulatory" legislation, not for rent con-
trol. The Commission failed to see the likely link between the two.^ 
The first route back to rent control could be achieved without the 
Victorian Government enacting legislation beyond that already provided 
for in the proposed Act. All that is necessary is for the authorities 
to respond to the primary impact of the legislation in such a way as to 
effectively impose rent control, labile the existing Rental Investigation 
Bureau has had very little business in setting rents (see, for example, 
Bradbrook, 1975-76), the situation is likely to change dramatically if 
the proposed legislation is enacted. The legislation would cause rents 
to rise. This will induce more tenants to seek rent determinations in 
itself. But tenants will also be far more aware of the new Bureau than 
of the existing Bureau. This stems from the publicity already given the 
proposed legislation as well as the probable further media coverge that 
would herald the establishment of the new Residential Tenancies 
1 Professor Henderson accused Professor Parish of "naughtiness" for 
suggesting that regulation might lead to control. Henderson has 
argued that regulation will help prevent control. 
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Bureau.-^ In addition, the Director of Consumer Affairs would have 
the power to initiate investigation. Once given a determination (and 
security of tenure for a year), there is nothing in the proposed legis-
lation to stop tenants from getting a series of determinations ensuring 
indefinite security of tenure (as long as the tenant "plays the game" 
in relation to paying rent and looking after the premises). 
Whether the above scenario represents a situation of true de facto 
rent (and eviction) control is dependent on how the Tribunals actually 
set rents. If they set rents below market levels, and if such sub-market 
determinations become widespread, a form of rent control could be said 
to prevail. The only possible item in Clause 77 of the Bill which 
could prevent the setting of below market rents is the instruction that 
the Tribunals have "regard to" the rent payable on comparable premises 
in the locality. There will, however, be pressure on the Tribunals to 
hold rents down. 
This .is only one possible route to rent control as a result of this 
legislation. Suppose, for argument's sake, that the Tribunals show 
remarkable restraint and do not hold rents down below market levels. 
.1 
Remembering that - "market" rents will be higher than otherwise anyway 
(because of factors already discussed) and that the market will be 
"tighter", we might take the Ontario route to control. Ontario, Canada, 
is proclaimed by the Community Committee on Tenancy Reform (1978) as the 
ideal prototype for the legislation proposed in Victoria. Let us hope 
that the Committee is not suggesting a complete emulation of Ontario 
because Ontario has now adopted rent control. The Ontario-type legis-
1 In Canberra, the Rent Control Office has, in the past, virtually 
advertised its services in an attempt to "drum up business". 
2 A determination does not have to be made to influence landlords' 
behaviour in relation to rents. The threat of being taken to the 
Tribunal is probably sufficient in many cases. The pervasiveness of 
rent regulation should not be measured by the number of determinations 
alone. 
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lation simply does not work. XJhen the regulations begin to create 
problems of high rents and high search costs, the legislators look around 
for something to blame other than the legislation. And because the 
legislation is blameless, the solution must lie in more legislation. 
However, those who are tempted to move from "regulation" to "control" 
should take cognizance of the following statement from the Ontario 
Minister for Housing: "[The fall-off in rental production] can largely 
be attributed to high interest rates, escalating costs and, more 
recently, to the introduction of rent control. It is our judgement that 
the modifications to the Landlord and Tenant Act, per se, have not been 
an important consideration in the building decline" (italics added, 
quoted by the Community Committee, 1978, p.74). The regulations them-
selves are implicitly apportioned some blame by the Minister. But, more 
importantly, Ontario has not been content with just the regulations and 
went further to introduce a form of rent control - which was found to 
have some unsatisfactory implications. 
A third possible outcome is that the institution of regulatory-type 
controls will create a fear that there will be an extension of controls. 
I-Jhether this happens or not is immaterial - it is the fear of recontrol 
that matters. -In addition to the primary impact costs imposed on land-
lords, they will be burdened by a further cost. If rent control is 
expected to be imposed, landlords will be expecting to incur the costs 
associated with rent control. This cost will affect landlords' current 
behaviour, leading to demands for higher rents and the (attempted) with-
drawal of some rental units. This effect will be additional to the 
primary effect. The results of these two effects could be quite 
dramatic, perhaps leading to a successful call for full rent control. 
8. Australian Evidence of a "Fear Factor" 
The issue of a fear factor has been raised in Chapters 2 and 6 and 
is here further developed. An appreciation of the significance of a 
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possible "fear of recontrol" is crucial to understanding the true 
implications of rental market regulation. Some Australian evidence of 
such a fear is presented. 
In way of evidence confirming the "fear factor" we can appeal to 
cases where full rent control has been partially relaxed by the exclusion 
of new lettings from control. As Rothenberg (undated) puts it, "while 
the new unit is uncontrolled when it first comes into the market, the 
existence of rent control as a policy raises the possibility that 
controls may be extended to it at some later part of its life. Such 
subsequent extensions of control have been experienced in the real world, 
so it is not an idle surmise" (p.25). An excellent discussion of this 
phenomenon, with overseas evidence, can be found in Block (1972, pp.50-
54). We argue here that "regulatory controls" are very capable of crea-
ting exactly these same fears. 
Australian landlords are control-wary to the extreme, remembering 
their complete emasculation in the 1940s and 1950s. When compulsory 
rent conttol was introduced into Canberra in 1973, the Real Estate and 
Stock Institute of Australia responded by preparing a long, expensive 
and thorough report qn the adverse effects of rent control.^ The 
strength of their reaction can only be explained by the fear that 
controls may be extended to other parts of Australia. In a sense their 
fears have proved to have been well founded. 
Before examining some statistical evidence on the, Australian situ-
ation in the 1950s, we will look at some more qualitative assessments 
of the situation. Helen Nelson (1977), in her thesis on The 
Politics of Rent Control in New South Wales, discusses the fear of re-
control question at some length. New South Wales had decontrolled new 
dwellings in 1954 but, despite this. Nelson reaches the cautious con-
1 See RESI (1975) and Chapter 7. 
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elusion "that rent control was a deterrent to potential investors in new 
rental construction" (p.143). A damning conclusion was reached, at the 
time, by the Department of National Development (1956) which presents 
a list of "maladjustments" to the rental housing market comprising "the 
abandonment by private investors of the building of new houses and flats 
for rental (this has not recovered, despite the removal of rent control 
from new building in most States), the withdrawal of many previously 
rented houses from the rental markets, rent and tenancy controls ... 
"(pp.11-12, italics added). Yet another mid-fifties verdict comes from 
the Institute of Public Affairs (1954). Referring to Victoria, which 
had decontrolled new dwellings in 1953, the IPA stated that "[t]he 
continuance of rent control has had a bad psychological effect on invest-
ment in house property for rental purposes. Although technically free 
from control, most investors do not relish building at the present high 
level of costs coupled with uncertainty about the future of rent control 
legislation" (p. 76). Other such statements could be cited. 
Table 8.1 summarizes the interesting evidence provided by census 
data on the rental housing investment record of the mainland States. 
If there was a fear of recontrol, then we would expect that States which 
decontrolled most would have the best investment record. In particular, 
we are seeking evidence that decontrol only of new lettings has a lesser 
impact than total decontrol. The Census data for June 30, 1961 gives 
a breakdown of the then stock of privately rented dwellings by date of 
construction. In Table 8.1 the number of the 1961 stock constructed in 
the inter-censal (1954-1961) period is expressed as a proportion of the 
total inter-censal construction for each of houses, flats and total 
dwellings. A priori, one would expect Western Australia to come out on 
top as it was the only State to completely decontrol during the fifties 
(in 1954). Certainly we would expect Western Australia to dominate New 
South Wales (which decontrolled new dwellings in 1954 and then made no 
major concessions towards decontrol until the 1960s and Victoria (which 
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Table 8.1: Rental Investment Performance of the Mainland States 
1954-1961 
Western New South 
Queensland Australia South Wales Victoria Australia 
Number of houses 
privately tenanted 
as of June 30 1961 
built in 1954-1961 
as a proportion of 
total construction 
of houses, 1954-1961 1069 1099 .0742 .0743 .0774 
Number of flats 
privately tenanted 
as of June 30 1961 
built in 1954-1961 
as a proportion of 
total construction 
of flats, 1954-1961 7585 .6182 .4962 5189 .4553 
Number of dwellings 
privately tenanted 
as of June'30 1961 
built in 1954^1961 
as a proportion of 
total construction . 
of dwellings, 1954-
1961 1556 1341 1089 1060 1015 
Proportion of 1961 
housing stock rented 
to tenants by State 
Housing Commission 
or Trust .06 .10 .05 .05 .15 
Sources: Private construction figures from 1961 Census (calculated 
from data in Vol. I, Part IV, Table 14, for each State). 
Public housing figures from Jones (1972). 
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decontrolled new lettings in 1953 and made other minor moves towards 
greater freedom in the ensuing five years, including the allowance of 
a 25 per cent increase on "base rent" in 1955) . This expectation is 
borne out, with New South Wales and Victoria performing least well of 
all mainland States. However, the results for Queensland and South 
Australia appear to contradict the overall hypothesis. Queensland, 
which was not a leader in legislative decontrol, performed better in 
rental investment than any other State studied. South Australia, which 
did go a long way towards decontrol, did not have a good private 
rental investment record over the period. Perhaps these results are 
not quite as damning as they seem on first glance. In the case of 
Queensland, flats were completely omitted-from its 1948 Landlord and 
Tenant Act. This early and emphatic concession led to a flat building 
boom in that State. Queensland's position at the top of the "ladder" 
is attributable to its record with flats. However, Queensland's 
performance with houses, second only to Western Australia, is difficult 
' I 
to explain and weakens the thesis somewhat. In the South Australian 
case, a quite considerable amount of decontrol was associated with 
an abysmal record of private rental investment. However, there was 
an unusually large amount of public rental investment (see the last 
row of Table 8.1). As argued elsewhere in the thesis, public housing 
investment "crowds out" private housing investment, possibly on a one-
to-one basis. This phenomenon not only goes a long way towards 
explaining the South Australian result, but also reinforces the 
conclusions reached about Western Australia in relation to Victoria 
and New South Wales. However, Queensland still remains a problem 
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and makes it difficult to strongly conclude that the prior 
expectation of a "fear of recontrol" is borne out by Australian data 
for the period under consideration.^ 
9. Conclusion 
It is difficult to be sanguine about the likelihood of success 
of rental market regulation. Like rent control, this type of legis-
lation will result in benefits for some tenants. These benefits will 
not be wrought without costs and the costs must be at least as great 
as the benefits. If there are problems in the rental housing market, 
rental market regulation is not the way to solve them. As the Poverty 
Commission rightly points out, most of the problems stem from the low 
incomes of some tenants. Interference with the landlord-tenant 
contractual arrangement seems to be a mis-direction of energies. 
Policies aimed at the root cause of the problem would be far more 
sensible.' 
1 Figures equivalent to those in Table 8.1 were available for the 
period 1947-1954, but not for intercensal periods after 1954-1961. 
Over the 1947-1954 period, all States except Queensland performed 
relatively better than in the 1954-1961 period. The total figures 
for each State were Western Australia, .1614, New South Wales, 
.1401, South Australia, .1374, Queensland, .1286 and Victoria, 
.1149. The ranking conforms well to expectations, except for 
New South Wales. Queensland excelled with flats. 
CHAPTER 9 
A CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE IMPOSITION AND/OR 
RETENTION OF RENT CONTROL 
In this chapter there are three major concerns. Firstly, we look 
at the arguments for or justifications of rent control put by legis-
lators who introduce and/or retain such laws. Secondly, there is a 
review of the cases put by economists to support rent control. Finally, 
there is a critique of an argument for retaining rent control which is 
based on the idea of a "transitional gains trap". Many interesting and 
wider issues arise from these considerations. However, it is concluded 
that there is no clear case for rent control to be imposed or retained, 
once imposed. This negative conclusion carries over into a wartime 
situation where, while the pro- case is stronger than in time of peace, 
the argument is still very weak. 
1. Arguments Used By Legislators to Justify Rent Control 
In seeking arguments for rent control it would not seem unreason-
able to expect that such arguments would be most clearly put by legis-
lators introducing or justifying the imposition of rent control. 
However, this does.not prove to be a fruitful area for the finding of 
clear and logical arguments. Nevertheless, we will review a number of 
the justifications that have been made. 
In wartime Australia the stated aim of rent control was "to avoid 
rent inflation arising from increased spending power and from the ex-
ploitation of the acute shortage of accommodation in areas surrounding 
military camps and war-time industries" (Commonwealth Year Book, 1944-
45, p.1116). 
In New South Wales, the 1948 Landlord and Tenant Act was introduced 
into Parliament by the Minister for Conservation, Mr. Weir, with a 
statement that it "is agreed, I think on all sides, that fair rent 
legislation must be continued" (New South Wales Parliamentary Debates 
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(New Series), 187, Session 1947-48, p.3353). Mr. Weir asserted that 
"the fact Is that the supply of accommodation ... Is Insufficient to 
meet the demand. Unless a degree of control is continued there would 
be wholesale eviction of [tenants] ... [If controls were lifted] rents 
would spiral ... I put it then that the need for rent control needs 
neither further emphasis nor further illustration" (p.3354). The 
(Liberal) Opposition Leader, Mr. Treatt, thought that because "many 
citizens have no homes ... it has been found necessary to fix the rent 
by persons who occupy houses provided for them by someone else" 
(p.3366).! In the Report of the Royal Commission (New South Wales 
Parliament, 1961) the role of rent control was seen as "that of pre-
venting the exploitation of a shortage of accommodation by the charging 
of excessive rents" (pp.16-17). 
The lack of elaboration and/or logic of the New South Wales 
politicians was also a feature of Mr. Enderby's introduction of rent 
control in Canberra in 1973. As we noted in Chapter 7, Mr. Enderby 
introduced, controls which "sought to maximise the opportunities of low 
and middle-income earners ... to have access to ... accommodation at 
0 ' ' a reasonable rent"* 
Other instances could be cited but no more light would be thrown 
on the situation. Justifications are either vague, indirect or 
illogical, indicating the possible presence of hidden motives. We now 
turn to the arguments that economists have used in support of rent 
control. 
2. The Wartime Arguments 
Conditions special to wartime are sometimes used as a basis for 
an argument for rent control. These special circumstances are said to 
1 The convoluted logic of this statement is not a result of quoting 
Mr. Treatt out of context. 
2 Quoted in RESI (1975, p.52). 
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be (i) that the supply of housing is very inelastic during a war period 
because of competing war-related demands for building resources and (ii) 
that a wide range of commodities are rationed and price-controlled. 
Before examining the two arguments we will review the situation which 
prevailed in wartime Australia. 
Two striking features of wartime controls in Australia during World 
War Two are evident. The first of these was the wide extent of their 
coverage. Not only were most commodities controlled explicitly, but 
also wages and interest came under the regulatory net. Most commodities 
were controlled by the Prices Branch of the Department of Trade and 
Customs. Interest rates were controlled through the Treasury and the 
Commonwealth Bank. Machinery was already in existence to control wages, 
and profits were automatically controlled by the Prices Branch which set 
prices on a "cost-plus" basis. House rents have not, as yet, been 
mentioned. Their control brings us on to the sec6nd feature of wartime 
control in Australia. - The rental housing market was treated differently 
to other markets. Butlin (1954), in reference to the administrative 
differences, states that "Rent Control from the beginning stood apart 
from other forms of price control" (p.47). There were other diffe-
rences. Firstly, housing services were not rationed by the government. 
They were allocated by what Friedman and Stigler (1946) call "chance and 
favouritism". This form of rationing tends to favour people such as 
existing tenants, childless couples and attractive unattached females. 
Those disadvantaged are mainly newcomers to town and minority groups. 
Secondly, rents were controlled by rigorous "pegging" such that they 
fell considerably relative to other prices and income. As Table 9.1 
shows, rents (on 4 and 5 room houses) rose only 1 per cent during the 
war. Prices in general rose by more than 22 per cent and wage rates (not 
shown) by an even greater proportion. Finally, while some "essential" 
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Table 9.1; "C Series" Retail Price Index and its "Group" Index-Numbers 
For the Six Capital Cities (Meigbted Average) 
Base: 1939 = 1,000 (By Conversion) 
Food and 
Groceries 
Rent (4 and 
5 Rooms) Clothing Miscellaneous All Items 
1939 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
1940 1,013 1,008 1,136 1,037 1,040 
1941 1,021 1,011 1,329 1, 101 1,095 
1942 1,112 1,011 1,555 1,155 1,185 
1943 1,118 1,010 1,712 1,205 1,229 
1944 1,106 1,011 1,706 . 1,211 1,223 
1945 1,115 1,010 1,694 1,206 1,223 
1946 1,117 1,011 1,789 1,213 1,244 
Rise, 
1939-45 % 11.5 1.0 ; 69.4 20.6 22.3 
Source: Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 38, 1951 
(Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra), 
p.396. 
Note: The rise in the index overall, and the relative fall in the 
price of rental housing, would have been greater without 
subsidies. The extent of subsidies is indicated in 
Bambrick (1974). 
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commodities attracted a subsidy, rental housing did not.^ But rent 
control was seen as providing a subsidy, offsetting other price 
increases (see Bambrick, 1974, p.4). 
The discriminatory treatment of rental housing in Australia was 
also a feature in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the 
U.K., the overall rise in the working-class cost of living index was 
28.43 per cent over the 1939-1945 period. The "rent and rates" com-
ponent rose only 2 per cent over this period. Wage rates rose by 48.5 
per cent. In the U.S., rent controls were imposed in 1942. Between 
1942 and 1945 rents rose only .027 per cent while prices rose 10.21 per 
cent.^ Chance and favouritism was the rationing mechanism in both 
countries. 
The first argument for the imposition of wartime rent control is 
the assertion that the rent elasticity of supply of rental dwellings 
is zero or very near zero. In such conditions, created by reduced 
availability of labour and building materials, shifts in demand result 
wholly or mainly in higher rents. Quantity response is negligible or 
very limited. Some writerssuch as Whitman, (1925) and Drane (1961a), 
have referred to this type of situation as "quasi-monopoly" or 
"monopoly". Government intervention, in the form of rent control, is 
justified in order to prevent the exercise of this alleged monopoly 
power. 
1 Bambrick (1974) reports that under an (abortive) 1946 housing 
program "the government had arranged to pay a subsidy on rent where 
the rental of a standard house absorbed more than 20 per cent of 
the income of the occupant" (p.11). This idea has a remarkable 
likeness to the defunct Housing Allowance Voucher Experiment (HAVE, 
later HAE) where a subsidy of up to the difference between rent 
on a standard dwelling and 25 per cent of the occupants income, 
would be paid (see Chapter 10). It also bears a strong resemblance 
to the Government's public service rent allowance scheme. 
2 United Kingdom data is from the Statistical Digest of the War (His 
Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans Green and Co., London, 
1951). United States data is from Grampp (1950). 
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Bloomberg (1947) puts the inelastic supply argument clearly and 
succintly: "Proponents of rent control are not against landlords as 
a group. They advocate rent control because housing is scarce, and they 
do not think that a commodity which is scarce because of wartime res-
trictions on construction should be bid up in a free market to the 
benefit of those who happen to hold the commodity. The time to abandon 
rent controls is when landlords and tenants are in more equal bargaining 
positions" (p.217). 
Excess demand is assured if rents are held below the market 
clearing level, and demand elasticity is non-zero. It is a consequence 
of not using the price system to ration the available quantity of 
housing services. Use of price as the rationing device will induce 
demanders to economize in the use of space. More people will have 
somewhere to live than under the rent control. Price rationing will 
accommodate more people with less average housing services than rent 
control which causes those lucky enough to find an abode to consume more 
space than necessary. Rent control must create an unsatisfied fringe 
of demanders who suffer while the satisfied under-utilize available 
housing.^ Walker (1939) has suggested that housing services should be 
formally rationed by the state and preference be given to poorer and 
larger families.. Friedman and Stigler (1946) warn of the administrative 
nightmare that such rationing would probably involve. 
The curtailment of any possible supply response is assured by rent 
control. It might be argued that none would occur even if rents were 
allowed to find market levels. This assumption is far too rigid. 
Supply response, in the form of housing service units available to the 
rental market, does not only take the form of new building. It also 
includes conversions of existing dwellings to make them yield more 
service units and owner-occupiers making parts of their homes available 
to renters. Rent control will not encourage such supply response. This 
T These propositions flow from simple partial-equilibrium analysis. 
There is no suggestion that the "unsatisfied fringe" will live in the 
streets. Perhaps they will live with family or friends or in mobile 
homes. 
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is for two reasons. Firstly, the reward for suffering the inconvenience 
of having lodgers is reduced. Secondly, once a part of the house is 
let it is extremely difficult to evict the tenant, if so desired. It 
should also be noted that building did not cease immediately the war 
began. In Melbourne, Prest (1945) reports the erection of over 15,000 
new dwellings during the first two years of the war (p.54).^ 
The second type of wartime argument relates to the pervasiveness 
of price controls in general, usually associated with rationing. 
Leaving rental housing out would be like leaving the lid off one pot. 
Unsatisfied spending power would surge into the only free sector only 
to force up prices. Rent control is advocated to prevent prices (rents) 
from rising in the free sector. 
One solution would be to control disposable income in order to 
prevent a spill-over of unsatisfied demand into the rental housing 
market. The Government had at its disposal taxation and debt manage-
ment policy to siphon off purchasing power from the private sector. 
There is, however, a considerable constraint on the extent to which the 
private sector can-be squeezed. If too much purchasing power is exprop-i 
riated from consumers, a disincentive to work effort would be created. 
The same sort of disincentive can be imposed from the other end, by 
rationing. This was recognized by Tobin (1952) who wrote that 
"rationing removes the incentive to work to the extent that this 
incentive is provided by the opportunity to increase consumption of the 
rationed commodities" (p.538). The incentive to work to buy uncontrol-
led goods is not reduced. 
1. There was very little house building after the first two years of 
war in either Australia or the U.K. For the U.K., figures in the 
Statistical Digest, op.cit., reveal 332,405 completions in 1938-
39, 195,962 in 1939-40, 42,498 in 1940-41 and less than 10,000 per 
year until 1945-46. This was not, of course, the only source of 
supply response. 
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Suppose that a considerable "spill-over" into rental hous?.ng does 
occur. If supply is fairly unresponsive, the consequence would be a 
redistribution of income towards landlords. Should this be allowed to 
occur? There are three possible courses of action. Rationing elsewhere 
could be removed. A second possible approach is to control disposable 
income by appropriate taxation and debt management policies. This might 
create disincentive effects but, at the same time, it would seem to be 
crucial. Prest clearly identifies rising incomes as the major causal 
factor in the increase in wartime demand for rental housing. Finally, 
rent control could be imposed. The disadvantages of this method have 
already been pointed out. The problem of disposable income being in 
excess of the value of available supplies (valued at controlled prices) 
would not be overcome. 
In conclusion, then, rent control is not a suitable solution of 
the problems caused by any spill-over of demand into the rental housing 
market due to rationing. Appropriate demand management is the correct 
weapon. " 
As a final point on the' issues raised by wartime, it is far from 
clear that the-, circumstances of war would create large increases in 
rent, if the market were free. Population growth is usually static 
during a war period but large population movements can occur. Rents 
may be expected to rise sharply in locations to which population shifts. 
Even this is not certain. When a serviceman goes abroad or into camp, 
house-space potentially becomes available for newcomers. As we have 
already noted, more intensive use can be made of a given stock of 
housing, even without structural alteration. Pressure on rents will 
only occur in areas where there is a net population increase. 
The available evidence seems to support the contention that, in 
the absence of rent control, landlords' real incomes would tend to fall. 
Viner, in his discussion of U.S. experience in World War I, claims that 
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"[t]he average percentage of increase in rents of urban property of 
all kinds for the country as a whole was unquestionably considerably 
less than the average rise in commodity prices or in cost of living. 
This would indicate that the urban landlord also suffered a decrease in 
real income as a result of price inflation" (Viner, 1920, p.71). The 
Australian evidence is supportive of a rise in rents far less than the 
rise in prices in general. In 1946 it was officially estimated that 
if the rental market were decontrolled, rents would rise by an average 
of 15 per cent.^ The actual rise in rents was only 1.1 per cent 
between 1939 and 1946 while prices in general rose 24.4 per cent over 
the same period (see Table 9.1). Another possible indicator of un-
restrained rent increases is given by the results when shared accom-
modation was brought under the wartime Regulations in June 1945. Of 
the 35,768 shared accommodation determinations made, rents were de-
creased in 20,954 cases, unchanged in 8,667 and raised in 6,147. "The 
net effect of all these determinations was to reduce rents by about 
thirteen per cent" (Butlin and Schedvin, 1977, p.563). If the Rent 
Controller was consistent, the shared accommodation experience is 
suggestive of market rents being approximately 15 per cent above 
controlled rents.^ ) 
3. Moralistic Arguments 
Two arguments for rent control which may on the surface appear 
separate but are, in fact, closely related, have distinct moralistic 
qualities. One argument is that "profiteering" is bad, the other is 
that "unearned increments" should not be allowed to be kept by land-
lords. The relationship between these two "arguments" is clear from 
a contemporary's views on the subject. In asking the question as to 
1 This estimate is reported in Bambrick (1974, p.11) but is not 
sourced. 
2 Given that a calculation based on the shared accommodation gives 
the same figure as the unsourced official estimate it is probably 
reasonable to expect that the two estimates have the same basis. 
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whether higher costs of new dwellings justified a rise in the rents of 
old dwellings, Walker (1939) replied that if "the object is to avoid 
a rise in general living costs and to prevent profiteering, the answer 
is in the negative; and the resulting disparity in the rents of old and 
new buildings must be accepted as a wartime inconvenience" (p.101, 
italics added). Walker calls any increase in rents of old houses due 
to rising costs of new, an "unearned increment". 
Those of the "cost-plus" school, if they stick to a rigid markup, 
deny any role for the demand side of the market. Any increase in a plus 
factor implies "profiteering", it would seem. The wartime Commonwealth 
Prices Commissioner, Professor Copland, chanced his hand at a definition 
of profiteering. He stated that "profiteering is a relative term. It 
is relative to some basis or standard that you have in your minds". 
He "took pre-war prices and pre-war profits as the standard ... From 
this we arrived at the idea that any rise in prices above those standard 
prices had to be justified by increased costs. The objective was to 
limit the rise in prices to the increase in costs due to the war" 
" f 
(Copland, 1940). ; > 
The implications' of the views of Copland for rent control would 
be to allow existing landlords rent increases only on the basis of 
increased outgoings, although this would result in a decrease in profit-
ability in an inflationary situation. Presumably new dwellings would 
be determined on the basis of current capital value so that a disparity 
of "new" and "old" rents would arise. This seems to be the sort of 
situation created by the rent control provisions of Australia's wartime 
Regulations. 
The idea of taxing "unearned increments" seems to flow from the 
ideas of Henry George. Parish (1977) identifies two classical arguments 
for taxation of unearned increments. "The ethical argument is that un-
earned increments may be expropriated simply because they are unearned; 
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their recipient cannot claim any moral right to them since they accrued 
to him without any effort or enterprise on his part.... The practical 
argument is that such gains may be taxed away without engendering any 
disincentives to effort and enterprise ..." (p.38). In the case of 
rental housing, rent control would mean a transfer of part or all of 
the "unearned increment" to the tenant, whose claim to it seems less 
than that of the landlord. Landlords could escape the expropriation 
by selling to an owner-occupier if eviction controls allowed such a 
transfer. 
4. Equity Arguments 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty (1975) believed "that many of the problems of low income private 
renters result from their low incomes". The Commission saw "rental 
market regulation" as a partial solution, but did not advocate rent 
control.^ Others have been less cautious in jumping from the obser-
vation that many tenants have low incomes to a proposal that rent 
control shpuld be imposed. For example, Prest (1945) argued that it 
.V ' 
was "sufficient justification" for wartime rent controls that a "rise 
in rents of the required magnitude [to equilibrate the market] would 
have borne particularly heavily on all those whose incomes did not rise 
proportionately, and particularly on the families of service men" 
(p.54). Stated in this way, the equity argument looks something like 
the "inelastic supply" case. However, the equity argument is distinct 
and rent control has been advocated as a redistributive device to 
achieve a more equitable income distribution. 
There are several objections to the use of rent control as a re-
distributive device. One major problem is that rent control does not 
1 As was strongly argued in the previous chapter, rental market 
regulation could easily lead to rent control. 
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produce a straight "Robin Hood" redistribution from rich to poor.^ 
Some landlords are poor and some tenants are quite well off. Rent 
control may create some poor-rich redistributions. In a United States 
study, Johnson (1951) found no conclusive evidence for the basic premise 
of the "Robin Hood" argument for rent control. The haphazardness of 
the redistribution is an off-mentioned feature of rent control schemes. 
A second difficulty arises if we stop to think, "Why stop at 
housing?" If the poor have difficulty paying for their housing, 
presumably there are problems in paying for other things like food, 
clothing, medical care and transport. As has been suggested elsewhere 
in this thesis (and will be discussed at some length in the next 
chapter), there is no reason to regard housing as special. So in 
addition to rent control we would need to have food price control, 
clothing price control and so on. 
In defence of rent control it may be argued that rent comprises 
an unusually large proportion of poor peoples' budgets and that rental 
housing is a .commodity largely consumed by the poor. These factors 
would make rental housing a good target for price control if they were 
2 ' 
true"^ but it still has to be shown that price control is a good means 
of redistribution. 
This latter demonstration is difficult, if not impossible. Better 
(less costly) means of redistribution are at hand, even if we are 
1 The term "Robin Hood" has been used in relation to rent control 
by Mishan (1969, p.42). 
2 According to the Household Expenditure Survey 1975-76 (ABS, 
Canberra, 1978) there is little basis for this belief. The very 
poorest group (under $80 per week household income) spent on 
average 13.84 per cent of their expenditure on housing (compared 
with 25.84 per cent on food and 13.71 per cent on transport and 
communication). Only 201,800 out of 651,500 households in this 
poorest group lived in rented accommodation, a percentage of 30.97. 
For the $80-$140 income group the corresponding figures are 16.93, 
22.29, 18.18, 226,200, 599,400 and 37.73. 
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confined to using the rental housing market as a medium of redistri-« 
bution. This matter is discussed at length in the next chapter. 
5. A Critique of the "Transitional Gains (Losses) Trap" Argument 
for Retaining Rent Control 
As we have argued, the caSe against rent control seems to be widely 
accepted by economists. Accordingly, one tends to find few economists 
arguing for its introduction (if it does not presently exist) or re-
tention (if it does presently exist). It is surprising, then, to find 
Professors Shreiber and Tabriztchi (1976) arguing for the continuation 
of rent control in New York City. The argument used by Shreiber and 
Tabriztchi is very similar in essence to what Professor Tullock (1975) 
has dubbed the "transitional gains trap" except that, in the case of 
rent control, it is more a "transitional losses trap". In this section 
we do two things: firstly, the general transitional gains trap argument 
is examined critically; secondly, the application of this type of 
argument to rent control is put under scrutiny. Ve conclude that the 
transitional gains (losses) line of inquiry does not provide an 
acceptable argument for the retention of costly government-conferred 
privileges. This conclusion' is heartening - if the "trap" argument were 
to gain acceptance it' would involve the retention of a host of costly 
interventions in the free market system. Such a prospect would cause 
most Chicago-inspired economists to choke on a free lunch. 
(a) A Red Herring in the Transitional Gains Trap 
The "transitional gains trap" argument runs something as follows: 
The government bestows a monopoly privilege on a group of individuals or 
firms. The privilege provides the beneficiaries with a stream of rents 
which may be capitalized into a salable asset. Examples include produc-
tion quotas and taxi plates. The original recipients all sell their 
asset over a period of time. The buyers pay an amount equal to the rent 
stream capitalized and, therefore, only earn normal returns from their 
activity, having paid for the rents in advance. At some stage the 
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government contemplates removing the monopoly privilege because of the 
deadweight or efficiency costs associated with the policy. On learning 
that the present operators have purchased their "privileges", the 
government should decide against policy-reversal because it would be 
taking away something the current agents never had. Alternatively, the 
government should disfranchise but pay compensation to all the "losers" 
if the excess burden of the taxes levied to pay compensation is less 
than the efficiency gain from demonopolization. 
Let us view the transitional gains trap argument in the best 
possible light. A monopoly privilege exists and has attendant social 
costs but all holders of the monopoly rights make only normal returns. 
The policy involves a point like A (see Figure 9.1) inside the utility 
possibility frontier. Removal of the monopoly rights involves (i) a 
cessation of the associated efficiency costs, thus moving society onto 
the utility possibility frontier, and (ii) a loss to the current holders 
of the rights to the rents. The move, to a point'like B, does not 
satisfy the Pareto criterion but it does pass the "Kaldor-Hicks" test. 
Hypothetical compensation could take the economy inside the shaded area. 
If redistribution were costless a point like C could be attained. There 
is nothing in the "new welfare economics" which says that compensation 
should actually occur, but the traditional efficiency argument dictates 
removal of the distortion.^»^ it is probably more fashionable to 
represent these situations in terms of a "social welfare function". 
The social welfare function may, or may not, favour the change from A 
to B. A case where it does not is shown in Figure 9.2. If^  we knew the 
1 Tullock's statement that "... cancellation of the original gift 
... [places society on] an inefficient portion of the Paretian 
frontier" (p.671) seems to involve an internal contradiction. 
Possibly it was intended to assert that the move did not satisfy 
the Pareto criterion. 
2 Corden (1974) has embodied the requirement for compensation in what 
he calls the "conservative social welfare function". This boils 
down to a requirement that all changes must actually satisfy the 
Pareto criterion. 
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social welfare function we could use it to decide the issue. As we « 
do not know it we are back with the traditional "new welfare" approach 
which tells us to remove the monopoly rights. Only a "distributional 
value judgement" can underlie compensation. 
All of the above has accepted the basic argument that transitional 
gains are all-pervasive. These basic conditions are, however, highly 
unlikely. There are two vulnerable links in the argument. 
Firstly it is difficult to believe that all holders of monopoly 
rights are new entrants in the sense that they purchased an asset 
entitling them to a stream of rents rather than receiving it "free" from 
the government.^ This is a matter for empirical investigation, case 
by case. However, a little "casual empiricism" is enough to convince 
one that there are still quite a few original beneficiaries around. 
It is probably not too unfair to suggest that Professor Tullock's 
discussion of this point is a little unclear.^ There is no reason, 
either in principle or empirically, to believe in the complete per-
vasiveness of transitional gains. 
i-
The second weak link is certainly the more important. Even if 
there are no original beneficiaries left in an industry or occupation 
it is not wise to assume that the current agents are only making normal 
returns. Presumably buyers of monopoly rights are aware that govern-
ments can (and do) sometimes cancel such rights. In addition, policies 
can be modified so as to affect the rents available. The possibility 
of both these types of contingency will be reflected in offer prices. 
1 If one accepts the "rent-seeking" argument, then not even the 
original holders of rights can be regarded as necessarily earning 
above-normal profits. But this is another story. 
2 Tullock seems to believe that after a lapse of time gains will 
"have been fully capitalized, with the result that the people in 
the industry now are doing no better than normal (synopsis, 
p.671). There are at least three other statements to this effect 
(pp.672, 675 and 677). 
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The market will embody the probabilities of cancellation and modifi-
cations in government policies in the capital values it will establish 
for the "right" to an uncertain stream of rents.^ A government could 
proceed to withdraw monopoly privileges, safe in the knowledge that 
private decision-makers have accounted for the possibilities. In this 
sense there can be no losers and, therefore, there can be no trap. Of 
course, as in any lottery, there are gainers and losers. However those 
that play the game know the risks and need not be the subject of 
misguided derision or sympathy when the outcomes become clear. 
By way of conclusion of the general discussion, it is strongly 
contended that we should not get ourselves ensnared in a transitional 
gains trap. There is argument for enduring inefficient government-
bestowed monopoly power. A close look into the trap only serves to 
reveal a lowly catch - a red herring! 
(b) Rent Control - A Transitional Losses Trap? 
Shreiber and Tabriztchi argue against the abolition of rent control 
in New York City because decontrol "may not restore the wealth to those 
landlords from whom the rights were originally taken" (p.515). The 
argument is that losses froA rent control are transitional - borne by 
those landlords who owned properties when controls were first imposed. 
Over time "many controlled units [will have] changed hands ... and 
landlords who purchased such units bought them subject to the statutory 
tenancy and at prices lower than comparable uncontrolled buildings" 
(p.516).2 Abolition of control would bring "windfall gains" to the 
purchasing landlords at the "expense of the tenants". 
1 A colleague has suggested that attitudes to risk will have an 
important bearing on offer prices and asset values. This aspect 
of the problem will not be pursued. 
2 Some evidence that purchasing landlords assess risk of decontrol 
is provided in our study of New South Wales' post-war rent control 
(see Chapter 6). Capitalization of rent differentials yields much 
larger values for tenancies than direct observation of this value. 
The implicit risk factor found was about 8.56 per cent compared 
to an interest rate of about 6 per cent. These figures pertain 
to New South Wales in 1960. 
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This seems to be precisely the type of argument set out by Tullock. 
However, Shreiber and Tabriztchi draw different policy conclusions than 
those implied by Tullock's analysis. Presumably, Tullock would support 
the retention of rent control only if negative compensation (taxing of 
landlords) involved an excess burden greater than that associated with 
keeping rent control. Shreiber and Tabriztchi argue unambiguously for 
the retention of rent control.^ 
It goes without saying that the efficiency solution must involve 
abolition of control. The "transitional losses" argument shares the 
same defects as the "transitional gains" argument. 
While it is more common to see the rent decontrol issue in the 
"transitional losses" light, it can, to a degree, be viewed as a 
"transitional gains" case. This occurs when a tenancy is seen as a 
saleable asset. Rent control is imposed and the initial' ("sitting") 
tenants are granted the right to a stream of rent savings. After some 
time has elapsed many (all?) tenants will have sold their tenancies for 
a price reflecting the expected stream of rent savings. Gains will only 
have been "transitional", accruing to the initial tenants. Tullock's 
line of argument'would dictate that purchasing tenants be compensated 
if rent control were to be removed on efficiency grounds. 
In practice the situation could be much more complex as two types 
of transaction may be occurring - sales of controlled properties and 
sales of tenancies. The situations created by decontrol can be sum-
marized in the following matrix (Table 9.2). The outcomes assume that 
1 Shreiber and Tabriztchi are, however, concerned with the efficient 
allocation of the available rental stock such that each tenant has 
a willingness to pay at least equal to the market value of the 
dwelling. They propose achievement of this by facilitating 
voluntary agreements between landlords and tenants within the 
context of rent control remaining. 
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Table 9.2: Possible Consequences of Decontrol Where 
Agents Acted in Belief that Decontrol Would 
Not Occur 
Original Landlord Purchasing Landlord 
Original 
Tenant 
Original Positions 
Restored 
Pre-rent control situa-
tion restored for tenant 
Windfall gain to landlord 
Purchasing Windfall loss to Windfall loss to tenant 
Tenant tenant 
Pre-rent control Windfall gain to landlord 
situation restored 
for landlord 
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assets are regarded as being riskless. Obviously we are delving into a 
real "can of worms''.^ 
Finally, the recent trap discussions should be related back to an 
older literature which broached the decontrol issue. Writings by Harrod 
(1947) and Paish (1950) of thirty years ago are mainly concerned with 
bringing about an efficient distribution of available housing without 
interfering with the distribution of income created by the rent control. 
The essence of Harrod's scheme is the repeal of rent control associated 
with a tax on landlords equal to the difference between market and con-
trolled rent. This tax revenue would be paid to existing tenants for 
a period of ten years, irrespective of whether they remained in the 
original dwelling. Paish's scheme was a considerable modification of 
Harrod's plan and we will not concern ourselves with the details. 
Harrod seems to miss the point about the wealth tr^ansfer involved 
with rent control. Harrod argues that straight decontrol "would involve 
a hardship- on those dwelling in rent-restricted houses, on account of 
their expectation of a continuation of the restriction, and a quite un-
warranted windfall profit to the landlords" (p.122). Neutze (1978) has 
recently expressed a similar view, arguing that "repeal gives a capital 
gain to landlords at the expense of their tenants" (p.107). Neither 
writer seems to have the transitional loss-gain argument in mind. 
However Paish does seem to express the germ of the argument put 
by Shreiber and Tabriztchi. Paish contends that "[w]hile. some of the 
landlords who would benefit from repeal have no doubt suffered unjustly 
..., there are others, such as the recent purchasers of rent-restricted 
property at the "sitting-tenant" price, who would make large windfall 
profits" (p.9). 
1 The actual importance of these trades is an empirical matter. Most 
rent control laws make trades in tenancies rather difficult. 
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The argument in favour of retaining costly interventions, like rent 
control, on the grounds of their being a "transitional gains (losses) 
trap" is, on the surface, appealing. Close scrutiny reveals that its 
attraction is very superficial. The structure of the argument is built 
on shifting sands. Even if the structure were stable, it need not be 
regarded as being a trap. Only if viewed with the help of a distri-
butional value judgement will it appear as a trap. Traditionally, 
economists have been very uneasy about basing policy prescriptions on 
a distributional value judgement. Their lack of ease in this regard 
is more a strength than a weakness. 
6. Conclusions 
The overall thesis is that rent control is not a policy that can 
be recommended to governments confronted with imaginary or real problems 
in the rental housing market. In this chapter the thesis has been 
supported by demonstrating that there is no substance in any of the 
arguments for introducing or retaining rent control, even in wartime. 
Previously,the thesis has been built up by examining the consequences 
of rent control (and of rental market regulation). In the next chapter 
the approach is to compare rent control with some other alternative 
policies (like housing allowances and public housing provision). 
CHAPTER 10 
THE RELATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE RENTAL HOUSING 
MARKET POLICIES 1 
In the last chapter rent control was considered per se and found 
to be undesirable on a cost-benefit basis. However, if we have as an 
objective the desire to transfer wealth to low-income tenants (for 
whatever reason) then rent control must be considered as one of the 
means by which this may be achieved (even if it is a very imprecise 
means of achieving this end). The other means at hand are, basically, 
housing allowances and public housing provision. The three broad types 
of policy must be analysed and compared. If policy-makers are going 
to use the housing market as a medium of redistribution, society has 
an interest in them applying the most efficient available means to their 
task. Rent control is certainly not this means. 
1. Housing Allowances 
Prior to the elaborate housing allowance experiments in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Australia, economists thought of housing 
allowances'in terms of vouchers. The traditional voucher entails the 
government issuing'a pertificate entitling the recipient to purchase 
a stated number of dollars worth of housing. The landlord supplying 
the housing would be able to "cash the certificate in" for the stated 
amount. Olsen (1969a) regards such certificates as probably "the most 
efficient method of subsidizing the housing of low income families ...." 
(p.619). Olsen also reports the large-scale issuance of such 
certificates in the United States during the Depression. 
Myers (1975) reports the change of emphasis in United States rental 
housing policies in the late 1960s. The movement was towards "demand-
side" policies and a large housing allowance experiment ensued. This 
1 Much of the material in this chapter is based on two papers published 
in the Australian Journal of Management - Albon (1977b and 1979b). 
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was a far cry from the traditional voucher scheme. Similarlythe 
Australian experiment (1976-78) toyed with a.concept of housing 
allowances which lacked the simplicity and attraction of the traditional 
voucher. The United Kingdom scheme, reported by Ricketts (1976), is 
perhaps one of the most convoluted "welfare" schemes ever devised by 
man. 
The Priorities Review Staff (1975) in its excellent Report on 
Housing, supported a traditional voucher scheme if a minimum income 
scheme could not be introduced. The PRS wanted the scheme to apply to 
both renters and purchasers, advocating "means-tested vouchers which 
those on low-incomes could use for renting or purchasing accommodation 
from private or public suppliers [at market prices]" (p.100). The 
Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975) also supported some form of 
housing allowance scheme. 
The now-defunct Australian experiment was the responsibility of 
the now-defunct Department of Environment, Housing and Community Deve-
lopment (EHCD). The experiment was initially known as the Housing 
Allowance Voucher Experiment (HAVE) and later as simply the Housing 
Allowance Experiment (HAE). The EHCD seemed to have difficulty deciding 
whether to use HAVE or HAE. In late 1977 it used both names in its in-
formation booklet (EHCD, 1977). The decision not to use vouchers had 
been taken (or dictated) as early as 1976. The name HAE seems to be 
most appropriate in this light. 
The Federal Government had announced the advent of an experiment 
in 1976. This announcement seemed to herald a radical change in Govern-
ment policy towards low-income housing. One may have anticipated a 
major move from subsidized public housing (a "supply-side" policy) to 
housing allowances ("demand-side policy"). This was not to be, as the 
experiment was terminated in June 1978. 
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The United States lineage of the experiment was obvious from the « 
beginning. An American who was involved in the United States experi-
ments, Arnold Katz, headed the project. Katz brought with him a 
prejudice for a housing allowance concept involving some tieing of 
benefits to housing consumption.^ 
Having begun with a complicated idea, the HAVE team within EHCD 
seemed to be baffled by the implications. While an elaborate experiment 
was planned, EHCD did not really seem aware of v^at to expect. For 
example, the administrators did not seem to appreciate the likelihood 
of tenant-landlord coalition formation. Nor did they recognise the 
likely importance of moving costs on recipients' reactions. The HAVE 
team also seemed to be dogged by internal dissension with some of the 
staff being extremely pessimistic about supply response and, it seems, 
opposed to the whole housing allowance concept. The original head of 
the experiment, Arnold Katz, returned to the United States prematurely 
and the headship was taken over by Dr. John Paterson. 
Because the actual form was to be decided by an experiment, and 
because the experiment was aborted, it is not known with certainty how 
any Australian housing allowance scheme would have looked. In Chapter 3 
we assumed a particular form for the purposes of analysing tenant 
benefits which would ensue. A perusal of papers by Katz and Jackson 
(1978) and Paterson (1977) plus the two EHCD infor-mation booklets (1976 
and 1977) seems to bear out the bias in favour of the form assumed in 
Chapter 3. Accordingly we will persist with an analysis of that type 
of scheme and will carry over the assumptions and notation from the 
earlier chapter. 
Consider Figure 10.1 which compares the choice sets presented by 
the traditional voucher, the HAE-type scheme and a lump-sum income 
1 Katz did not seem to understand that the scheme he supported did 
actually involve tieing. See Katz and Jackson (1978, pp.199-200) 
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FIGURE 10.1 
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grant. .If the recipient were to fully utilize the HAE-type payment 
available (i.e. receive S-.25Y in payment), the diagram is drawn such 
that each scheme entails exactly the same payment. Measured in terms 
of housing services this payment is equal to ab or ge. The choice sets 
each have one common segment, ec. The HAE-type scheme has the most 
restrictive choice set, agec. The traditional voucher allows choices 
along abec and the lump-sum income grant presents the recipient \-n.th 
an opportunity locus of dbec. Another way of looking at it is to 
examine what is excluded of dbec. The lump-sum income supplement 
excludes none of dbec, the traditional voucher excludes db and the HAE-
type scheme disallows dbe. Yet another way of viewing these situations 
is in terms of tenant benefits (as measured by Hicks' equivalent 
variation) relative to the payment. For the lump-sum subsidy, tenant 
benefits and the lump-sum are always equal. This will be true for all 
three if the recipient ended up along ec. The probability of tenant 
benefits being less than the payment increases as the policy moves.from 
the lump-sum income supplement (with zero probability) through the 
traditional voucher to the HAE-type scheme. 
For some reason or another, the Australian housing allowance 
experimenters wanted to tie housing allowance payments to the recipients' 
consumption of housing more than would be entailed by a traditional 
voucher scheme. In short, the EHCD was opting for a less efficient 
scheme which would tend to raise the demand for housing more.^ 
One aspect the administrators neglected to consider was the 
possibility of coalition formation as a means of untieing payments. 
Suppose the best a tenant could do from the HAE-type scheme was a 
"corner solution" at point e with the consequence that his subjective 
valuation of the payment was below its dollar value. If the tenant 
1 This is difficult to understand if there was a real concern about 
the degree of supply response. 
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could, without cost, secure the same payment and consume housing 
according to his preferences, he would be able to find a position along 
segment be.^ The rental of a dwelling which would put him on be would 
be less than standard rent, S. Therefore the tenant would have an 
incentive to make an arrangement with his landlord to artificially 
charge a rent of S. The tenant might physically pay S and then be 
refunded the difference between standard and actual rent. Under these 
circumstances the HAE-type scheme would be effectively equivalent to 
the traditional voucher. However, there may be "flies in the 
ointment". 
Firstly, the landlord may require a consideration, L, for co-
operating. According to Tullock (1971), it would be zero. He states 
that if "the market is highly competitive (even if not perfectly 
competitive) it seems likely that the individual would be able to find a 
landlord who is willing to [make a full rebate of the difference between 
standard and actual rent]" (p.218). However, there may be circumstances 
where L is-positive. One such situation is where any penalty from 
forming a coalition is borne by the landlord, perhaps in the form of 
a fine. L would.then be a positive function of the probability of 
detection and the magnitude of the fine. Another situation where L is 
positive could occur when a landlord, having ensnared a tenant, demands 
a share of the payment knowing that it is costly for the tenant to move. 
On the other hand, it is also costly for the landlord to change tenants. 
Finally, there could be costs to the landlord in administering a tenancy 
where a rent rebate is being paid, and such costs would be met by the 
tenant. If L is positive, be will not be feasible. The opportunity 
locus will shift down by L so that the choice set would become ajfec. 
1 For convenience, we are assuming that he does not wish to consume 
less than S - .25Y worth of housing. We do not have to assume this. 
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Secondly, there may be penalties for cheating imposed on tenants « 
caught in the act. At the experimental stage, households were to be 
excluded from the scheme for, among other things, filling out 
"intentionally untruthful" Household Report Forms (EHCD, 1977, p.11). 
Households could get back in the scheme by correcting their mistake 
within six months, but they would not have been eligible for any back 
payments. Coalitions would probably have fallen into this category of 
transgression as the information sought in the Household Report Form 
was that on which the calculation of the actual payment would have been 
based. Such a threat would not have concerned those families who would 
only participate with a coalition anyway. However, those with a lower 
opportunity cost of not forming a coalition would be deterred if the 
probability of detection was sufficiently high. 
Another factor largely neglected by EHCD was the cost of moving. 
Both physical and psychic moving costs can be incurred.. Denoting tenant 
benefits available from a family's initial position as BQ, those from 
the best HAE position as B j . moving costs as M and the market interest 
rate as d, we have 
(B, - B^) Z (1 + d) > M (10.1) 
^ i=l 
as the condition for moving in the case of a family with an n-period 
horizon. There could be cases where the family initially consumes close 
to S/Py units of housing services such that a high HAE payment with 
a high valuation is available without moving. The cost of moving would 
outweigh the present value of the extra tenant benefit attainable by 
moving. The moving condition might also not hold for families who 
initially consume little housing services and for which such services 
yield a low marginal utility. In the non-participation without a 
coalition case, the LHS of (10.1) is negative. For those who would just 
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participate in the absence of moving costs, B^ - Bq is very lev/ and 
if (10.1) does not hold, they become non-participants unless via a 
coalition. The existence of moving costs therefore tends to enlarge 
the group who would not lawfully participate in HAE, and to raise the 
potential number of coalitions. For a family with a zero marginal 
utility of housing, moving costs are irrelevant as they will not move. 
Under circumstances where a tenant has to move anyway, moving costs 
are irrelevant to the opportunity cost of not forming a coalition. 
Where there is zero risk to the tenant, this opportunity cost is the 
difference between the maximum attainable payment (receivable as an 
untied income supplement) and the best attainable tenant benefit without 
a coalition and L, all expressed as a present value. That is, 
n 
[(S - .25Y) - (B + L)] Z (1 + d) (10.2) 
1=1 
The moving condition for a tenant wishing to form a riskless coalition 
is 
' n _. 
[(S - .25Y) - (B +'L)] Z (1 + d) > M (10.1a) 
i=l 
• 
If (10.1a) does not hold, a tenant could still seek to make an arrange-
ment with his current landlord. 
The case for preferring the traditional voucher to the HAE-type 
scheme is very strong. There is no faultless or unqualified argument 
for tieing subsidization to housing consumption. The traditional 
voucher implies only a very small probability^ of the householder 
voluntarily attaining a tied solution and must be preferred. Tieing 
involves costs - efficiency costs. These are greater under HAE. Even 
1 This probability depends on the size of the payment. If this is very 
large it may entail "too much" housing consumption and cause tenant 
benefit to be less than the payment - except via a costless 
coalition. 
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if coalitions form to reduce these efficiency costs, the HAE-type scheme 
can only approach the efficiency of the traditional voucher. Finally, 
the HAE-type scheme raises the demand for housing more than the 
traditional voucher. This latter aspect must be a worry to the supply 
pessimists. 
The issue of supply response has probably dominated the Australian 
debate about HAE. Supply pessimism has been a feature of both Aust-
ralian and overseas writings. United States' supply pessimists include 
Myers (1975) and Hartman and Keating (1974). The latter writers argue 
that the advent of a housing allowance scheme will simply raise rents 
which are very "sticky" in a downwards direction. To prevent this 
happening, Hartman and Keating suggest that rent control should be 
imposed simultaneously with the introduction of housing allowances.^ 
In 1976, Patricia Apps (1976) began the Australian debate with 
the comment that if supply is price-inelastic "the subsidy will be 
passed on to landlords in higher rents (in which dase the experiment 
fails)" and the assertion that this result is so obvious that it 
"requires rjo expensive experiment". Jay (1977) quotes a group called 
SHELTER as claiming that the scheme would result in rent increases of 
the amount of the allowance. "The resultant increase in average rents 
will either force an increase in the maximum rent allowable or force 
tenants to pay for these higher rents. This rent/voucher spiral can 
be expected to occur without any significant increases in the supply 
of housing services ...." Neutze (1978, p.105) thought that "it [HAVE 
or HAE] might simply result in rents being bid up by the amount of the 
allowance so that most of the benefits go to the (landlord) owners of 
low-income rental housing". Robert Carter (1977), in his study of the 
Prahran Local Government Area, came out in favour of "[a]ttacking 
1 To my knowledge this has not been suggested for Australia. This is 
surprising. Adoption of the Hartman and Keating plan would probably 
mean the death-knell for a housing allowance scheme. 
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deficient housing demand in poorer housing areas" but warned that 
"[t]here will be localities in which complementary policies aimed at 
ensuring an increase in supply will be necessary if the vouchers are 
to lead to an improvement in housing standards rather than just an 
increase in rents" (p.2A). David Kiefer has also written about the 
experiment (see Kiefer, 1978). Kiefer's treatment of the supply 
question is rather unusual as it seems to imply that rents will rise 
most in submarkets where there is an excess supply of low-income 
housing. This conclusion is counterintuitive. 
If there are grounds for supply pessimism, the case for a 
traditional voucher is enhanced further. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, there is little basis for a belief that supply will be 
unresponsive, especially in the long-run. 
Finally, there is the question of administration of the different 
types of scheme. In issuing traditional vouchers, the bureaucracy would 
only require accurate information about the recipient's Income. Contrast 
this with the requirements of the sort of scheme which probably would 
have followed" HAE. Actual rent and standard rent would have needed to 
have been known, in addition to income. A housing "police force" would 
•; 
have been needed .to seek out the far greater number of cheats. The 
determination of "standard rent" in localities would have been an 
immense task. In addition to varying by locality, "standard rent" vrould 
have varied with family size. EHCD Intended to undertake "[r]ental 
surveys .... in the three experimental sites prior to the commencement 
of the experiment in order to determine the average cost in the local 
housing market of dwellings of different size" (EHCD, 1976, p. 19). The 
target group of the scheme comprised about 200,000 income units in 1973, 
if this group is taken to include private and public renters with less 
than 120 per cent of Henderson poverty-line Incomes (see Commission of 
Inquiry into Poverty, 1975, p.164). The potential for building a 
bureaucratic edifice around any such scheme was enormous. 
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2. Public Housing 
Apart from rent control, the predominant form of intervention in 
the Australian rental housing market has been the provision of public 
housing, until recently, at rents considerably below market levels. 
While the level of provision has been nowhere near as high as in the 
United Kingdom, much more has been done in Australia compared with the 
United States.^ 
The history of Australian involvement in public housing is set out 
in several places, including Jones (1972), Neutze (1978) and Pugh 
(1976). The basis of the post-war activity has been the series of 
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreements (CSHA's) by which loan money, at 
concessional interest rates, has been channelled from the Commonwealth 
to the States for purposes of public dwelling construction. Rents have 
usually been set on a basis which covers "costs". For various reasons 
(cheap loans, use of historic cost, no taxation, etc.) rents have tended 
to be well below market levels. However, the 1978 CSHA provides for 
a move to market-related rents but with a continuation of the rental 
? rebate schemes for those tenants on very low incomes. 
Australian public housing provision has worked in a fashion which 
is far from ideal. It has been plagued by various inefficiencies, 
inequity and corruption. This need not have been the case as solutions 
to most of these problems were - and are - available. 
The inequity of the public housing programmes was forcefully 
brought home by the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975). The 
1 In the United Kingdom over 30 per cent of the housing stock is 
local authority owned (see Robinson, 1979, p.116). In Australia, 
the Government had built 9.5 per cent of the 1971 stock but only 
owned 5.4 per cent of it (see Neutze, 1978, p.94). The United 
States figure was about 1 per cent in 1967 (see Bish, 1969, 
p.432). 
2 In the Australian Capital Territory, Government rent increases have 
been very large relative to private rent increases in recent years 
such that they are now very close to market rents. 
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results of a 1973 survey showed that of 183,000 Australian public house 
tenancies, 132,000 (or 72 per cent) of the income units had incomes of 
at least 120 per cent of the "poverty line". At the same time, 125,000 
"Henderson poor" families rented in the private market, receiving no 
direct benefit from public housing. A detailed analysis of data compiled 
during the 197A/75 Expenditure Survey gives further evidence of the extent 
to which public housing fails to accommodate the poor. This analysis was 
conducted by R.W. Archer of the (Federal) Department of Housing and 
Construction. Many people were (or are) poor when they enter public 
housing, but circumstances change in many cases. However, because of 
low rents a large number of tenants find they are better off staying put 
rather than adjusting their housing consumption to their changed 
circumstances. 
One of the inefficiencies of public housing has already been 
covered in Chapter 3. Only by a fluke will a public housing offer not 
entail an efficiency loss due to quantity constraint. The less the 
range of offer and the less flexible the attitude to moves, the greater 
will be the efficiency cost.. These costs probably have been quite high 
in Australia. . ' ^ 
A closely related inefficiency is the effect on labour mobility. 
This has certainly been a major consideration in the United Kingdom. 
In Australia both intra- and inter-state mobility will have been 
effected by the way public housing has been provided. Again efficiency 
costs will result. 
A third possible inefficiency is due to bad administration and 
corruption. Where a bureaucracy is involved in large-scale land 
purchasing and letting tenders for dwelling construction, there is scope 
for maladministration. One need not dwell on the rather dubious record 
of the Victorian Housing Commission in regard to land purchases. Land 
and construction costs have probably been considerably higher than for 
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private developers. The bureaucracies have been protected from compe-
titive market pressures, a situation not compatible with cost-
minimization. 
A final inefficiency relates to the generation of negative 
externalities, especially where public housing has been concentrated 
in large estates or in high-rise developments. This has been a feature 
of Victorian practice where large numbers of people who "cannot cope" 
have been herded together to form unsatisfactory communities. These 
aspects have been discussed by writers such as Friedman (1962) for the 
United States and Brennan (1973) and Pugh (1976) for Australia.^ 
There are means of overcoming many of the problems associated with 
public housing. If it were the case that there was a minimum income 
scheme or some similar policy in operation,^ the solution would be 
to disband the housing commissions and trusts and to sell the existing 
stock, at market prices, giving first offer of sale to existing tenants. 
If we wish to persist with public housing there are various ways of 
improving the, efficiency and equity of its provision. 
The basic remedy is to make the public housing providers far more 
responsive to market pressures. In some respects the South Australian 
Housing Trust (SAHT) has been more attuned to the market than the other 
State authorities. Rather than being purely involved in acquiring stock 
through construction, the SAHT has purchased existing private stock in 
diverse locations. This has meant that the SAHT has been able to better 
match people to places and to avoid some of the worst difficulties due 
to concentration. Stretton (1974) claims that "[o]ne good way to keep 
public housing managers sensitive to what the customers really want is 
1 Reference is also made to the discussion of externalities in Chapter 1. 
2 Always assuming that society wants to redistribute wealth to low-
income persons. 
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to have^thera compete in the open market as well as building houses ..." 
(p.66). But the competition must go further than this. 
Somehow the housing has to be allocated in an efficient and 
equitable manner. However, if public housing is to remain a medium for 
redistribution towards low-income people, this is not an easy task. 
The difficulty is one of divorcing the degree of subsidization from the 
consumption of housing. Consider the case of a rental rebate scheme 
together with market rents. If the rental rebate scheme acts such that 
public tenants do not pay more than some percentage of their income in 
rent there is an incentive to "over-consume housing".^ It could be 
very difficult to devise a rebate scheme which did not have this 
feature.^ In the case where public housing tenants paying market 
rents were allowed to participate in any HAE-type scheme, the sort of 
problem we have already discussed would arise, except that the upper 
limit to the amount of subsidy is bounded. 
Paterson (1975) has suggested another improvement involving an 
auction system where tenants bid for public house-space but where the 
proportion of their bid that they actually pay is related to their 
income. Paterson sees this as a market solution for which he has a 
strong preference: "I am an admirer of the market, not only on 
efficiency grounds, but also in its capacity as a check on social power. 
When allocation is by non-market means, discretionary power is auto-
matically conferred on someone to make arbitrary choices between 
alternative claimants on a given resource" (pp.33-34, original italics). 
Paterson's scheme is superficially attractive. Re-bidding would occur 
annually and proportions of bids actually paid would be adjusted. As 
people get richer they would be induced out of public housing, contrary 
1 Unless satiation set in the incentive would be to consume as much 
housing services as possible. 
2 There is, however, a big gap between individuals' wishes and what 
the bureaucrats will concede. 
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to the Current situation. Because the system would be like an ad 
valoren subsidy, there would be an excess burden (efficiency cost). 
It is difficult however to compare this efficiency cost with that of 
the present means of allocation (chance and favouritism?). My own 
intuition suggests that Paterson's scheme would be more efficient. 
3. Other Rental Market Policies 
The major rental market policies are certainly rent control, 
housing allowances and public housing. These three types of measure 
do not exhaust the possible methods of intervention. Here are some 
others:-
Direct Subsidization of Landlords. While housing allowances involve 
the subsidization of tenants' demand for rental housing, it is possible 
to subsidize supply. If the aim were to increase the amount of housing 
services supplied at a lower net price to tenants, a subsidy to land-
lords on the basis of housing services may be an appropriate policy. 
Such a subsidy has not been prominent in discussions about rental market 
housing policy but seems to have certain attractions if the aim is to 
lower the price of rental housing without reducing its supply. 
Taxation Incentives to Landlords. A policy possibility which has been 
discussed is similar in essence to direct subsidization of landlords. 
This policy would involve giving landlords a discriminatory tax incen-
tive such as a rapid depreciation allowance. A scheme of this kind has 
operated in the United States (see Starr, 1979) and has recently been 
considered in Australia. There is talk that any Australian scheme 
would only apply to new rental housing, making the consequences 
difficult to predict. At present, landlords' rental incomes are taxed 
and usual business deductions - including interest payments - are 
allowed. While there is equity of treatment compared with businesses, 
there is horizontal inequity of treatment of ov-ner-occupiers (whose imputed 
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income i s not taxed and who cannot deduct mortgage i n t e r e s t ) arid landlords , 
Taxation Allowances f o r Tenants. The Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 
(1975) suggested the use of a " rent tax c r e d i t " f o r people below the 
poverty l i n e . The Commission's reasoning on the e f f e c t s of such a tax 
c r e d i t i s , however, highly quest ionable . The Commission argued that 
" [ t j o provide f i n a n c i a l a s s i s tance to those who continue to rent , in 
a manner which w i l l b e n e f i t them and not jus t be passed on to their 
landlords in higher r ents i s not easy . . . [A]ny rent supplement re lated 
to rent paid may have th is e f f e c t . . . . [but ] . . . . the supplementary 
Ass i s tance and tax c r e d i t proposals discussed below can achieve high 
take up r a t e s and provide ass i s tance to renters without corresponding 
increases in r e n t s " (p .162 ) . The Commission seems to be arguing that 
a rent tax c r e d i t w i l l not r a i s e demand while a d i r e c t rent subsidy 
w i l l . Fundamental economic l o g i c suggests that bo'th forms of subsidy 
w i l l r a i s e demand and that i t i s an increase in demand that w i l l r a i s e 
rents - at l e a s t in the short -run. Trying to push the subsidy in through 
the back door w i l l not make any d i f f e r e n c e . The Commission a l s o makes 
a further dubious statement when i t a s s e r t s that i f a rent tax c r e d i t 
were to be paid on an annual bas is " i t w i l l be l e s s l i k e l y to f low 
through into increased rents " ( p . 163 ) . 
4 . Factors Important in Deciding Between A l t e r n a t i v e P o l i c i e s 
The fundamental o b j e c t i v e of renta l housing market p o l i c i e s would 
seem to be to r e d i s t r i b u t e wealth to low-income tenants.^ Housing 
i s the medium of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . Why low-income tenants are singled 
1 There may a lso be " e x t e r n a l i t y " arguments f o r intervent ion which 
are discussed below. 
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out from low-income poeple in general is something of a mystery. 
However, we will play the game and confine ourselves to redistribution 
through the housing market. 
Apart from tenants (all tenants, not just low-income tenants), all 
landlords and a l l taxpayers have an Interest in rental housing market 
policies . While remembering the objective of such policies is "to 
transfer wealth to low-income tenants we wi l l invoke the "dollar-is-
a-dollar principle" in adding up costs and benefits . A dollar transferred 
to a tenant is a dollar transferred from someone else. Our objective 
is to minimize the costs of any given transfer. 
In deciding between the competing policies, several matters need 
to be considered which involve both theoretical and empirical concerns. 
The f irst consideration is the very vexed issue of tieing benefits to 
consumption of a particular commodity - in this case , housing services. 
This issue is very important, especially in relation to public housing 
.V 
and housing allowances. 
(a) The Issue of "T ieing" 
The issue of redistribution-in-kind versus lump-sum transfers has 
assumed great importance in recent years. From the recipient 's point 
of view , redistribution-in-kind would only be regarded as inferior to 
a lump-sum transfer if it caused a substitution effect ag well as an 
income ef fect . If the recipient 's util ity level only is considered, 
and a recipient family is unanimous about the form of its uti l ity 
function, it will always value a lump-sum transfer as greater than or 
equal to a tied-transfer of equal monetary value (at given prices) . 
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However, arguments for transfers-in-kind have been forcibly put in « 
recent times. Firstly, a considerable literature on "merit goods" has 
arisen since Musgrave (1959) introduced the term. Subsidization in-kind 
has been justified if the medium of transfer is a merit good which is 
by definition, not valued by the recipient as much as it should be. 
Secondly, if the donor's welfare is taken into account, it may be the 
case that external benefits generated by the recipient's consumption of 
a particular commodity justifies tieing subsidization to the commodity 
which creates the goods-specific externality. 
There are, then, three arguments for transfers-in-kind. These are: 
the merit good argument; the goods-specific externality argument; and 
the argument, implied above, that recipient families may not be 
unanimous about their utility functions. Each will be treated in turn, 
paying special attention to the implications for housing. 
Housing has often been singled out as a merit good. For example, 
Neutze (1978) has asserted that "housing is a merit good, and its 
value is not adequately reflected in conventional economic calculations 
(Stretton, 1974)" (pp.99-100). Merit good arguments, if they are not 
simple expressions of value judgements, involve either deficiencies of 
information or externalities.^ In other words, if merit goods have 
any significance it is only that of a sub-set of market failures. In 
the present context, information deficiency is unimportant and we will 
concentrate attention on the externality argument for using housing 
1 Culyer (1971, p.548) probably overstates the situation when he 
asserts that "(de)merit wants must involve externality relationships" 
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as a medium of income redistribution. The term "merit good" will 
be avoided. 
Economists used to be fairly unanimous about the optimality of 
lump-sum, untied transfers and this belief was based on the sovereignty 
of (recipient) consumers. However, according to Daly and Giertz (1976, 
p . 1 7 9 ) , "[r]ecent work in this area has demonstrated that unrestricted 
lump-sum transfers are not necessarily superior to restricted types if 
the motivating factor for the transfer is a goods-specific externality". 
Note the requirement that the externality be of a goods-specific kind. 
If the donors were concerned about the recipients' general well-being 
(a general consumption externality) the lump-sum transfer would remain 
optimal. No substitution effect would be,required. 
Those advocating transfer systems which "distort" 'recipients ' 
preferences would seem to have two tasks. Firstly , they would need to 
demonstrate the existence of goods-specific externalities as being 
common amongst the population of non-recipient tax-payers. Secondly, 
there is the thorny question of the limits of the Paretian framework. 
Should goods-specific externalities be regarded as "legitimate" 
externalities which require some form of government action (subject 
to a cost-benefit analysis on that action)? While few would argue that 
production externalities (e .g . the smoky factory) do not fit into 
the Paretian framework, there are many who would, at the opposite 
extreme, argue against the inclusion of moral questions (e .g . homo-
sexuality amongst consenting adults) . Goods-specific consumption 
externalities comprise a set of relationships which intersect the set 
of "moral questions". The consumption of pornography is an element in 
the intersecting set. 
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Arrow (1970) has argued that " if an individual expends 
resources in supporting legislation regulating another's behaviour, 
it must be assumed that the behaviour affects his utility" (p.67). 
Arrow, however, then equivocates by his statement that certain "crimes 
without victim" would be outlawed. Tullock (1971) has strongly 
suggested that laws against "crimes without victim" should be repealed. 
Tullock specifically includes coalition formation in the face of a 
tied subsidy amongst his "crimes without victim". McLure (1968) has 
suggested that cases where "distributional objectives are framed in 
terms of specific goods instead of in terms of general purchasing 
power" (p.479) deserve the same fate as all so-called "merit wants" -
relegation to a "normatively empty box" into which the economist only 
delves at his peril. A third school argues that goods-specific 
externalities do belong in the Paretian framework. For example, Olsen 
(1971), in .reply to Tullock, does place housing-specific subsidies in 
the Paretian framework and ar-gues that landlord-tenant coalition 
formation is no-t a victimless crime - those who provide the subsidies 
are the victims. Olsen also points out that if the costs of enforcement 
exceed the net benefits^, cash grants become optimal. 
The issue of goods-specific externalities is both a "philosophical" 
and an empirical matter. Whether one places these externalities in the 
Paretian framework or not probably depends on whether one is a "libertarian", 
a "paternalist" or whatever. If these externalities are accepted there 
are then two further obstacles to the advocacy of "tied" transfers -
1 Benefits to donors minus costs to recipients, 
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Are the externalities important in a quantitative sense and are the costs 
of policing less than the net benefits? Accordingly, we conclude that 
there is a case for "tied" transfers if we adopt a certain ("paternalistic"?) 
philosophical attitude and if we also have empirical evidence of a wide-
spread and strong belief amongst donors that recipients "should" be tied 
and if the costs of enforcing the tieing arrangement are lower than net 
benef its. 
For its part the EHCD asserted two objectives for HAE - an income 
supplement objective as well as a housing-specific aim of increasing recip-
ients' consumption (see EHCD, 1976). The EHCD did not expend any effort in 
arguing why it favoured bending preferences. Perhaps that was not its role. 
The third argument for a tied subsidy is a lack of internal 
unanimity about a family's utility function. It is often asserted that 
the husband is a beer drinking chain-smoking gambler who controls the 
pay-packet and ignores the plight of the wife and children. The wife 
and children desire, among other things, better housing. The only way 
to ensure the transfer is not expended on beer, cigarettes and the 
horses is to tie it to consumption of a commodity like housing.^ 
This argument seems to assume a great deal. For example, it implies 
that the state -knows the family's utility function better than the 
husband. It also assumes that it is common for low-income husbands to 
behave in the manner asserted. It would be foolhardy to penalize the 
many for the sake of the few. A tieing arrangement cannot always ensure 
the desired effect as recipients may find ways of undoing the knot. 
Finally, if the husband is so terrible the solution might be to channel 
an untied transfer directly to the wife. In Australia, family 
allowances are paid to the wife. 
were right to see housing as an asset J ^e monopolised, 
shared well. Unlike money income, it can t l^^l'll e-
or spent on a bigger car, or °ver-committed to hire purchase a^ ^^^ 
ments; and deserting husbands find it hard to take 
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(b) The Form of the Policies 
e 
It is not enough to talk about "public housing", "housing 
allowances" or "rent control" as if they were well-defined entities . 
As we have seen, these terms mean very different things to different 
people. This should serve to make us very careful to define exactly 
what we mean. If a commentator comes out in favour of "housing 
allowances" , for example, many questions should spring to mind. What 
groups are to receive the allowances - all tenants? low-income private 
tenants? public tenants? low-income purchasers? Is the allowance of 
the traditional voucher type or will payments be more dependent on 
housing consumption? How will pajnnents vary with the incomes of 
recipients? These and many other questions will arise . Similarly, if 
we began with "rent control" (see Chapter 2) or "public housing" (see 
section 2 of this chapter). 
(c) Elasticities of Supply and Demand 
The question of supply response is a central issue of rental 
housing market policy discussions. The supply pessimists would argue 
strongly against any demand-side policies which raised demand for 
private rental housing arguing that very l ittle new supply would be 
forthcoming and rents would tend to rise by the amount of the per unit 
subsidy.^ The pessimists would probably favour a policy like public 
housing provision as the only way to raise the stock of rental accommo-
dation for low-income people.^ A belief in a low rent elasticity 
of demand as well as a low elasticity of supply might even engender 
1 However, as noted in Chapter 4 , even if the total supply of housing 
is perfectly inelastic , an increase in demand for rental housing 
would not result in a pure rent inflation. 
2 Friedman (1962 , p . 179 ) has argued that public housing projects in 
the United States have actually reduced the total supply of rental 
accommodation - "The number of dwelling units destroyed in the course 
of erecting public housing projects has been far larger than the 
number of new dwelling units constructed". The question of public 
house construction "crowding out" private construction was explored 
briefly in Chapter 4. Some evidence for a "crowding out effect was 
found. 
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support for rent control. On the other hand, if we are sanguine about 
supply response, housing allowances become the only serious contender 
araongst the alternative types of policy. 
(d) General Equilibrium Implications 
The emphasis throughout this thesis has been on partial equilibrium 
analysis, although some general equilibrium considerations arose in the 
Appendix to Chapter 2 when considering the wider implications of rent 
control. However, general equilibrium considerations are important and 
the wider effects of policies may modify our feelings about their 
desirability. 
In the case of rent control type policies we were able to conclude 
that control is likely to raise the demand for (and price of) substitute 
accommodation but that this effect would only be temporary if entry was 
totally free in these other related markets. Rent control will have 
only short-run implications for others, unless there is a fear that 
controls may be extended. These short-run implications may be quite 
severe (as in Queanbeyan during the mid-1970s). The fear of recontrol 
might a l s o b e significant, as in New South Wales during the late fifties. 
The wider'effects of housing subsidies have been considered by 
Aaron (1972) using the results of general equilibrium incidence analysis 
developed by Harberger (see the review by McLure, 1975). Aaron summa-
rizes the general equilibrium effects of housing subsidies as follows: 
"Those who receive the subsidy are encouraged by reduced costs to 
consume more housing services. The total demand for a capital intensive 
product rises, driving up the return on capital relative to that of 
labor. As a result, the price of all capital intensive goods rises 
relative to that of all labor intensive goods to the benefit of con-
sumers who spend more of their incomes on labor intensive goods and to 
the detriment of those who spend less" (p.50). These general equili-
brium considerations may alter conclusions about the consequences of 
220. 
impleraenting a subsidy scheme. However, these general equilibrium 
effects are likely to be unimportant relative to the direct effects. 
In the case of public housing, there could be indirect benefits 
or costs to private renters. Again to quote Aaron, "if the availability 
of public housing reduces demand for unsubsidized housing more than it 
reduces supply, rents paid for low cost, unsubsidized housing \in.ll tend 
to decline" (p.121). If the public housing authorities built dwellings 
containing more housing services than would be built by private supp-
liers, private supply would be reduced more than private demand so that 
private rents would tend to rise. In the long-run, if supply is highly 
elastic, public housing would be a matter of indifference to private 
landlords. 
A final general equilibrium consideration relates to the effect 
of various policies on the supply of effort. While recognising that 
this is an issue of some importance it is not one that will be pursued 
here. Some, work on this problem has been done by Powell, Tulpule and 
Filmer (1977). . ' . 
» 
(e) Administrative Costs 
All rental housing policies entail administrative costs. In 
Chapter 7 we considered the costs of administering Canberra's rent 
control. Olsen (1972) has examined the administrative costs of rent 
control in New York City. In this chapter we considered aspects of the 
administration of both housing allowance and public housing schemes. 
In choosing between schemes, relative administration costs are an 
essential concern. Simple schemes are to be preferred as they minimize 
bureaucratic discretion and, therefore, help prevent elevation and 
growth of the bureau. A traditional voucher scheme seems to come out 
rather well on an intuitive comparison with other policy instruments. 
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5. Cqnclusions 
It is probably true that redistribution should occur on a 
general wealth-transfer basis - not through the medium of housing 
(rental or owner-occupied), food, medicine or any other commodity. 
To push this line of reasoning too far is, unfortunately, an ostrich-
like response. In-kind transfers are important and will almost 
certainly remain so. Housing, which some regard as being "special", 
is a prime target for those wishing to see commodity-specific 
redistribution. Rent control has had a good run in Australia over 
the past sixty-five years and is now due for compulsory retirement. 
No grounds for keeping it on have come to light. The younger 
contenders - housing allowances and public housing - both have 
attractions. If rental housing is to be a medium of redistribution 
then the traditional voucher is the suggested means. This conclusion 
happens to concur with that of the Priorities Review Staff (1975). 
CHAPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Rather than summarize the thesis chapter-by-chapter, the approach 
in this concluding chapter is to draw out the several major concerns 
or themes, making reference to the relevant chapters for elaboration. 
To some extent the ordering of the issues does not follow that of the 
chapters. Given the existence of recurrent themes and some discretion 
in the placement of chapters, this should not be surprising. 
1. The analysis is an adaptation of the neoclassical partial-
equilibrium approach. Certain variations from the basic analysis 
were found to be necessary to take into account the peculiarities 
of the housing market. Many of these factors are considered in 
a recent review by Maclennan (1979). Maclennan points out the 
"inadequacy of simple competitive models" (p.328) in analysing the 
housing market and reviews the recent work on the major peculia-
rities. These are basically the factors considered in Chapter 1. 
The success of the applications in this thesis should be judged 
by the explanatory power of the predictions. The empirical parts 
of the thesis attempt to test the worth of the theoretical 
approach. It is contended that the modified-neoclassical 
analytical approach has not been a failure and may, indeed, have 
been a little successful. 
2. There are two senses in which housing might be regarded as being 
"special". One of these senses is that considered above - the 
specialty of factors necessary in analysing the housing market. 
A second meaning is the assertion that housing is a particularly 
"meritorious" commodity deserving of special attention or subsidy. 
This contention is strongly disputed. Further, the case for inter-
vention in the (rental) housing market is very weak. On efficiency 
grounds there is no important market failure. On equity grounds 
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there is no particular reason why housing should be a medium of 
any redistribution. There are, indeed, good reasons why it should 
not. 
3. It was felt to be essential to tackle the question of supply 
response in rental (and other) housing. This is the subject-matter 
of Chapter 4. This is probably the most contentious issue in the 
housing debate. The United States evidence points to the expected 
result - a high "long-run" elasticity of supply with respect to 
rents. The attempt to estimate a supply function for Australian 
Capital Territory time-series data was neither a glorious success 
nor an unmitigated disaster. The indications from the analysis 
are supportive of a quite high "long-run" elasticity. 
4. Analysts of rent control have used approaches which range from the 
simplest partial-equilibrium demand and supply model to a variety 
of more sophisticated analyses. The analysis' must be tailored to 
the particular circumstances created by the legislation. For 
example, it is important to take cognizance of whether the "rent 
control" limits price per dwelling or price per housing service 
unit. Writers on rent control have tackled most of the approp-
riate issues. Chapter 2 reviews this literature and provides some 
critical comment. 
5. If rent control has any tangible objective it is to bestow benefits 
on tenants. Other rental housing market policies would seem to 
have the same objective. There are various conceptual and measure-
ment problems in relation to tenant benefits and these are discus-
sed in Chapter 3. A version of Hicks' equivalent variation is 
proposed for use in quantity-constrained situations and applied 
to cases of tenant benefits arising from rent control, housing 
allowances, public housing, urban renewal and other policies. Two 
alternative methods of attacking the problem of conceptualizing 
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tenant benefits, where there is a quantity constraint, are set 
out. Two possible Marshallian measures are also discussed. 
6. The central thesis can be stated as follows: Rent control is a 
"costly" redistributive device. Looked at in isolation, rent 
control has a ratio of costs to benefits in excess of one. Bene-
fits fall in a very haphazard manner. Compared with housing 
allowances and public housing (both implemented in an appropriate 
way), rent control is an inferior policy. No economic argument 
for introducing or retaining rent control could be found. If re-
distribution is to be carried out, housing should not be the 
medium. Some more general means of redistribution (like a negative 
income tax) is preferable. If housing is to be the medium - for 
whatever reason - rent control is not.the policy. These matters 
are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
7. The history of rent control legislation in Australia is reviewed 
(in Chapter 5) as a background to two case studies of rent control 
in Australia which allow us to focus on different aspects of the 
effects of this type of legislation. Chapter 6 deals with an 
entrenched system of control in post-war New South Wales. Major 
emphasis is on the conceptualization and estimation of the capital 
value of a controlled tenancy which is found to be very large -
$2,500 in 1960 (1960 dollars) on average. Chapter 7 examines rent 
control in the Australian Capital Territory, 1973-1976. This 
system never became entrenched, but still had the classic effects 
expected of rent control. The relationships between the (control-
led) Canberra and (uncontrolled) Queanbeyan rental markets are 
explored at some length. 
8. A relatively new phenomenon in the area of landlord and tenant 
legislation is the advent of "rental market regulation" which can 
be distinguished from "rent control", despite some over-lapping 
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elements. Chapter 8 reviews different instances of rental market 
regulation in Australia and abroad, and assesses the likely short-
run and long-run implications of this type of intervention. 
Evidence for a "fear of recontrol" is drawn from Australian 
experience in the 1950s. Rental market regulation is not 
recommended as a solution to the problems of low-income tenants. 
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